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ABSTRACT 
ACQUIRING THE TOOLS OF GRAND STRATEGY:  
THE US NAVY'S LCS AS A CASE STUDY 
 
Sean P. Murphy 
Old Dominion University, 2017 
Director: Dr. Regina Karp 
 
Grand strategy is about how states allocate resources and employ these resources to 
achieve desired political conditions. In examining the match between desired ends and available 
ways and means, an often-overlooked subject is how the specific tools of grand strategy are 
forged.  One of these tools is the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), a Major Defense Acquisition 
Program (MDAP) that started in 2000.  LCS remains a controversial and often unpopular 
program with many stakeholders to this day.  This study examines how the means of grand 
strategy, in this case a new ship class, are acquired. It also looks at how these means are 
employed (ways) to achieve the desired outcomes (ends) and the feedback loop between means, 
ways, and ends.  The initial portion of the study examines how the U.S. Department of Defense 
and Department of the Navy formally acquire systems or “systems of systems.” The second 
portion of the study examines the design, construction, and fielding of the LCS class or the 
attainment of Initial Operational Capability (IOC).  The final portion analyzes the design, 
construction, and introduction of the LCS into the fleet in terms of the three models used by 
Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow in Essence of Decision; the Rational Actor Model (RAM), 
Organizational Behavior, and Governmental Politics – Models I, II, and III respectively.  The 
hypothesis is that individual personalities may have more influence than any of these models 
account for and that instances of individual impact may offer more nuanced insights into these 
models of state behavior.  This study reveals that the process of evolutionary acquisition and 
spiral development caused increased risk in the time-line for achieving Final Operational 
     
 
Capacity (FOC) of LCS.  It also provides insight into the reaction and adaption of a large 
organization to changes in its environment.  This study does not however reveal strong evidence 
to support the hypothesis of individual personalities significantly influencing decision making or 
action taking compared to organizations in Models I-III.  The details of individual participation 
and internal deliberations are obscured by security and proprietary rules which privileges models 
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INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
INTRODUCTION 
This work started out as an investigation of the research question, “Do the government 
decision models presented by Graham Allison in Essence of Decision, sufficiently explain 
government behavior?”  The hypothesis is the individuals have more impact and influence in 
government decisions and outcomes than the three models give them credit for thus making the 
three models insufficient for explaining and predicting outcomes.  The U.S. federal acquisition 
process and more specifically the Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition process serves as an 
excellent physical proxy for comparing the theoretical constructs developed by Allison.  While 
acknowledging that if one strictly adheres to the tenets of international relations one must 
examine the overarching international system or structure, there is value in analyzing at the sub-
systemic or national level.  There is also value in looking for a more nuanced explanation of state 
and national government behaviors, choices, and decision making if we attempt to un-pack the 
so-called “black boxes”1 that are used to represent a “state” or a “government.”  These entities, 
while functioning and examinable as unitary wholes are really only theoretical constructs 
representing the parties, interest groups, and above all the individual people who actually form a 
state or a government.  In trying to determine and define the scope of individual influence and 
impact on government decision making, in this case the acquisition of a weapons system, the 
                                                     
1 Steve Yetiv. Explaining Foreign Policy: U.S. Decision Making in the Gulf Wars, 2nd ed. (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2011), 12.  
 




goal is not to prove or disprove the applicability of Allison’s models but to identify other 
variables that might be significant in the design of these models and reveal the scope of their 
power and influence within the model structures.  
 The first chapter of this dissertation serves to introduce readers to both the structure of 
the work and the literature addressing the concept of “Grand Strategy.”  The overarching 
philosophical intent from the beginning of this research was to look at how the tools of grand 
strategy are chosen by a state, with a narrowing focus on case studies or a case study to examine 
this procurement in terms of policy but also in terms of the basic process.  The intent was to go 
from the macro level which even though it remains below the traditional international relations 
systemic level remains important, after all the international system is made up of individual 
states.  Moving down the ladder of abstraction, we will begin to examine both the strategic 
drivers that become important variables in the equation of selecting tools to fit intended 
strategies and the governmental process that control and drive the acquisition of weapons 
systems.   
The basic outline of this dissertation starts with the introduction to the basic organization 
by chapter and an examination of the literature addressing grand strategy in Chapter One.  To 
steal a phrase from my Army training brethren, “Tell ‘em what you’re going to tell ‘em. Tell 
‘em. And tell ‘em what you told them.” The goal of the first chapter is to tell the reader what the 
author intends to tell them.  It is also an attempt to explain the focus of this dissertation, going 
from the macro-level of IR to the micro-level, the purchase of the “tools” of grand strategy and 
one tool, the LCS. Why LCS? One of the major reasons for the focus on this acquisition program 
and the sole case study for this dissertation was the acrimony and sheer bad-blood that this ship 
class has engendered in the American naval community.  A wide variety of writers, in and out of 




uniform, former and current sailors, waxed and waned generally in derogation of the entire idea.  
The comments, papers, stories, and articles were very much more often than not harshly critical 
of the LCS both as a concept and once launched as actual physical platforms as well.  There was 
a constant shadow of stories regarding engineering casualties, failures, crew training issues, 
equipment failing, and most damning of all, the increasing lag in the development of the warfare 
mission modules.  In short, LCS has been one of the most contentious Navy acquisition 
programs ever and presented an opportunity to present a more academic and thus potentially, a 
more objective assessment of the system than was available in other sources. 
The second chapter focuses on and provides an analysis of the market factors driving and 
limiting the acquisition of the common good known as national defense. This section explores 
the issue of monopsony, the legally required process that both serves to form and to distort the 
market for the good known as national defense, and by way of comparison, provides some 
insight from the national defense market in the United Kingdom (UK).  It also focuses on the 
actual government procurement system and the two major instructions within the Department of 
Defense (DoD) and the Department of the Navy (DON) that govern acquisition; Department of 
Defense Instruction 5000.02, “The Operation of the Defense Acquisition System (DAS),” 07 Jan 
2015 and SECNAVINST 5000.2E, “Department of the Navy Implementation and Operation of 
the Defense Acquisition System and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System,” Office of the Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D.C., 1 September 2011 respectively.   
Chapter Three addresses the other ‘market forces’ driving national defense as represented 
by the changing strategic landscape and encapsulated in the Navy’s strategic guidance 




publications starting with “…From the Sea…”2 and tracing the development and evolution of 
these documents to the current day. This chronological analysis also examines several key 
studies, papers, and books that informed and influenced the decision to acquire the LCS.  These 
included Vice Admiral Art Cebrowksi’s network centric, distributed platforms or 
“Streetfighter,”3 Wayne Hughes books on fleet tactics,4 and several engineering studies, most 
notably the “Sea Lance” study from the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, 
California.5 It also looks at the government solicitation which included concept of operations 
(CONOPS) that forms such a cornerstone for the entire LCS program.    
Chapter Three is also in many ways an analysis of the actual Request for Proposals (RFP) 
that the government issued informed and influenced by the author’s experience and background 
as a commercial contractor bidding in response to packages like the LCS solicitation.  There is 
some significant value in this review because this was a very different methodology for ship 
procurement from previous solicitations for of warships like the SPRUANCE or OLIVER 
HAZARD PERRY classes.  There is also an analysis of the Navy’s “Open Architecture” 
standard6 which is important because of both its impact on the nature of the design for LCS but 
                                                     
2 “…From the Sea Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century: A New Direction for the Naval Service,” 
(Washington, DC: Chief of Naval Operations, 1992) U.S. Navy white paper, available online at 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/policy/fromsea/fromsea.txt. Accessed 10/09/2016 at 1013 EDT. 
3 Wayne Hughes and Arthur Cebrowski, “Rebalancing the Fleet,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 125, No. 
11 (1999): 31-34. 
4  Wayne P. Hughes, Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice (Annapolis, MD U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1986). -----. 
Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat 2nd ed. (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 2000). 
5  LT Howard Markle, USN, Team Leader, LT Rick Trevisan, USN, LT Tim Barney, USN, LT Karl Eimers, USN, 
LCDR Garrett Farman, USN, LTjg Ahmet Altekin, Turkish Navy, LT Ricardo Kompatzki, Chilean Navy, LT Chris 
Nash, USN, Technical Report NPS-ME-01-001, “Sea Lance Littoral Warfare Small Combatant System,” Naval 
Postgraduate School: Monterey, CA, 2001. 
6  “Design Guidance for the Navy Open Architecture Computing Capability.” Naval Surface Warfare Center 
Dahlgren: Dahlgren, VA, 01 October 2002. 




also the importance of software in weapons systems which it serves to highlight as this 
requirement was included in the solicitation package from the Navy.7   
The fourth chapter is a narrative analysis of the LCS class’s road from the award to the 
two leading bidders to the achievement or non-achievement of its Initial Operating Capacity 
(IOC).  This chapter serves to highlight the persistent and consistent “bad press” that the LCS 
received and that at least in the author’s opinion indicates more than merely residual resistance 
within and without the Navy to this concept class of warships.  This chapter also serves to place 
the fielding of the sea-frame (a concept borrowed from the aerospace acquisition field – the 
standard term there being air-frame) in relation to the development and slow fielding of the 
mission modules.  This capability gap provides some justification for the bigotry against the 
entire program but is also reveals the very real engineering challenges of developing mobile and 
removable equipment packages that can be swapped out to meet changing warfare mission 
needs. 
 Chapter Five turns back to the field of international relations in a more traditional venue 
and re-engages with the question of the applicability of Allison’s models to government 
decision-making.  The three models, Rational Actor Model (model 1), Organizational Behavior 
model (model 2), and Governmental Policies model (model 3) are introduced, numbered for 
simplicities sake, and applied to the LCS acquisition.  The analysis was seeking to determine the 
accuracy of fit for the model as applied to the actual process of program acquisition for the LCS.  
The analysis revealed that, in general, the government’s and the Navy’s predicted behavior from 
each of the three models was in line with the observed behavior during the LCS acquisition. The 
                                                     
7  LCS Solicitation, N00024-03-R-2309, Section J-10-1, dated 10 February 2003. 




chapter also served to neither proved nor disprove the basic dissertation hypothesis that 
individuals had more impact than organizations on government or bureaucratic decision making.  
There was no, what this writer has labeled the “Smoking Gun,” revealed.      
 The sixth and last chapter serves as a summary and discusses what exactly this study 
reveals.  There are two major findings for consideration, one in the federal acquisition field and 
the second in the strategic planning realm.  The acquisition issue that was revealed is the risk that 
Evolutionary Acquisition and spiral development can create if there is a long lag time between 
developing a carrying frame i.e. the LCS hull and associated organic systems and the weapons 
and sensors this frame is designed to carry i.e. the mission modules.  Having a sea- or air-frame 
with some built in capabilities may not suffice to meet the full range of intended and required 
capabilities for which the system was procured.  This equates to risk in the military doctrinal 
world.  The other issue is the inherent challenge of designing systems for both the current and the 
predicted operational environment.8  Several naval case studies focused on the systems acquired 
and employed by various navies in the twentieth century, how effective these systems were, and 
how appropriate to the operational and strategic situation that obtained they proved.   These case 
studies reveal how difficult it is to accurately predict the operational environment and how 
quickly it changes under the stress of combat and competition.  In turn, this serves to highlight 
the importance of flexibility, adaptability, and dependability for weapons systems to remain 
effective in the operational environment. 
                                                     
8 “The JFC's operational environment (OE) is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that 
affect employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. It encompasses physical areas of the 
air, land, maritime, and space domains; the information environment (which includes cyberspace); the 
electromagnetic spectrum (EMS); and other factors.”  Joint Publication 3-0, “Joint Operations” (Washington, DC: 
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In order to avoid the trite introductory question “What IS Grand Strategy” and launch 
into the lengthy discourse required for definition, let us instead looks at grand strategy by 
applying a framework applied in later chapters of this dissertation; that of ends, ways, and 
means.  In this case means stands for the money or resources, ways stands for how the money is 
spent or resources expended, and ends represents the desired outcome or end-state.  With these 
terms of reference, we can now turn to grand strategy as the application of ways and means to 
achieve desired ends.  Various authors have offered definitions of grand strategy and while there 
are some very good ones available the following is offered as our working definition for this 
review of the competitors.  Grand strategy is the planning and execution process through which a 
state having determined a desired outcome, generally one prejudiced in favor of the 
aforementioned state’s interests, aligns means to ways (money to systems in the LCS case) in 
order to effectively and hopefully, efficiently gain that desired end. This is sufficiently generic 
enough to apply to desired political, military, economic, or diplomatic end-states.  It may not 
however be sufficiently detailed to ascribe the moniker “grand” to a given strategy. This is true 
to an extent because both means and ends are loosely defined by intent. This is partly due to the 
nature of this dissertation, we are trying to examine a case involving one of the tools of grand 
strategy, a ship to be overly simplistic, and not say for example, the idea of “containment” as 
practiced by the United States from 1948 until 1991. This provides some justification for a 
certain level of simplification. 
The other issue in terms definition is that under the sobriquet of grand strategy we often 
find an extreme focus on the military means that are applied in certain ways to achieve the 
desired strategic end-state. This unfortunately, rather than over simplifying, overly restricts the 




fields where grand strategy can and ought to be applied.  Grand strategy for a state should imply 
the entire gamut of state capabilities from military to economic that can be used to attain a 
desired goal. The goal can range from triumph in a war as already mentioned, to the upset of a 
mercantilist economic system and the substitution of a capitalist free market in its place.  
However, at the core of the concept of grand strategy I would argue, lies the idea of maintaining 
the existence of a state.  Grand strategy is in essence what a state does in order to guarantee its 
own continued existence, from balancing to band-wagoning. But what we are looking at 
specifically in this dissertation, if not this chapter, is the resources and their application in the 
military sphere in contrast to the political decisions and theoretical constructs that form the basis 
for a given grand strategy or strategic vision.  
One item of interest that surfaced in looking at the literature on grand strategy or strategy, 
at least written by U.S. based authors most frame the issues in terms of ways, means, and ends.9 
This is likely due to many of these writers being involved in the DoD process of Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE), especially the programming and budgeting 
steps of this process.  The U.S. DoD has a distinct and pronounced tendency where strategy is 
involved to base the desired strategic end-state10 on the force structure and funding for it that is 
available. This tends to bias or privilege analysis towards trying to match the desired end-state to 
the means in terms of budget dollars available.  This is not surprising, but it does differentiate 
between the policy planner field and that of the academic scholar, there is a rather distinct 
                                                     
9  Paul M. Kennedy. Grand Strategies in War and Peace (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 4, 27, 134, 
147.  
10  For a definition of end-state, see Joint Pub 5-0, Joint Planning, Chapter 1.2 (a) “Principles of Planning.” 16 June 
2017.   
“a. Focuses on the End State.  Joint planning is end state oriented: plans and actions positively contribute to 
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border-land between the two especially because of the fiscal and actual physical considerations. 
The point to this excursion is to highlight some of the biases that scholars may bring into the 
discussion and to note that some of the literature is not directly addressing grand strategy from 
the IR perspective but from the foreign policy and military planner perspectives.   
Robert Art, in A Grand Strategy for America presents a set of eight strategic alternatives 
or policies from which the U.S. could choose.11 These options range from outright dominion to 
isolationism to off-shore balancing.  Each of these has its own pros and cons but all are 
predicated on protecting U.S. national interests by keeping latent threats latent and reducing or 
outright removing threats to U.S. interests.12  Art examines each strategy in terms of 
effectiveness and efficiency in terms of cost.  His analysis led him to conclude that the best grand 
strategy, based on the strategic landscape in the early 21st century was selective engagement.13  
He was also careful to note that this strategy was appropriate at the time but not at all times.14 
This could be considered a watered-down version of the strategies linked to the liberal-
institutionalist school of IR theorist like Keohane, Ikenberry and Nye; more on these scholars 
and their thoughts on grand strategy or how their thoughts apply to grand strategy in the 
following sections.  
In contrast, taking Christopher Layne as the most persistent of its advocates, some 
scholars argue in favor of off-shore balancing.15  He has been joined by noted scholars in the 
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Strategy After the Cold War” International Security, Spring 1991 (Vol. 15, No.4), 5-53.  
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field John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt.16 The main argument of these advocates is that 
offshore balancing by reducing the U.S. presence overseas would significantly decrease the size 
of defense budgets.  A ‘Policy Analysis’ paper from the Cato Institute provides some broad cost 
estimates and specifics in advocating for U.S. withdrawal from overseas bases.17  The most 
recent major work in this school is from Barry Posen and is entitled Restraint a New Foundation 
for U.S. Grand Strategy.18  As the title suggest, Posen argues that the U.S. ought to restrain itself 
from enforcing the so-called “liberal hegemony” and instead work towards selected engagement 
with key allies and coalitions, if only to repress nuclear proliferation.19  He takes a slightly 
different path from Art however in that selective engagement is important but Posen’s real key to 
success for the U.S. is control of the global commons.20  His is a more maritime, and maybe 
cyber-, oriented strategy.21   
In direct contrast to the offshore balancers, at least one author argues directly against it as 
a strategy if not in favor of other specific approaches. Hal Brands, a strategist at the U.S. Army 
War College, pointed out the limits to offshore balancing.22  His conclusion is that the concept of 
offshore balancing is oversold on its potential benefits and its risks are understated.  The telling 
                                                     
16John J. Mearsheimer, and Stephen M. Walt. "The Case for Offshore Balancing." Foreign Affairs 95, no. 4 (2016). 
17 John Glaser, "Withdrawing from Overseas Bases," (Washington, DC: The Cato Institute, 2017). Available online 
at: https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/withdrawing-overseas-bases-why-forward-deployed-military-
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18  Barry Posen. Restraint a New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Studies in Security 
Affairs, 2014). 
19 See Chapter 1, “The Perils of Liberal Hegemony,” 24-68, and 72, 78-83 for engagement.  It is interesting to note 
that many of the arguments against offshore balancing focus on remaining engaged in order to continue combating 
nuclear proliferation, see for example Stephen G. Brooks, G. John. Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth. "Don't 
Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment." International Security 37, no. 3 (2012): 7-51. And a 
response Campbell Craig et al., "Debating American Engagement: The Future of U.S. Grand Strategy," 
International Security 38, no. 2 (2013): 181-199.  
20  Ibid, 136-144, 148-158, 162-163. 
21  Of note, at least one group of European scholars characterized the U.S. strategy under the Obama administration 
as a type of offshore balancing, see Ana-Maria Ghimis et al., "America's New Grand Strategy - an Inherited Step 
Back?" Strategic Impact, no. 44 (2012): 98. 
22 Hal Brands, The Limits of Offshore Balancing [Electronic Resource] (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies 
Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2015), https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1291. 




point he makes about withdrawing from overseas locations and intervening only when critical 
U.S. interests are at stake is that this will require significant air and maritime forces.23  And even 
the “reduced” ground component would still require cutting edge (hence expensive) technologies 
to be effective against threats.24  So, it would seem difficult to identify where the savings would 
be realized. To amplify this point, the last time the U.S. applied offshore balancing, before the 
Second World War, the lack of overseas bases or presence equated to extremely high physical 
entry costs, in the form of amphibious assault, air, and maritime campaigns to gain access into 
the geo-political theaters of that conflict.  He goes on to note that while withdrawing U.S. forces 
from overseas if often portrayed as “removing” these forces from the reach of terrorism, that 
does not mean that terrorists will cease trying to attack U.S. military targets, it may actually 
increase the likelihood of another terrorist attack on American soil.25  Now withdrawal to 
balance offshore would get us “out of peoples’ faces” in places like Okinawa where the U.S. may 
not be popular but in other locales the U.S. military population can be welcomed and certainly 
the money they bring into foreign “garrison” towns is welcomed – if only in lamenting its 
absence as some Bavarian locations have done since the Army garrison there drew down.26   
All of these perspectives can be classified as realist or neo-realist in their orientation. 
Harkening back to Hans Morgenthau, Stephen Walt, and John Mearsheimer, their conceptual 
focus is on an anarchical global system where there is no overarching authority governing the 
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relations between states.27  It is an international system ‘red of tooth and claw’ where only the 
fittest and most powerful prosper and survive.  Ultimately, international relations boils down to 
relative strength and the competition is about maintaining a state’s relative power against the 
most powerful or most dangerous (classical realist vs. neo-realist) potential foe. Balance of 
power becomes the key to maintaining relative power relations in the realist theoretical construct 
and offshore balancing just by its name highlights this focus.  The notion of husbanding power 
and resources by remaining disengaged and only intervening when critical national interests are 
at stake is a rational course of action with more than a little appeal to isolationists, America 
“firsters,” libertarians, and fiscal conservatives but as Brands pointed out, it can have some steep 
costs and unanticipated consequences.  
In contrast to the realists/neo-realists, another school of thought, much more along the 
lines of the liberal or liberal-internationalists advocates for a more selective engaged grand 
strategy with strong overtones of collective security.  While he did not exactly address grand 
strategy, Robert Keohane has persuasively and persistently provided analyses and arguments that 
favor the role of the liberal world-order to include important and influential roles for 
international institutions like the United Nations and the former Global Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs (GATT) now known as the World Trade Organization (WTO).28  Joseph Nye is another 
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of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first Century 1st ed. (New York: 
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Security Affairs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).  See especially Robert Gilpin. War and Change in 
World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981) for a discussion of the balance of power and what 
causes change in the balance, he obviously comes down on the side of war as the main agent for change. 
28  Keohane, Robert O., and Lisa L. Martin. "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory." International Security 20, no. 
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scholar in this school who in fact wrote a book Power and Interdependence with Keohane.29  
While not directly addressing grand strategy this book does serve to highlight the increasing 
inter-connectedness of the global economy and global politics both of which call into question 
one of the foundations of state grand strategies, specifically sovereignty.  The author’s analysis 
reveals a potential weakening of individual state powers which are becoming constrained by 
interdependence among states and between states and international political and economic 
institutions.30  If we try to frame their analysis and arguments in terms of U.S. grand strategy, 
they would argue in favor of the liberal world order as established in the post-Second World War 
by the U.S. and bolstered by the resurgent western European industrial democracies and Japan in 
the years after 1950.  This would be very much in opposition to offshore balancing because the 
U.S. would have to remain engaged politically and though maybe a stretch theoretically, engaged 
physically i.e. militarily with overseas allies and coalition members.  One could characterize this 
as the benevolent hegemon fostering free markets and democracy of one flavor or another across 
the globe.  John Ikenberry is another leading scholar in this theoretical school.31  In Liberal 
Leviathan, he too makes an argument in favor of the benevolent hegemon but with a slightly 
different spin.  The hegemon both enforces the rules but as the global order is joined by more 
and more states, the order itself constrains in some ways the hegemon creating trade space for 
rule-making that may not directly benefit the leading state.  While not intended to slight Messrs. 
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Keohane and Ney, Ikenberry seems to have remained engaged in the on-going academic and 
policy debate about the correct world order.32   
There is also the constructivist school of international relations who have weighed in on 
grand strategy albeit again not directly.  As Alexander Wendt might point out, the very concept 
of grand strategy, defining the resources or capabilities to deploy in support of it, and the threats 
against which it is designed is very much a constructed dialogue.33  There is a lot of discussion 
and dialogue that goes into the formulation and even the basic definition of grand strategy.  And 
especially in the American case there is a definite process if we can let the National Security 
Strategy and National Military Strategy stand as proxies for the concept of grand strategy.  While 
this school of analysis tends to be focused on the state level, often national security and again by 
proxy extension grand strategy, is not solely formulated within a given state.  There are after all 
the threat(s) against which the strategy is designed.  There are also the allies, friends, and 
neutrals that have some impact if not direct input into strategy formulation.  While there does not 
seem to be significant constructivist writing on the topic of grand strategy there is definitely a 
place at the table for members of this school to analyze and discuss the topic to reveal concepts 
and theory of both value and interest to the field of IR.34  
THE RETURN OF GEO-POLITICS? 
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 The study of how geography impacts the foreign policies of states seems to have fallen 
out of favor since the end of the Cold War.  Other factors like demographics and economics 
remained apparently valid factors for political science equations but standard geography had 
fallen off of the table so to speak.  Perhaps the bitter legacy of classical geopolitical theorists like 
Mackinder, Haushofer, and Spykman as embraced by totalitarian regimes, notably the Nazis, 
made geography a distasteful factor of consideration by scholars.  The ideas of space, of 
geography, and of physical position had fallen out of favor as significant factors in IR with the 
growth of “globalization” and the shrinking of the world through the Internet and the rapidity of 
modern communications.  Giving rise to terms like “glocalization” and phrase like “distant 
proximities,” globalization seemed to confirm the ‘end of history’ and a new homogenized, 
conglomerated, flattened world.35   However, it would seem that the reports of the demise of the 
old-world concept of geography and its impact on international politics were exaggerated or at 
least a bit premature.   
While he was not the first to begin resurrecting the idea of geopolitics Henry Kissinger’s 
stature as a practitioner of geopolitics and diplomacy guaranteed that he would at least get a 
hearing.36  Another noted commentator on international relations and foreign relations, Walter 
Russell Mead, noted that the disappearance of old-fashioned geo-politics occurred only in the 
minds of Western scholars and policy wonks. As he put it, Westerners enjoyed a “false sense of 
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security” after the collapse of the Soviet Union.37  It seems that the critical school and its 
adherents are also dis-interring geopolitics and maybe putting a Marxist or neo-Marxist spin on 
them.38  While Klinke and his compatriots are not commenting directly on grand strategy, their 
focus is mostly about the dialogue and relations between Russia and the European Union, this 
literature is indicative of the re-emergence of geopolitics in a more traditional sense in scholarly 
circles.  A much more traditional piece on Russian grand strategy and geopolitics is from Milan 
Vego of the Naval War College.39  He provides a detailed discussion of the specific steps, 
policies, and political backing for the Russian regimes geopolitical focus and strategy.  His 
conclusion is that this iteration of Russian geopolitics is not the existential issue as it was under 
the Soviet Regime but will cause tension between Russia and the West.40  A somewhat more 
recent entry into the debate is from Stefan Auer who examines the role of geopolitics in the 
Kremlin’s policy towards Ukraine.41  While his theme is less focused on details and more on 
actions than Vego, he is definitive in declaring that geopolitics as influenced by the Nazi 
geopolitical theorist Carl Schmitt form an important part of the Russian government’s intent and 
explain its actions towards Ukraine and internally for that matter.42 
In a larger and longer discourse, and with a maybe surprising liberal flavor to some of his 
specific policy recommendations, Thomas Barnett examined U.S. grand strategy from the 
military’s perspective.  In his book, The Pentagon’s New Map, Barrett argues for a bifurcated 
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national security policy and/or grand strategy that treats member states of the “Core” differently 
from those of the “Gap.”43  This is not unreasonable considering how the U.S. treats individual 
states in the normal course of diplomatic and political relations; some states are more equal than 
others, at least in the eyes of the U.S.  His take on grand strategy focuses on the lack of economic 
development and thus opportunities in the “Gap” mostly formerly third world countries clustered 
in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East.  He argues that the lack of connectedness and the 
lack of opportunities breed extremism and resentment against the “Core.” The “Core” is 
represented above all else by the United States but includes Europe, Japan, China, and the 
industrialized democracies of the world.   
Another entry into the debate about geopolitics comes from a surprising source, a 
European and in fact British scholar. James Rogers authored an Egmont Paper for the Royal 
Institute for International Relations entitled “A New Geography of European Power?”44  His 
discussion of the geopolitical and grand strategy interests of Europe and by extension the 
European Union focuses on a ‘Grand Area’ approach aimed at a permanent European presence.45  
The rationale is to avoid crisis management and instead practice a civil and military ‘forward 
presence’ thus reducing the need for sporadic intervention.46  It sounds remarkably like the 
underlying premise that has justified U.S. and especially U.S. Navy strategic force distributions 
since the end of the Second World War.  The two major differences from Barnett’s approach is 
that Rogers does not divide the world into a core and a periphery but focuses his ‘Grand Area’ 
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around the Europe, North Africa, parts of West and East Africa, and the Middle East to the 
borders with India, the central Asian petroleum sources (like Kazakhstan), and part of the 
Indonesian archipelago. 47  The contrast with Barnett’s map of the “non-integrated gap” is 
distinct if not striking. It may reflect a lower level of hubris, the EU is not concerned with the 
entire globe, but it also may reflect a bit more concentrated thinking on those areas, resources, 
and trade routes that really are crucial to the continued health and well-being of the EU’s 
member states.  It may also reflect an honest assessment of the reach and capabilities of the 
military forces available to European states with which they can impact the ‘Grand Area.’ It 
remains however very interesting that a graduate of Aberystwyth University and a practicing 
scholar in the EU offered such a traditional study of geopolitics and the interest of the European 
powers.  It would be inferential and probably wrong to call his references to the “civilian power” 
and the “passive” use of military power as window-dressing to appease other European scholars 
but there is a distinctly traditional, maybe even old-school imperialist flavor to his analysis.  
CONSTRUCTIVIST GRAND STRATEGY 
 With more than a passing respectful nod to the constructivist school of international 
relations, we can easily see that grand strategy can be defined as a mutually constructed 
discussion or idea.  It changes based not only of the international system of relative power but 
also on how the states, governments, and individual people involved in grand strategy at the sub-
systemic or national level change.  “The grand strategy of the Soviet Union was…” or “the grand 
strategy of the United States under [insert presidential administration here] is…” are example of 
how at least recently some scholars and writers have framed the issue of grand strategy.  
Scholars can trace changes in the grand strategies of individual states and even governments 
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based on the identity of those Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Politburo members 
who showed up atop Lenin’s Tomb indicating who was in or out of power or as various national 
security experts in U.S. administrations have come and gone since the 1950s. 
 Paul Kennedy cites B.H. Liddell-Hart as a significant strategist in the pantheon of 
strategic thinkers and points out how Liddell-Hart’s vision or concept of strategy was 
constructed.48 His concept was based partially on his First World War experiences in France and 
partially on his post-war researches into the “British way of war.”  While Liddell-Hart settled on 
what in the military sense is basically a tactical, maybe operational level concept, the indirect 
approach,49 his was a constructed vision likely informed and influenced by post-war writers like 
Jellicoe, Haig, and Churchill and his fellow military theorists like Douhet and J.F.C. Fuller.  This 
is admittedly a hypothetical postulation, but it is very doubtful that Liddell-Hart conceived of the 
indirect approach and the British way of war totally out of whole cloth like some Athena new-
sprung from his Zeus-like head. 
 On a slightly different note, there is a lively discussion among constructivist and/or post- 
modern geographers that has some bearing if only tangentially to the idea of grand strategy. The 
discussion is generally focused on the nature of identities and how both state and individual 
identities are constructed.  In a guest editorial in Political Geography, Nick Megoran points out 
that geographers need to re-engage with political scientist and IR scholars regarding the revival 
of geopolitics or what he terms “neo-classical geopolitics.”50  This fits in with the previous 
discussion regarding geopolitics and at least one aspect of grand strategy as a broader concept.  
This is also true of a piece by Thomas Diez where he discusses the idea of the “other” based on 
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Frantz Fanon’s pioneering work51 and the role “otherness” plays in the development of EU 
integration.52  The linkage here is that the revival of geopolitics is making the development of a 
European identity more challenging which in turn makes the development of a coherent EU 
grand strategy that much more difficult.  The last constructivist works to address look at the roles 
of individuals, in keeping with original research intent of this dissertation but focusing on how 
their identities and roles are constructed and not on their individual impact on grand strategy.  
The first article by Edward Lock investigates ‘strategic culture’ and looks at how strategic 
culture impacts behavior, by states and individuals within the process.  It also examines how 
strategic behavior shapes the identity of the actor who engages in this behavior.53  The 
application of this sort of analysis could represent another opportunity to look inside the “black 
box” of grand strategy and understand who and how it is created for a given state. The last article 
by Merje Kuus looks at the role of intellectuals in the “production of geopolitical discourses.”54  
He looks at how intellectuals as individuals contribute to foreign policy discourse and how these 
in turn, reflect a certain culturally concept and indemnity. As with Lock’s analysis this 
potentially allows scholars to examine the role of the individual in the development and 
implementation of grand strategy for a given states. 
 The challenge with the constructivist, post-modern, or critical schools is that much of the 
dialogues as evidenced above are very much sub-systemic and even sub-state level in their 
studies.  Again, there is value in examining the role of the individual or state and how the 
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identity of the individual or state are developed through dialogues, cultural perceptions, social or 
organizational mores but it remains related to grand strategy at several removes from the 
overarching concept and the broader nature of grand strategy.  In some ways, one is forced to 
tease out nuances and details in order to effectively apply a constructivist analysis to grand 
strategy.  There is however a very interesting case study to do by applying constructivist 
approaches; the development of nuclear strategy as it relates to the U.S. and USSR in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Looking at how each state’s identify was constructed by interactions between them, 
between them and their allies, and within each state could offer some great insights into strategic 
development and strategic planning.  Examining how dialogue and identities affected the arms 
control negotiations or just how did the idea of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) develop 
and how did it come to be a shared idea?  These are some interesting questions that constructivist 
scholars could successfully engage with the tools and analytic framework of their school. 
 
NAVAL STRATEGY 
 Though it might be best termed a sub-set of grand strategy, the final section of this 
literature review will look at the naval or maritime strategy. This is in keeping with the ultimate 
focus on a naval platform and how it fits into strategic planning and execution at several levels   
that may or may not have informed and influenced grand strategy.  While historical writers like 
Mahan, Corbett, and Gorshkov55 remain influential, more recent scholars like Norman Friedman, 
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Geoffrey Till, and John Hattendorf have made significant contributions to the field.56  Much of 
the specific U.S. Navy strategic documents will be addressed in Chapter Three where we 
examine the strategic landscape that drove the Navy towards the concept of LCS.  There are 
however two more recent debates that are of interest and provide insights into the on-going 
debate about naval power and its role in grand strategy.    
 The first of these debates was born in the ashes of the Cold War and addresses the 
question of the venue in which the U.S. Navy is most likely to fight.  The demise of the Soviet 
Navy and the apparent rise in failed states seemed to indicate that the Navy would be mostly 
employed in the coastal waters and maritime chokepoints of the world as opposed to fighting a 
fleet on fleet engagement in the blue waters of the open oceans.  Steven Kosiak, Andrew 
Krepinevich, and Michael Vickers, writing for the Center for Strategic and Budgetary 
Assessment (CSBA) argued that the Navy should re-orient away from forward presence 
operations in the Mediterranean and instead focus more on the Persian Gulf, South and East 
Asia.57 As Frank Hoffman writing in Naval Institute’s Proceedings points out however, the 
authors’ focus on transformation as a key to continuing over-match and reducing force structure 
                                                     
nevertheless an excellent exposition on the value of a navy to the Soviet state with potentially broader applicability 
to non-communist states.  
56 See, John B. Hattendorf. U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s [electronic Resource] Selected Documents. Newport 
Paper; No. 30 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2007). 
https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/LPS92234/LPS92234/www.nwc.navy.mil/press/newportpapers/documents/NP30J
H.pdf. John B. Hattendorf, Peter M. Swartz, and Naval War College. U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s [electronic 
Resource] Selected Documents. Newport Paper; No. 32. (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2008). 
https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps106777/NP33.pdf. Geoffrey Till. "THE NEW U.S. MARITIME STRATEGY: 
Another View from Outside." Naval War College Review 68, no. 4 (2015): 34-45. -----, Seapower a Guide for the 
Twenty-first Century. 2nd ed. Cass Series--naval Policy and History; 32 (New York: London: B Routledge, 2009). 
Norman Friedman. The US Maritime Strategy (New York: Jane's Publishing, 1988). -----, Network-centric Warfare 
How Navies Learned to Fight Smarter through Three World Wars (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2009). 
57 Steven Kosiak, Andrew Krepinevich, and Michael Vickers. “A Strategy for a Long Peace.” Washington, DC: 
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2001.  




in view of increasing Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) are potential points of critical failure. 58  
Another set of entrants into the debate focused on the changing nature of warfare and the 
increase threat that this change, called swarming, represented to conventional forces especially in 
the littorals.59 Both John Arquilla and Sean Edwards focused on the impact of an apparently 
disorganized group or ‘swarm’ attacking from various directions against a traditional, linear-
oriented foe. 60  There has not been much refuting of this definition of the threat or how 
dangerous it is.  In fact, this writer worked on and reviewed several classified U.S. Navy tactical 
studies to address this threat as recently as 2013.  The interest and research into swarming and 
countering it continues.61  The challenge in focusing on swarming though is that it tends to focus 
on one or two geographic areas and one or two potential foes. The main geographic areas are the 
Persia Gulf and somewhat more specifically the Strait of Hormuz, and the other geographic 
region from the Navy’s perspective is the South China Sea.  The two states of interest are Iran 
and the People’s Republic of China both of whom maintain large numbers of relatively well 
armed small ships and boats.62  These surface craft are capable of conducting swarming attacks 
on U.S. surface combatants like the LCS and thus the swarming threat in the littoral still obtains. 
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 This leads us into the second part of this debate, where will the Navy fight? As 
mentioned above, the focus on the littoral regions of the world started after 1991 and really came 
into focus in the early 2000s.   However, neither the Navy nor other interested parties have 
totally abandoned the high seas as a focal point for future combat.  The first entry into this side 
of the debate could be Bernard Cole’s The Great Wall at Sea from 2001.63  This book serves to 
portray the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) as a soon to be ‘near peer competitor’ and 
provided some fuel for stoking the furnaces of a return to the “War at Sea” (WAS).64  It was 
included in the Chief of Naval Operations’ reading list published by the Navy Times in 2012,65 
not that we ought to read too much into that.  However, the term near-peer competitor has been 
surface in the defense establishment in the U.S. and certainly among naval officers and writers 
regularly over the last ten years.66 While some of the authors are dismissive of the role of China 
or even Russia as a near-peer competitor in the maritime sphere and often dismiss this ideational 
effort as no more than a quest to justify funding the fact that the term is even used by its 
detractors provides some legitimacy and longevity to the idea.  This writer has from personal 
experience working at both the office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) and U.S. Fleet 
Forces Command (USFF) heard a lot of nostalgia for the Soviet Union and statements regarding 
the threat from a mildly resurgent Russian Navy.67  The same holds true with regards to 
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individual opinions of uniformed, civil service, and retired military personnel regarding the 
PLAN.  This shows that the debate is going on at the individual level in the service and that there 
is a certain prejudice against operating on the edges and a desire to get back to fleet on fleet 
engagements.68 
 This provides a perfect segue into the next debate about maritime strategy, which is what 
are we going to fight with, which for the purposes of this dissertation will focus on the number 
and the types of ships that the Navy should buy.  Where the Navy expects to fight is critical to 
this debate because different geographic and different physical environments require different 
capabilities from surface ships.  An open ocean fight against the PLAN will require different 
platforms, weapons, and sensors than a littoral ’knife fight’ in the strait of Hormuz against the 
Iranian Navy or the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy.  In trying to answer the question 
of what we are going to fight with the Navy commissioned several comparative studies in 2016 
to examine the question.69 
THE FUTURE FLEET PLATFORM ARCHITECTURE STUDIES 
The Navy first conducted an internal Force Structure Analysis as sort of an entering 
argument for the congressionally directed Future Fleet Architecture studies.  The Navy 
determined that it would require 355 ships with one additional aircraft carrier, 20 additional large 
surface combatants i.e. not LCS, the same number of LCS ships (52), more attack submarines 
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and amphibious ships.70  In short, the same stuff only more of it.  This is not meant to be critical, 
the Navy planners’ charter was not to reinvent the fleet but to determine the type and number of 
platforms required to meet the Navy’s operational needs based on Geographic Combatant 
Commander (GCC) plans approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).  The Navy then proceeded 
to craft the first of the entries into the Future Fleet Architecture studies with mission guidance: 
“This dedicated, Navy Project Team was given guidance and wide latitude to develop an analysis that was 
a distinct excursion not constrained by current Navy submissions. As such, the Project Team study does not 
represent any official Navy position, but just another independent approach to the problem.”71 
This is important to note, foreshadowing the discussion regarding Allison’s models and the issue 
of bureaucratic politics, because the writing team was composed mostly of senior civil servants 
and only two uniformed officers.  Regardless of the composition of the concept development 
team, they are all in one form or another beholden to their parent organization plus the 
subordinate organizations for which they work.  This was going to create some inherent bias and 
preferences in whatever assessment they produced.  
 The Navy entry into the future fleet design focused on a networked based capability or 
what they termed the ‘Distributed Fleet.’  This is in keeping with the Navy’s tactical thought 
over the last two decades and owes much to Captain (ret.) Wayne Hughes who wrote a key work 
of fleet tactics in the mid-1980s and to Vice Admiral Art Cebrowski who first introduced the 
term ‘network-centric warfare’ to the Navy.72  The Navy group focused on five main mission 
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areas including building security globally, establishing sea control, and projecting power.73  The 
first mission description term is significant because ‘building security globally’ is so broad that it 
can be meant to describe everything from security cooperation events with friendly countries to 
forward deployment presence operations to launch land attack missiles.  It is almost meaningless 
because it is so broad, but it also allows the Navy to include the littorals and open ocean as 
potential areas of conflict.  Sea control on the other hand at least is very much a disputed term 
among naval theorists, it is ill-defined and can be used for everything from undisputed control of 
the open ocean to convoying merchant ships in the Persian Gulf.  However, it is significant 
because, in its traditional usage, sea control was applied to the struggle between surface fleets, 
notably the Royal Navy and Hochseeflotte in the First World War.  It was also a standard 
operational and tactical term used by the Navy in the 1970s and 1980s in the face of the growing 
threat from Soviet naval power.  Thus, it could be indicative of the Navy’s continuing bias in 
favor of blue water battles versus mucking about in the shallows of the littoral regions of the 
world.  Projecting power is significant because it represents a continuation of the Navy’s basic 
deployment strategy in place since about 1950.74  In order to project power ships need to be 
operating forward, or projecting from the continental U.S. (CONUS).  This mission description 
serves to confirm the way that the Navy has been operating and intends to continue operating. 
 The Navy’s report also mentioned that for the first time in 25 years there is a competition 
for maritime superiority with the rise of Russian and Chinese naval power.75  This is another 
allusion to the blue water challenge and again may be reflective of this persistent prejudice in the 
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Navy.  This sets the stage for what might constitute a surprising recommendation from the Navy 
regarding the required platforms for a new fleet architecture.  The Navy recommended a fleet 
comprise of 457 ships which is no surprise but among those would be “136 large unmanned 
vehicles.”76  That is somewhat surprising in view of the Navy’s continued commitment to 
manned platforms especially air and surface as its core weapons platforms.  However, this is 
actually very much in keeping with the intent of the LCS concept both in terms of maximizing 
the number of hulls or platforms available and in trying to reduce one of the most significant 
costs in surface ships, the cost of the crew.77  As one writer put it, the Navy went with “Robot PT 
Boats & LCS.”78  That brings up the last point to make, this Navy report did not recommend 
deleting the LCS procurement.  This is one of the significant differences between this group’s 
recommendation and the competing reports. 
 The second fleet architecture study was authored by the CSBA and while the authors are 
not academic in the traditional sense, they are experienced professional analysts, and several are 
Navy veterans who have held command at sea.79  This provides some justification for their bona 
fides as subject matter experts and some of the potential outlooks that are reflected in this report.  
Unlike the Navy report, the CSBA authors focus on changing the fleet composition and assigned 
missions as opposed to focusing on a networked system of platforms as a major discriminator for 
their architecture.  They present a force that is divided mirroring Barnett’s division between 
constabulary forces for counter-insurgency and stability operations and the more traditional 
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conventional units for force on force combat.80  The authors would divide the fleet into 
“Deterrence Forces” focused on specific regions and a “Maneuver Force” of Carrier Strike 
Groups (CSG) assigned to the Indian/Pacific Ocean region.81  They also focus more or at least 
mention more often the rising near-peer competitors and their potential impact on naval 
operations in the future.82 
 The force mix that the CSBA authors provide is not much different from the Navy 
version except in terms of total numbers.  They estimate a total of 382 ships (vice 457) and about 
94 unmanned platforms (vice 136 large unmanned platforms).  They also address Maritime 
Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft (MPRA) and unmanned aerial platforms whereas the Navy 
report did not.  The CSBA group would cease production of the LCS class and push forward and 
maybe accelerate the Navy’s intention to procure more capable frigates (FF) in place of the last 
ten to twelve LCS platforms.83  Another rather significant difference is that this report 
recommends acquiring ‘patrol vessels’ optimized for Surface Warfare (SUW) and strike 
warfare.84 These are the most significant differences between the Navy’s recommended approach 
and that of the CSBA authors. 
 The last report came from the MITRE Corporation and provides no authorship 
information.85  This is in keeping with MITRE’s tradition and general philosophy as sort of a 
neutral or objective participant in providing consulting and analytical service to federal 
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customers, but it makes it more challenging to identify potential bias or preconceptions that may 
have influenced this report.  There is however the fact that MITRE was already contracted with 
OPNAV N81 (Chief of Naval Operations Director of Assessment Division) and this report was 
produced as a task or project order on a 2010 award, so we can postulate that there is an existing 
relationship with this customer and thus some influence on the writers from that quarter.  Like 
the Navy and CSBA reports, MITRE does not recommend significant changes in the types of 
platforms and looks for increased effectiveness through new weapons and sensor systems and 
increased use of unmanned platforms.86  There is mention of Russia and China but also of Iran 
and North Korea, and in general MITRE’s contribution is focused on both force on force 
maritime warfare and operations in the littoral.  There may be some bias in favor of fleet 
engagements based on the warfare areas that MITRE focuses on, specifically A2AD and 
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) but it is no more and no less than the other two 
reports.87  Here again, it would appear that ‘Big Navy’ equities and interest may have informed 
and influenced the writing team. 
 The force mix of 414 ships is not as large as the Navy’s but larger than the CSBA (382) 
version.  There is however, no apparent break-out of unmanned platforms in the force structure 
referenced in the MITRE report and the report categorically states that MITRE does not 
recommend the force mix of 414 ships because it is not affordable.88 Significantly, MITRE also 
recommends shutting down production of the LCS and re-programming that funding to purchase 
one additional ARLEIGH BURKE class guided missile destroyer per year.89  The other 
                                                     
86 MITRE, “Navy Future Architecture.” 4.  
87  Ibid, 8, 9, 13, 16-20.  There are also sections on terrorism and proliferation of ASCMs as threats that the Navy 
cannot ignore, 10, 23-24. 
88  Ibid, 2-3. 
89  Ibid, 4. 




significant difference between MITRE’s report and the other two is that MITRE recommends 
several additional types of manned surface and sub-surface platforms including an ‘arsenal ship’ 
and diesel vice nuclear powered submarines.  They also recommend modifications to existing 
ship class designs for aircraft carriers and large deck amphibious ships to decrease costs while 
adding additional capabilities to these platforms.90  This focus on manned surface platforms and 
adjusting current designs and intended acquisitions are the most notable differences between the 
MITRE report and those from the Navy and CSBA. 
CONCLUSION 
 The literature on grand strategy covers a broad swath of IR scholarship and ranges from 
the extreme heights of theory to the individual level of identities and dialogues. Some of the 
works discussed above, notably the future fleet architecture studies do not fit neatly into 
scholarly definitions.  They are however, still pertinent based both on the intent of looking at 
how and why some of the physical tools of grand strategy are purchased and on the intent to 
highlight the intellectual effort, if not traditionally academic that goes into examining policy and 
into analyzing questions of national security.  This is by no means a comprehensive review of the 
literature and scholars who address strategy, but it should suffice to frame the examination of 
U.S. national security, naval policy, and naval acquisition that is the focus of this dissertation.   
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INSIDE THE BLACK BOX: THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION SYSTEM 
This chapter is to provide an analytical framework or structure for understanding how the 
U.S. government procures public goods in the national defense market.  It looks at the nature of 
the defense market in the U.S., several of the key higher-level acquisition documents, and 
provides a truncated and simplified description of a Request for Proposal (RFP) process for a 
MDAP.  While some researchers have recommended that models of military expenditure need to 
incorporate a specific role for the behavior of agents in the political market,91 this chapter seeks 
to describe the defense market writ large while subsequent chapters will examine the role of 
bureaucratic agents at the sub-systemic and even sub-national level, specifically examining the 
role of bureaucratic and individual agents in the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and the 
Department of the Navy (DON).    
THE U.S. DEFENSE “MARKET” 
If we try to frame the U.S. defense market in terms of classical economics, we ought to 
start by defining the goods that are traded in this market.92  Specifically, the good that is 
exchanged is national defense and it is classified as a public good.  This is a good that is both 
non-excludable and non-rivalrous, in that individuals cannot be effectively excluded from using 
the good and where use by one individual does not reduce availability or utility to others.93  
Economists use the term “non-excludable” when defining a public good.  This means that 
national defense is not a zero-sum game for the consumers, theoretically.  However, unlike a 
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traditional supply versus demand market where production efficiencies and/or competitive 
advantage lead to some suppliers gaining market share based on price differentiation, meaning 
their costs are lower in turn leading to lower prices for the consumer and increased purchases by 
the consumer, this is not true in the U.S. national defense market.  This market is a distorted one 
with most of the distortion caused by endogenous vice exogenous factors.  By this, we mean that 
the importance or value of a factor is determined by the importance of other factors within the 
system. The factors that create distortions in military procurement are most often internal to the 
acquisition process (if we widen the definition beyond just the DoD officially delineated process) 
or at least internal to the U.S. vice created by external factors, like other states or the 
international economic or political structure.  One of the specific factors that create significant 
distortion is the fact that this is a market consisting of small numbers of producers and in effect 
one consumer. For commercial products like beer, cars, or large-screen televisions, private 
markets of specific consumers e.g. private individuals or a hotel chain, will represent a set of 
prices for those products that can be estimated with some degree of accuracy.94  For example, 
market research can identify the number of consumers with sufficient income in a geographic 
area or region who might possibly afford and also be interested in say a $85,000 European sport 
sedan.  This enables suppliers to estimate the size and composition of a market into which they 
may want to sell.  The national defense market is harder to predict and often less flexible in its 
demand.  A further complication or wrinkle in the actuality of the defense market is that 
commercial markets also offer a yardstick for measuring a firm’s performance in that market.  
This is not necessarily so in the market for defense goods.95   
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The idea that the U.S. defense market is distorted or warped may cause some raised 
eyebrows considering that the amounts of money involved are by no means small but when we 
stop to consider the number of systems, suppliers, and customers we find that they are all very, 
very small.   There is really only one main consumer of national defense, the U.S. federal 
government in the form of the executive agency known as the Department of Defense (DoD).  
There are for major weapons systems96 a limited number of large commercial companies capable 
of providing these large, complex, and often expensive systems to the DoD.  And as in the UK or 
France, the government has created barriers to entry in order to protect existing, domestic firms 
especially from foreign competitors.97  While it is beyond the intended scope of this work to 
examine the protection of what the U.S. government calls the defense industrial base,98 we ought 
to bear in mind the significant impact of what could be termed protectionist policies on the U.S. 
defense market, despite the inroads that firms like British Aerospace and Engineering (BAE) or 
Oto-Melara have made over the last three to four decades.  The market is consciously and 
actively biased and warped in favor of American firms by intentional government policies.  
While most readers are likely familiar with the term monopoly, where there is only one 
producer of a good who can therefore set the price for that good, monopsony is less well known. 
Monopsony is almost the exact opposite of monopoly where there is only one buyer in a market 
but more than one producer of a good or service.  This results in the monopsonistic buyer 
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theoretically being able to set prices.  In many ways this is very much the definition of the role 
that the U.S. government plays in the acquisition of the public good of national defense.  Often in 
federal purchasing, most notably for large and complex weapons systems, the federal 
government and more specifically the Department of Defense is the sole buyer.  This may be 
because no other entity has a need or demand for this national security good or because other 
entities are legally prohibited from purchasing the good.  The Department of Homeland Security 
is an exception as are potential overseas purchasers (via the Foreign Military Sales [FMS] 
program) but one would not expect the Department of the Interior to purchase jet fighter aircraft 
or Health & Human Services to buy an aircraft carrier or ballistic missile submarine.  Likewise, 
the average citizen does not need and is in fact not allowed to purchase artillery pieces or 
strategic bomber aircraft. 
Another unique factor that significantly shapes the market for defense goods is the 
existence of mutual dependencies between buyers and suppliers.  With one overwhelmingly 
positioned buyer and relatively few suppliers, the market cannot effectively determine prices and 
create ‘efficiencies’ through competition.  However, the DoD is often reluctant or restrained 
from taking the best prices that it can get because in doing so, the sellers could be driven out of 
business.  This presents a dilemma for the federal government because if enough companies 
decide to exit the weapons systems market supply-side the government will have to produce 
these goods themselves.  This has often proved inefficient in the past and would likely prove to 
be unpopular among those citizens who lose their positions to government workers and stock-
holders who lose their investments in commercial companies.  There is also a policy issue at 
stake in driving commercial entities out of the defense business; since at least the Truman 
administration, the U.S. government has sought to satisfy its goods and services needs by 




leveraging the traditional free market process, seeking out the ‘best’ price for the desired quality 
of good.  Forcing all defense production into state-run enterprises would equate to an 
abandonment of this long-standing federal policy which has remained consistent regardless of 
the political party in power at any given time.99  It could also require the government to devote 
even more resources to creating the public good of national defense, further straining the fiscal 
and physical resources available to both the government and to the national economy.  At least in 
the short run, developing a governmental defense industrial base of the size required would 
divert significant public and potentially private investment into support this development thus 
removing that capital from investment opportunities in both the public and likely in the private 
sectors of the economy.  To an extent, the government is hostage to the continued existence of 
those commercial companies who are willing and able to provide major weapons systems.  
Without suppliers willing to work with the government, and often willing to accept lower Return 
on Investment (ROI),100 the government would be forced to either produce the goods itself or 
purchase from foreign suppliers, a course of action certain to be rejected by various domestic 
interests in the U.S.      
The limited customer base in the U.S. defense market results in the government enjoying 
a monopsonist position in the market.  Most of the literature in the acquisition community 
addresses the monopsonist pricing power of the government.101  But in some cases, there are 
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counter-balancing factors that prevent the government from fully leveraging its monopsonist 
power.  Without distracting from the main intent of looking at LCS acquisition, there is some 
value in taking a short look at some of the literature addressing monopsony issues in government 
procurement.  One of the better pieces is an article from Walter Adams and William James 
Adams, entitled “The Military-Industrial Complex: A Market Structure Analysis.”  The reason 
this article is valuable because the authors’ postulate a market composed on the monopsonist and 
a group of oligopolistic vendors.102  The UK’s defence market has been characterized as one of 
“selective competition resembl[ing] oligopoly with entry restrictions.”103  This is in fact a very 
accurate description of what the U.S. defense market and DoD’s acquisition process, especially 
for major weapons systems is like.  The DoD is in effect a monopsonist buyer, despite as 
mentioned earlier some potential FMS customers, and the suppliers resemble oligopolistic 
market entities.  An oligopoly is akin to a monopoly except rather than one firm dominating the 
market thus setting prices, a more limited number; often two or three firms dominate the 
market.104   In James Hasik’s “Better Buying Power or Better Off Not?” he cites a report 
authored under the chairmanship of then-Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics Ashton Carter addressing the government’s monopsony buying power.  
He notes that Carter in effect asked why the U.S. government, as the largest buyer by far of 
weapons worldwide, and the monopsony buyer in the largest market, did not have more power in 
pricing its purchases.105  Hasik goes on to discuss the issue of government purchases of the 
technical data rights for systems as his main topic but he also notes that in many ways the 
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relationship between the government and some of its suppliers resembles more of a bi-lateral 
monopoly versus a purely monopsonist to market (or supplier) relationship.106  Here again, we 
can see a relationship that appears close to a monopsony purchaser and oligopolistic set of 
sellers. 
Daniel Day in his paper “The Limits of Monopsony Pricing Power in the Markets for 
Defense Goods,” while accepting the apparent monopsony power of the government also 
presents several reasons why the government does not enjoy pure monopsony power.  He 
assumes the government position as monopsonistic but also provides several strong examples of 
how and why this power is eroded by external and internal factors.  For some purchases, the 
government is in fact not the only purchaser,107 fuel is a particularly appropriate example 
commodity of which DoD buys a lot and must compete on the open market for pricing.  This 
open market is a global one and despite the influence of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) is still one mostly driven by classical supply and demand.  Day further points 
out that while the DoD can force prices down on other products that it is indeed the sole or major 
purchaser of, the department must also allow some price and profit incentive in order to keep its 
suppliers in business and providing the needed products and services.108  He also addresses the 
role of politics in DoD purchasing and its impact on diminishing DoD monopsony power.109  
And finally, Day also acknowledges the oligopolistic power of major defense suppliers, 
specifically addressing the United Launch Alliance between Lockheed Martin and Boeing, which 
mitigated the government’s ability to dictate supplier pricing.110  As other scholars have, he 
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accepts that the U.S. government is a monopsonistic entity in terms of purchasing the public 
good of national defense but he also points out several factors that contribute to diminishing this 
power. 
THE UNITED KINGDOM (UK) VERSION 
While the UK’s defense market has gone through many of the same consolidation and 
limited growth challenges as defense firms in the U.S has since the early 1990s it remains both a 
distinct national and international market that mirrors the defense market in the U.S. fairly 
closely.  While it may not remain as true as it was two decades ago, it is likely that a number of 
UK high technology companies can be characterized as domestic monopolies, specifically 
aircraft, helicopters, missiles, nuclear powered submarines, tanks, and torpedoes.111  There was 
and is to an extent, an absence of rivalry or competition, especially within the UK while certainly 
not within the EU or globally.  By way of proof, there are reported examples of UK Ministry of 
Defence (MOD) procurements where competitive bidding has resulted in cost savings to the 
British Crown ranging from 10 to 70 percent.112  This level of cost saving could be interpreted as 
indicative of monopoly pricing, inefficiencies in the UK defence market, or a market that 
parallels the monopsony prevalent in the U.S. defense market.  Traditional economic theory 
would expect or potentially predict that the MOD and the armed forces would substitute 
relatively cheap for more expensive weapons systems in order to make their pound go further.113  
However, often the MOD like the U.S. DoD will select the more expensive option, sometimes 
based on the more effective capabilities the chosen system offers but sometimes based on other 
reasons.  These factors must by their very nature include potential enemies and current allies as 
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well as arms races, actual conflicts in progress, new technologies and the Exchequer’s or 
Treasury’s capability to pay for the weapons systems.114  So in the case of the UK, we have 
indications of the purchaser of national defense (or defence) goods as another monopsonist but 
we also find some mitigating or variable factors that may impact or influence purchasing 
decisions.  What is true for the UK is likely to a lesser or greater extent to hold true for the U.S. 
not because of the so-called special relationship but because of relative similarities (government 
form, alliances, etc.) between these two states.  So, monopsony may rule so to speak but it may 
also not be an absolute ruler. 
In short, the U.S. government does bear a striking resemblance to a monopsonistic buyer 
as described in economics theory.  However, often this role as the sole purchaser is off-set or 
blunted by the sellers’ strengths as oligopolistic firms, with limited numbers being able to supply 
the require goods and sometimes services.  However, there are several other factors including 
regional issues, economic policies, and legislative interest that have significant impact on the 
government’s purchasing and pricing decisions.  Not to mention the impact of imposed rules like 
the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), and the Defense FAR Supplement (DFARS).  These 
rules, as we will see in the discussion of the DoD DAS, act as sort of pseudo-market drivers.  
The intent is to level the playing field and to artificially force suppliers to adjust their pricing and 
quality as if there were competing buyers, at least for major weapons systems.  So in effect, the 
government works in many ways to force itself out of a monopsonistic position in the hopes of 
getting better pricing through competition vice using its inherent market strength to dictate 
specific ‘better’ pricing.115  One might think that the government and DoD would use its power 
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to the utmost in order to drive prices down and save money but as several authors have noted, if 
prices are too low, suppliers will lose money and thus exit the defense market – leaving the 
government without commercial suppliers to meet its national defense needs.  This is viewed by 
almost everyone in the government-side of acquisition as a less than optimal choice.  This 
obviously holds true on the commercial-side of acquisition as well. 




Figure 1- Simplified Notional Acquisition Process 
 
                                                     
(monopoly) would result in a better pricing situation for both parties vice competitive suppliers in relation to sole 
purchasers and competitive buyers versus one supplier.  By extension, this would appear to support the aggregation 
of DoD major systems suppliers; fewer suppliers equals better pricing for the monopsonist and the suppliers.  
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The federal procurement system as practiced by the U.S. government and especially the 
DoD is a complex one designed to reduce or remove favoritism or bias in selecting goods and 
services that the government purchases.  See the preceding figure (Figure 1) for a highly 
simplified version of the Defense Acquisition process.  From the contractor’s point of view, it is 
governed by two major sets of rules, the FAR and the DFARS.  However, these two documents 
are only the tip of the iceberg in terms of the rules, regulations, and statutory documents that 
govern how the DoD procures weapons systems and in fact everything else that it buys. This 
section will examine in some depth the governing DoD and Department of the Navy (DON) 
instructions on major acquisition of systems (equipment) and services. 
One of the other key governing documents is the National Defense Annual Authorization 
(NDAA).  This is basically the DoD’s annual budget as promulgated by Congress.  It often 
directs changes to the FAR and/or DFARS, directs contract awards of a certain size to firms of a 
certain type, and basically provides a lot of prescriptive guidance on how procurement ought to 
proceed under that Fiscal Year’s (FY) budget authority.  This is Congress’ opportunity to exert 
its power of the purse over the executive branch of government.  The challenge of the NDAA is 
that because it is an annual document it changes and can do so significantly from year to year.   
 





Figure 2- DAU Depiction of the Relationship between DAS, PPBE, & JCIDS 
 
The Defense Acquisition University presents the acquisition system as a series of three 
interlocking rings, representing the Joint Capability Integration Development System (JCIDS), 
the DAS, and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) and their 
interaction (see Figure 2 above).117  As the DAU website puts it; “DoD has three principal 
decision-making support systems. Together, the systems provide an integrated approach to 
strategic planning, capabilities needs assessment, systems acquisition, and program and budget 
development.” This is actually a very important concept to grasp, there are three key factors that 
DoD considers in purchasing major weapons systems, the requirement or threat (strategic 
planning), if the capability is really needed to fulfill the requirement or respond to the threat 
(capabilities), and can we afford it (PPBE) or do we settle for half loaf as better than none?  This 
is a very close parallel to the concept of ways, means, and ends. There is a desired end and there 
are certain ways and means to get there – but what is the best of these or the best combination of 
these ways and means? Identifying the ends and the ways they may be achieved determines the 
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means required (although in short-term strategies or crisis planning, the means currently 
available may determine the ways and ends).118  The other key item of interest in looking at the 
overarching system of DoD procurement is that inputs from outside the system – near-peer 
competitors, strategic non-state threats, and environmental issues – are critical input variables 
that go into the equation of defense procurement.  This is akin to the old adage that “the enemy 
gets a vote.”  
For the purposes of this study and brevity, we will focus on the DAS and while not 
ignoring the impact or importance of the other two systems, avoid going into depth about them in 
relation to the LCS procurement.  The DAS is the more important of the three interlocking 
systems in acquisition as a topic of discussion for the purpose of this study.  
The notional system begins with the definition of a requirement, often by a specific 
service, say the Navy for example, that is needed in order to accomplish the assigned missions, 
tasks, and functions that the service is required to perform.  Once this requirement is defined by a 
service or joint entity, it is presented to the Joint Requirement Oversight Council (JROC) for 
vetting, review and approval or disapproval. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System (JCIDS) is the process used by the JROC to fulfill its statutory responsibilities to the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), including but not limited to identifying, assessing, 
validating, and prioritizing joint military capability requirements.119  JCIDS ultimately informs 
much of the system development and procurement process from requirements acceptance 
through the DAS and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) where 
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money is actually allotted to the services and other DoD entities (Combatant Commanders, 
Combat Service Agencies, Joint Staff, etc.).120   
 
 
Figure 3- The Interaction between Capabilities Requirements and Acquisition Process121 
  
Using Figure 3 above, let us examine the notional flow from capabilities requirements 
definition – “We need something” to acquisition – “We are buying something that we need.” The 
initial capabilities document serves to both define the need and provide the justification for it 
being a needed capability for one of the (in our case) military departments.  Some recent 
examples that serve to illustrate this are; a new air-superiority fighter, the F-22 for the US Air 
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Force, a mine- and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) vehicle, the Mine Resistant Ambush 
Protected (MRAP) for the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, and a new surface combatant, the 
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) for the U.S. Navy.  If this capability document is reviewed and 
accepted by the JROC, then a Material Development Decision (MDD) must be made.  At this 
point there has been a decision made that a new product or system is indeed justified and needed 
and the lead service or Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) must analyze the alternative 
solution(s) available.  This pushes the acquisition program in the system into the Material 
Solution Analysis Phase.  The outcome of this is a review of the Analysis of Alternative (AoA) 
by the requirements authority, which varies with the size (cost) and nature (for example some 
DoD Information Technology programs are the purview of a Defense Acquisition Executives, 
generally a senior Deputy or Under-Secretary of Defense vice a military officer).  The outcome 
of this step is the drafting of a Capabilities Development Document and the first milestone in the 
acquisition process commonly referred to as Milestone A. 
 Milestone A, or the Risk Reduction Decision, is an actual decision to procure something 
to fulfill a capabilities requirement.  It is a decision by the DoD or service to invest in developing 
a specific product or design concept.  The intent is to commit the resources, generally funding, to 
mature a technology and/or reduce the risks inherent in a new technology before further 
resources are committed that would lead to the production and fielding of a system.122   The 
bottom line here is that the procuring agency or department needs to make a decision that 
something like the electro-magnetic rail-gun the Navy has been developing for the last five to ten 
years is effective enough and sufficient ‘bugs’ have been worked out of the technology that 
paying a company to set up a production line, provide a prototype able to function at sea, and 
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then being producing sufficient numbers to fit on Navy ships is a reasonable commitment of the 
Navy’s limited resources.  Or in our specific case study, that the concept of the LCS would 
provide the mission effectiveness and system reliability that the Navy needs for the next 20-30 
years.   
If a system passes Milestone A, it proceeds into the Technology Maturation and Risk 
Reduction phase.  Here the service seeks to improve the selected technology or develop it so that 
potential failures are minimized.  There is another phase of Capability Development 
documentation because the requirements may have changed during the intervening period of 
maturation.  As the instruction states: “Capability requirements are not expected to be static 
during the product life cycle.”123  We shall see just how important this specific statement in the 
road to IOC for LCS.  The world situation, new technologies, emerging threats, and budgets all 
play a part in the definition of required capabilities and the acquisition professionals need some 
way to adjust system and design acquisition to address these changes.  The DoD employs what it 
calls Configuration Steering Boards (CSB), to periodically review acquisition programs and 
adjust or even out-right recommend cancellation based on the capability requirements at that 
time.  For example, the Army’s self-propelled artillery system “Crusader” was cancelled with the 
end of the Cold War and the reduced call for large caliber, mobile tube artillery.124  
At some point in the technology maturation and Risk reduction process, DoD begins to 
shift into the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase of the acquisition.  
This is when DoD actually commits to building and putting into service a system, aircraft, or 
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ship and it entails three major decision points.  The first of these is the Requirements Decision 
Point or Capability Development Document (CDD).  There is where major cost versus 
performance trade-offs have been completed and enough risk mitigation done to commit to the 
set of requirements that will apply to the initial design, development, and production of a system.  
This means that the Navy has determined that 42 ships with a certain speed, weapons systems, 
and endurance are preferable in terms of cost versus 20 ships with half the speed, more systems, 
and longer endurance, again if we apply our specific case study, the LCS.  Bear in mind, that the 
cost is not just the procurement cost per unit but the entire cost of the system (people to run it, 
training the same, spare parts, system upgrades, even disposal costs) over the entire life-span of 
that system.  In the Navy’s case, as evidenced by the very recent retirement of USS 
ENTERPRISE (CVN 65) a life-span can last almost a half-century – and in her specific case 
much longer in view of the eight nuclear reactors that were installed and still require disposal at 
the time of this writing (June 2014).    
The second major decision point in the EMD phase is where industry really starts to get 
interested because it leads to the government soliciting a proposed solution from commercial 
companies.  This is the Develop Request for Proposal(s) (RFP) Release Decision Point.125  At 
this point, DoD decides whether or not a vendor, more often than not a commercial company, 
can provide a capable system to meet the requirement(s) as defined by the government.  For 
LCS, the requirement addressed ship size (tonnage and dimensions), crew, weapons systems, 
engineering systems, sea-keeping (how well the ship was supposed to handle rough seas and 
winds), maintenance, durability, speed, and endurance (either in range or days at sea).  With the 
required performance parameters provided by the government, the bidders are expected to 
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provide a design that fulfills all of the required metrics of performance and present the 
anticipated cost for them to design and build this system.  
THE REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL (RFP) AND AWARD 
The final decision point in the EMD stage is DoD’s Milestone B, or the decision to 
actually award a contract to a bidder who best satisfies the stated requirement(s).  The 
government has several options in awarding a contract, especially for a major weapons system 
like a ship or aircraft.  The simplest procurement selection process is called LPTA or “Lowest 
Price, Technically Acceptable.”  In effect, if the offered solution is “good enough” and cheaper 
than the other offerors, that bidder is awarded a contract.  This is however, not the preferred 
solution in the case of major systems because of the complexity and overall cost of the system.  
The other option labeled ‘quality trade-off’ is the preferred one for complex procurements like 
the F-22 or the LCS.  In this process, the government assesses the quality or value of the offered 
solution in comparison to the cost of the unit or whole series procurement.  Again because of the 
size and scope of major weapons systems acquisitions this is the preferred and generally most 
appropriate source selection criteria to use.  One generally wants to avoid buying anything, 
especially multi-million or multi-billion-dollar weapons systems from the proverbial “lowest 
bidder.”126   
Another alternative has gained popularity in government procurement though mostly for 
service contracts vice systems acquisition.  This is a multiple award contract, where there are 
numerous winners of a contract who then in turn compete for individual task orders issued 
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against that contract.  These are often seen in military construction (MILCON) and called 
Multiple Award Task Order Contracts or MATOC and in services where Indefinite 
Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) are issued.  These have become much more common 
because first, if everyone wins, no one loses and thus no bidder has grounds for protesting the 
award of a contract.  However, in competing for the individual task orders there are quite a few 
losers and often only one of two winners; this is in fact one of the main complaints heard from 
holders of the Navy’s Seaport-E multiple award contract vehicle.127  There has been a decided 
rise in the number of protests over the last decade and the addressing a protest costs the 
government a lot of time, money, and delays actually procuring the services or equipment that is 
required.  The other advantage from the government’s perspective is that bidders continue to 
compete, often driving down price bids, against one another for the individual task orders issued 
under a MATOC.  In the case of LCS, the government decided to make two awards, one to a 
consortium headed by Lockheed Martin and the other by General Dynamics – Bath Iron 
Works.128  This retains a certain level of the continued competition leveraged in multiple award 
contracts but requires more management from the procuring service.  However, two Rand 
Corporation studies, one on shipbuilding and the other on the Joint Strike Fighter actually 
provide evidence to the contrary.  In Why Has the Cost of Navy Ships Risen? the authors note 
that they “found no statistically significant evidence that using multiple producers lead to lower 
unit costs.”129 
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The decision to award a contract is not the end of the procurement process but is the final 
major milestone in DoD acquisition.  The final but often the most complex and costly steps are in 
the initial fielding, operational, and the disposal phases of the process.  Often new systems, 
including LCS go through “teething” problems as previously unsuspected or unexpected 
mechanical, electronic, maintenance, or software challenges (to name just a few) emerge with the 
first operational deployment or employment of a system.  One of the unexpected problems that 
has emerged with the LCS as a class is a more severe degree of metal fatigue and cracking than 
was predicted.130  Rectifying these issues takes time and money and can delay the Final 
Operational Capability (FOC) of a system, which though not exactly a procurement milestone is 
nonetheless a critical one for the owning service and the Geographic or Functional Combatant 
Commanders (COCOM) who will actually utilize these systems in military operations.  The 
other piece that is often overlooked is that weapons systems, especially ships but also aircraft and 
vehicles are not only maintained but updated over their life-cycle.  This sometimes engenders 
another round of procurement as the government looks to commercial vendors to develop new 
capabilities, install new equipment, or provide material repairs and overhauls to the systems and 
sub-systems.  One good example of this is the B-52 “Stratofortress.”  This aircraft was originally 
designed in the late 1940s to early 1950s, first flew in the mid-1950s and remains in service 
today (2016).  Over this almost 60-year life-cycle, most if not all of the systems including the 
engines and electronics have been replaced at least twice and the airframes themselves have been 
mechanically repaired on a regular basis.  Very much like DOD 5000.02 states, the requirements 
will not remain static over the life-span of a system and neither will the mechanical or electrical 
or software structure of the system.  This reflects why and how the Operations and Support phase 
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can actually become much more expensive than the purely acquisition phase(s) for a major 
weapons system.  Disposal costs are becoming more and more important as ecological values 
gain popular currency and the cost of protecting the environment rises.  We have already 
discussed the case of CVN 65, but Naval Air Station North Island in Coronado CA is another 
good illustrative case.  There was and is a major Navy aviation maintenance depot as North 
Island which has been there since the 1920s.  This is akin to a mid-sized factory or major 
industrial plant which overhauls and repairs aircraft, engines, electronics, and other aviation 
systems.  The problem is that for the first fifty or so years of the depot’s existence the issue of 
toxic heavy metals, petroleum products, and other chemical and metallurgical waste was not an 
issue.  It was often buried or dumped near the airfield and no provision to prevent toxic materials 
from contaminating the soil or ground water was required.  However, in the 1970s the 
environment and protecting it started to become a major interest item for the American people 
and thus for the military.  The level of contamination or pollution at North Island to this day, 
despite 30 plus years of remediation is high enough to match some of the EPA’s “Superfund” 
Sites.  This means that the military, and not just the Navy but all of the services have become 
much more environmentally conscious because of the costs inherent in spills, pollution, and 
contamination.  Many major weapons systems like ships cost money to dispose of properly and 
while neither the Navy nor this writer believe the environment to be unimportant; the Navy 
ought to expend its resources supporting the national security and national military strategies not 
in creating and then cleaning up new environmental disaster sites.   
SECNAVINST 5000.2E, “DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 
IMPLEMENTATION AND OPERATION OF THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION 
SYSTEM AND THE JOINT CAPABILITIES INTEGRATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM” 




 The Navy’s governing instruction fits or nests underneath the over-arching structure 
provided by the Secretary of Defense’s instruction.  It starts out with the usual broad statements 
of intent and applicability and then aims directly at many of the key pieces that fit under the DoD 
instruction.  The Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development, and Acquisition 
(ASN, RD&A) serves as the Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) for the Navy.131  Thus he 
or she is the key person in the formal procurement process for equipment and services for the 
U.S. Navy, assigning duties and responsibilities for specific acquisition programs to other 
individuals, offices, or organizations in the Department of the Navy (DON).  For us, in looking at 
the LCS program, the prescribed role of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) is of particular 
interest.  The CNO is tasked to assign program sponsors who are responsible for identifying 
naval warfare and functional areas program capability needs and requirements.132  This means 
that the CNO or his staff (known as OPNAV – Office of the Chief of Naval Operations) is 
responsible to identify and quantify or qualify the capability requirements for naval warfare 
which include several different areas applicable to the LCS class, including Surface Warfare, Air 
Warfare, and Undersea Warfare, to name some of the more significant.  It also means that 
functional areas, like communications, Command and Control (C2)133, and sensors like sonar or 
radar are ‘owned’ by OPNAV designated program sponsors.  This has some important 
implications in the procurement process and the manner in which decisions are made – especially 
as we explore the issues of organizational behavior and bureaucratic politics.  Also of note, the 
SECNAV instruction ensures that the verbiage in the instruction is in keeping with the latest 
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joint directives by stating that the “legacy term ‘requirements’ as used in this instruction may be 
interpreted to mean ‘capability requirement’ as defined in” the JCIDS Instruction (CJCSI 
3170.01I).134  Returning to the role of resources sponsors, the instruction notes that CNO 
resources sponsors are responsible for specific appropriations categories, the acquisition 
categories of ACAT, which are defined by both the equipment, systems, and services being 
acquired as well as the cost of these.  They may also have dual responsibility as program 
resources sponsors.135  Here again, we can see the potential for impacts driven by organization 
behavior and/or bureaucratic politics in the Navy’s acquisition process.   
 The instruction also delineates the process by which the Navy reviews and makes 
resource allocation decisions in a forum that allows the various stakeholders a say in where and 
when the Navy’s resources are allotted.  This is in the form of the Resources and Requirements 
Review Board (R3B).  The R3B serves as the organizational process or decision point where the 
senior members of the Navy’s flag mess, 3- and 4-star admirals look at major Navy and Joint 
acquisition programs, specifically ACAT levels I through IV.  A simple if imprecise 
characterization means that level 1 programs cost more than $2.19 billion (FY2000 dollars), 
level II cost more than $660 million, III are less than or equal to $660 million, and IV don’t meet 
some of the other criteria for level III while still costing $660 million or less.136  This simplified 
description serves to highlight the significant costs of the acquisition programs that the R3B 
reviews and also serves to highlight just how much of the Navy’s resources may or may not be 
committed to fund an ACAT program.  The decisions that the R3B makes can have significant 
impact on the resources that the Navy has available for regular operations (or Operations & 
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Maintenance often called O&M dollars) and for other acquisitions in both a specific fiscal year 
(FY) but also for the ‘out years.’137  In short, R3B decisions can have a significant impact over 
half-a-decade later on the naval service.  As the instruction puts it, the R3B serves as:  
“a focal point for decision-making regarding Navy and JCIDS ACAT I through IV and abbreviated 
acquisition requirements; the validation of non-acquisition related, emergent, and Joint requirements; the 
coordination of service input to Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) processes; and 
the resolution of cross-enterprise or cross-sponsor issues.”138 
The section regarding the PPBE processes again highlights the potential influence of 
organizational behavior because this is where the competition between the services for resources 
is often ‘fought’ out in a very political, Darwinian, and Machiavellian sense.139 
 The instruction goes on to describe the roles and responsibilities for various OPNAV and 
Navy entities in the procurement process and interestingly highlights an overarching theme of 
cost reduction or cost control whenever and wherever possible.  For instance the Deputy CNO 
for Manpower, Personnel, Training and Education or CNO (N1) is tasked to support the Program 
Executive Offices (PEO), System Commanders (SYSCOM), and direct reporting program 
managers (DRPM) with maximizing the use of technology in order to reduce manpower and 
personnel requirements and associated life-cycle costs for acquisition programs.140  This is of 
particular note for the LCS program because one of the key concepts for the individual platforms 
is the idea of minimum manning.  Sailors are considered both one of the Navy’s most important 
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resources but also one of its largest expenses and any possibility of reducing manpower 
requirements can translate into significant savings in other areas of the Navy’s corporate 
structure.  Likewise, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Information Dominance) CNO 
(N2/N6) is enjoined to “optimize Navy network investments.”141  This means that he or she is 
responsible to make the most efficient use of the Navy’s money in buying the computer 
hardware and software possible.  Considering the number of computers required to effectively 
run most of today’s weapons systems, ships, and aircraft, network investments represent a large 
sum of money and being able to purchase the most effective systems in an efficient manner can 
represent large resource savings potentially freeing up money that the Navy can invest 
elsewhere.  Likewise, though it is more implied than categorically stated, the Vice CNO for Fleet 
Readiness and Logistics (N4) is tasked with developing and recommending policy for the ASN 
(RD&A) to approve regarding acquisition life-cycle logistics.  This office is also directed to 
conduct assessments of system life-cycle cost affordability.142  Again it is drawing inferences, 
but the unstated assumption is that N4 should develop policies that will, if possible, minimize 
systems maintenance costs for the entire life-cycle of the system.  Likewise, if the system 
logistics life-cycle is not affordable, N4 will notify the acquisition lead and potentially make 
suggestions on how to decrease the overall life-cycle costs, cut-short, or even recommend 
cancellation.   
 One final observation from the introductory section of SECNAVINST 5000.2E; the 
various acquisition entities tasked with leading procurement efforts are provided with very 
definite directions.  The various Program Executive Offices, System Command Commanders 
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and DPRMs are granted the authority, responsibility, and accountability for the life-cycle 
management of all acquisition programs under their respective cognizance.143  Again, this infers 
that managing and if possible reducing those costs in a policy goal supported by the office of the 
Secretary of the Navy and levied upon subordinate organizations in the acquisition process. 
 For the LCS program, the role of Commander, Space and Naval Warfare Systems 
Command (COMSPAWARSYSCOM) assigned by this governing instruction has some special 
significance.  This is because much of the LCS concept is based on the idea of networked 
platforms working in concert.144  SPAWAR (to use Navy short-hand) is tasked with managing 
the system and technical architecture and mission-area chief engineer for command and control 
(C2) and net-centric segment reference architectures (SRAs).  Again, this is important because 
the LCS mission or function concept relies very heavily on timely and accurate C2 and the 
integration of individual LCS platforms (hulls) into net-centric networks where each functions as 
part of the greater sum to apply kinetic or non-kinetic effects (or “fires”) against a specified 
target.145  The introduction goes on to delineate roles and responsibilities for a host of other 
offices and organizations from Navy Net Warfare Command (NETWARCOM), the Naval 
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Center for Cost Analysis (NCCA), and the Ergonomics Center of Expertise owned by the Naval 
Facilities Engineering Command (who as “NAVFAC” is more often associated with shore based 
architecture and engineering, than systems acquisition). 
FLEXIBILITY IN ACQUISITION 
While the DoD acquisition system is a clearly defined and complex process it is not set in 
stone.  Part of this is necessitated by the differences inherent in procuring a ship or a system of 
systems, and for example, a radar system to be mounted on said ship.  Differences, especially in 
the time required to develop and field a major weapons system force the ability to adapt and 
adjust the system to program needs and to filling defined ‘gaps and seams’ in current military 
capabilities.  The governing instruction specifically states: 
While these generic decision points and milestones are standard, MDAs have full latitude to tailor 
programs in the most effective and efficient structure possible, to include eliminating phases and combining 
or eliminating milestones and decision points, unless constrained by statute.146 
The intention here is not to enable Milestone Decision Authorities to cheat, it is to allow them 
sufficient flexibility to get the required capability into the hands of those who need it in as timely 
a manner as they can consistent with budgetary and legal i.e. statutory constraints.  This idea is 
repeated in several other places in the instruction; “Tailoring is always appropriate when it will 
produce a more efficient and effective acquisition approach for the specific product.”147  And in 
fact, there is a specific acquisition model for the “Accelerated Acquisition Model”148 as well as 
an entire enclosure addressing the acquisition process for the Rapid Fielding of Capabilities.149  
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What these passages and example all serve to highlight though is that the acquisition process is 
described as being capable of flexibility and adaptability.  There are certain advantages to this 
and the Navy has adapted them to its ship acquisition process. 
SECNAVINST 5000.2E (CONT.) 
The Navy’s acquisition process is governed by the DoD instruction and the Secretary of 
the Navy’s instruction, 5000.2E. This instruction describes how the Navy is to implement and 
execute the DAS and JCIDS program within its own acquisition programs.  It also describes in 
somewhat less detail how Navy acquisition may diverge from the strictest interpretation of the 
Secretary of Defense’s guidance.  As mentioned several times in preceding passages, the 
acquisition of ships, representing a “System of systems” can be and often is significantly more 
complex and more expensive than a new aircraft or tank.  While these systems are not simple by 
any means, the sheer size of most ships and the number of component sub-systems that are 
installed on ships can be orders or magnitude larger than other DoD weapons systems.  This 
increases the development time, the design and construction time, and the overall cost of the 
program.  In view of the time requirements to bring a new ship class into service, the Secretary 
of the Navy has “hedged” his or her bets by including verbiage that allows increased flexibility 
specifically for shipbuilding.  
Unlike most DoD major acquisition programs, according to the Secretary of the Navy, 
because of the need to design the structure of the ship (hull and superstructure), the program may 
be initiated at milestone A – before the technology maturation and risk reduction efforts are 
undertaken. 




“Shipbuilding programs may be initiated at milestone A in order to start ship design concurrent with sub-
system and component TD.” 150 
The rationale behind this is that naval architecture and systems engineering need to proceed in 
concert (if not ’lock-step’) so that while the systems are being designed, the container that they 
shall be placed in i.e. the hull is designed at the same time.  All of the systems to be installed 
need to both fit and be mounted in such a way that they do not make the ship unstable or 
underpowered.  A very appropriate historical example is the Swedish warship VASA.  She was 
and is a masterwork of 17th century naval architecture but when her weapons systems (cannons) 
were fitted they created a negative metacentric height, in effect the distance between the ship’s 
center of gravity and its center of buoyancy was insufficient to provide a righting arm (otherwise 
known as the metacentric height).  This in turn created a very unstable platform that once it was 
in the water with the guns mounted proceeded to heel (tilt) excessively, allowed water to pour in 
further decreasing the metacentric height, and finally sank because of the flooding off the shore 
of Stockholm.151  Another famous historical example is the Tudor warship MARY ROSE.  While 
scholars, maritime archeologists, and naval architects still debate the specific reason(s) for her 
sinking on 19 July 1545, one of the more reasonable hypotheses is that she was overloaded with 
guns newly fitted before the battle with the French.  This coupled with a sharp heel during a turn 
allowed water to flood through her lower gun ports sinking the ship.  The key fact that these two 
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examples highlight however, is that designers have to be very careful when installing systems or 
weight into and on a waterborne hull. 
 These historical anecdotes while potentially anachronistic highlight the very real concern 
regarding stability of a warship. The U.S. Navy has made a very calculated risk-reward decision 
in its acquisition program by enabling program managers to adjust the formal DoD process to 
allow for concurrent design and development of ships and systems in order to better balance the 
engineering requirements with the capability requirements or performance.  Many major 
weapons systems must address the balance between intended systems to provide the desired 
capability and the physical platform which will carry the system or systems through the 
operational environment.  Military aircraft need radars, bombs, missiles, radios, etc. in order to 
accomplish their mission.  These physical loads must be balanced with the airframe that will 
carry them, the engines that will propel them and the airframe, and the fuel required to power the 
whole system.  Trade-offs need to be made so that the aircraft has the required range, speed, and 
the flight endurance to carry out required missions; the same is true for LCS and other ship 
classes.  Concurrently designing the ship and the technologies is a logical approach depending on 
the complexity or “newness” of the technology.  There is also the fact that while ships are often 
designed to be multi-mission platforms, sometimes they are specifically designed around one 
major weapon or one major system.  The TICONDEROGA class of cruisers was designed 
around the Aegis weapons system, using an already existing hull and power plant. This led to 
some early challenges with stability because the radar transmission panels and associated power 
and cooling systems were mounted high in the superstructure.   
 What the Navy has done by allowing parallel development and design is to adjust volume 
and weight considerations in the technologies and to in turn adjust the volume, weight, and shape 




of the hull which is intended to carry those systems.  Referring back to the earlier example of the 
electro-magnetic rail gun, a gun that is too large or requires too much power for a given hull 
would potentially fail to fulfill the required capability.  As an extreme example, a gun that can 
fire a projectile 200 nautical miles and sink any ship afloat but that requires a 1000-foot hull and 
20 electrical generators to power it, might match the required capability but be so expensive to 
produce that it is impractical and ultimate fails to truly fulfill the capability requirement.  In 
developing the gun system while designing the hull and supporting systems, the Navy might be 
able to produce a level of effectiveness at a reasonable cost that does satisfy the capability 
requirement.  The same holds true in the case of the LCS class; designing the systems or more 
accurately the mission packages while designing the ship itself enables the needed tailoring and 
adaption to integrate these equipment packages into an effective system of systems.  
The Navy’s instruction returns to the standards set out in the DoD governing instruction 
with the statement that a Capabilities Development Document will be validated and approved 
before a shipbuilding program not started at milestone A is approved for program initiation.152  
This serves to reiterate that while the Navy may choose to initiate an official procurement 
program at milestone A this is not necessarily the general rule.  In the case of shipbuilding, the 
lead ship and initial follow-on ships are normally approved at milestone B. The follow-on ships 
that are approved at milestone B shall be sufficient quantities to maintain shipyard construction 
continuity until the FRP DR.153 
SECNAVINST 5000.2E: THE TWO PASS, SIX GATE SYSTEM 
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The companion volumes to the DoDI 5000.02E from the Navy are the Secretary of the 
Navy instructions, 5000.2E “Department of the Navy Implementation and Operation of the 
Defense Acquisition System and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System” 
and its partner volume SECNAVINST M-5000.2 “Department of the Navy Acquisition and 
Capabilities Guidebook.”  These two instructions expand and amplify the direction provided by 
the DoD instruction and tailors acquisition planning to better fit Navy (and Marine Corps) needs.  
Both of the documents follow the prescribed processes laid out in the DoD instruction while 
assigning specific duties and responsibilities to organizations and individuals internal to the 
Navy organization in accordance with the governing instruction.  However, neither of these 
service specific documents are mere reiterations of what the Secretary of Defense has published; 
they both leverage off of and differ from the overarching guidance in some particularly important 
ways.  Having already looked at the first section of SECNAVINST 5000.2E, let us turn to the 
second section where we can find the Navy’s acquisition process described by the “Two-Pass 
and Six-Gate DON Requirements and Acquisition Governance Process”154 depicted in the below 
figure.   
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Figure 4- Diagram of the 2 Pass/6 Gate System155 
 
The Navy’s DAS and JCIDS implementation guide provides a description of what the 
service calls the “2 Pass, 6 Gate System.”  The stated intent of this process is to “improve 
governance and insight into the development, establishment, and execution of acquisition 
programs in the DON. The goal of the review process is to ensure alignment between Service-
generated capability requirements and systems acquisition, while improving senior leadership 
decision-making through better understanding of risks and costs throughout a program’s entire 
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development cycle.”156  The DON process in effect overlays or is embedded in the standard DoD 
acquisition process.  Pass 1 and gates 1 through 3 are focused in the JCIDS and Material Solution 
Analysis phases before the milestone A decision point.  Gate 1 is the Initial Capabilities 
Document that must be routed and approved by both the Navy’s and the joint community’s 
acquisition hierarchy.  Gate 2 encompasses the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) where the intent 
is for the service or MDA to determine the ‘best’ solution to their capabilities requirement.  
Without belaboring the point or reiterating specifics from the DoD instruction, this step is 
important because the alternatives are not always technical or physical in nature.  One of the 
unspoken policies at US Joint Forces Command in the early 2000s until the command was dis-
established was the pursuit of non-materiel solutions.157  Often in looking at required capabilities 
analysts would investigate the DOTMLPF-P158 domain for solutions not requiring the acquisition 
of major weapons systems.   Gate 3 is the review of the service approved Capability 
Development Document (CDD) and Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the system described 
in the CDD and ought to be completed before milestone A.159  It encompasses an additional 
variety of steps or system attributes that must be certified before the program can move forward.  
These include developing the cost position and scope – or in other words the affordability of the 
system – with a focus on the costing of the technology development (TD) phase.160  In concert 
with the costing of the TD phase, gate 3 requires a review and acceptance of the strategy for TD, 
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for testing and evaluation, and for the System Engineering Plan.  Following along this funding 
theme, there is also a requirement to certify the selected solution for funding for milestone A and 
to review the entire intended program for health in terms of both costs and funding.161  There is 
also the requirement in the technical sphere to validate the System Design Specification (SDS) 
Development plan and to ensure that the outlined SDS links to the required Key Performance 
Parameters (KPP) and Key System Attributes (KSA).  In short, the intent of these technical 
reviews is to ensure that the system or system of systems is designed to perform as intended and 
to fulfill the required capability for which it is being chosen.  
Pass 2 starts at milestone A but just before the technology development (TD) phase itself 
initiates.  This pass encompasses gates 4 through 6 with 6 lasting throughout the entire life-cycle 
of the acquired system or ‘system of systems.’  It is led by the Component Acquisition Executive 
(CAE) and as noted above encompasses three acquisition gates and continues through the end of 
the system life-cycle to disposal.162  Gate 4 approves the formal SDS and formally approves a 
program to proceed to gate 5 and milestone B.  The gate chair (Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
for Research, Development & Acquisition – ASN [RD&A]) is responsible for verifying that the 
SDS reflects the design parameters necessary the KSAs and KPPs delineated in the Capability 
Development Document (CDD).  He is also responsible to review and certify that the system is 
designed for some degree of ‘mass’ production, operability, inter-operability, reliability and 
maintainability.163  In short, to make sure that it can be built with some level of manageable cost, 
that it works and that it will work without prohibitively intense maintenance and/or repairs. For 
some systems these are not easy characteristics to certify and it requires significant effort on the 
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part of the service and stakeholders to ensure that these attributes apply with a level of accuracy 
to the system to be procured.  Here again, as at gate 3, the reviewing body and chair are required 
to look at the overall program health in terms of cost and budgeting but also in terms of schedule 
and risk before passing the program to proceed through the acquisition process.  This is also a 
stage where the Configuration Steering Board (CSB) provides inputs regarding any changes to 
the systems, and where their technology, their required performance, materials, etc. are 
addressed and incorporated as required.   The CSB has significance for the LCS program because 
of the two selected platforms or hull forms and the variety of intended mission modules.  
Maintaining the configuration of these systems or adjusting them to changes in required 
capabilities can be a complicated and expensive endeavor.  This requires that the CSB monitor 
the technical configuration of the systems and sub-systems to ensure that the required updates 
meet the requirements and are cost-effective.  In some cases, required capabilities may need to 
be delayed or even out-right rejected by the CSB, if implementing them will be too expensive or 
take too much time to complete.  
Gate 5 is designed to ensure that the Navy has completed the needed actions and 
recommendations made by the MDA so that the MDA can release a formal Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development (EMD) Request for Proposal (RFP) to industry.164  This gate also 
serves to justify full funding certification for milestone B and to ensure that the CSB changes 
have been addressed.  It also provides another point in the government acquisition process to 
review the overall health of the program, the risk in the schedule, and the planned program 
budgeting for sufficiency throughout the entire life-cycle of the capability acquisition.165 
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Gate 6 repeats the assessment of the overall health of the program and continues to do so 
throughout the life-span of the program.  It also requires an assessment of the program’s 
readiness for productions, the sufficiency of the SDS, the Earned Value Management System 
(EVMS) Performance Measurement Baseline (PMB), and the Integrated Baseline Review 
(IBR).166  Gate 6 reviews are conducted initially after the EMD contract award and the 
satisfactory completion of the IBR.  They are also conducted before the Full Rate Production 
Decision Review (FRP DR) and after the system reaches IOC.  The post-IOC review focuses on 
program sufficiency in terms of both fiscal and material resourcing.  Gate 6 reviews will be 
conducted periodically during the entire life-span of the systems and serves as a forum for annual 
CSBs.167   
The gate review boards are composed of various stakeholders from across the Navy (and 
Marines when appropriate) and sometimes the joint world as well.  The principal members 
include Vice Chief of Naval Operations; Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, 
Development, and Acquisition (ASN(RD&A); Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial 
Management and Comptroller (ASN(FM&C)); Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program 
(N00N) as required; Principal Military [Assistant to] DASN(RD&A) (PMDASN(RD&A)); CNO 
(N1, N2/N6, N3/N5, N4, N8); Warfare Enterprise (WE) representative(s) (Surface, Undersea, 
Naval Aviation; Naval Network Warfare (NETWAR)/FORCEnet; and Navy Expeditionary 
Combat Command) lead (TYCOM)168; and or Deputy, United States Fleet Forces Command 
                                                     
166 In accordance with Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition policy, Program Managers (PMs) must conduct 
Integrated Baseline Reviews (IBRs) on contracts with Earned Value Management (EVM) requirements. IBRs are 
intended to provide a mutual understanding of risks inherent in contractors' performance plans and underlying 
management control systems. Source: “The Program Manager’s Guide to the Integrated Baseline Review Process” 
(Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, April 2003), 1.   
167 SECNAVINST 5000.2E, 1-56. 
168 The TYCOMs are ‘type commanders’ in the Navy who are responsible for the maintenance, manning, and 
training of specific platform types; surface ships (Commander Naval Surface Forces), aircraft (Commander, Naval 




(USFLTFORCOM), and cognizant SYSCOM commander. The chair determines the specific 
membership for each Gate Review.  The chair also determines which advisory members or other 
representatives may be included while principal members may request attendance by other 
relevant stakeholder commands.  These relevant commands may include Department of the Navy 
Chief Information Officer (DON CIO); Chief of the Navy Reserve (CNR); cognizant PEO; and 
Director, Strategic Systems Programs (SSP).169   
The advisory members for gate reviews may include Chief of Naval Operations (CNO 
Director, Programming Division (OPNAV (N80)); Director, Assessment Division (OPNAV 
(N81)); Director, Fiscal Management Division (OPNAV (N82)); Associate Director, Assessment 
Division (OPNAV (N81D)); CNO (N091); resource sponsor); Deputy, USFLTFORCOM (Fleet 
Policy Capabilities Requirements, Concepts and Experimentation (N5/N8/N9)); DASN(Budget); 
DASN(Cost and Economics (C&E)); DASN(Acquisition and Procurement)(AP); Office of 
General Counsel (OGC); SYSCOM cost director; Director, Navy International Programs Office 
(NIPO); SECNAV Office of Program Appraisal (OPA); DASN Research, Development, Test, 
and Evaluation (RDT&E); Chief Systems Engineer (CHSENG); cognizant DASN; and the 
Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Forces (COMOPTEVOR).  It is notable that we 
can see the scope and breath of organizations involved based on the position title of the 
respective organizations or offices – there are quite a few stakeholders in Navy ACAT programs.  
They cover a broad spectrum of service equities including the funding sources, the technology 
offices, the acquisition community, and some of the actual operations stakeholders.  This broad 
spectrum presents an opportunity to get buy-in from key stakeholders, but it also presents the 
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opportunity for an organization or individual to impact the course of an acquisition.  In some 
cases, there may be a ‘cast of thousands’ or a small, select group of decision makers involved in 
all of the gate reviews under the SECNAVs’ cognizance and the CNO has a preponderance of 
influence in selecting or allowing participants.  
SECNAVINST 5000.2E – CHAPTER TWO  
 The following chapter in the instruction addresses specifically the assessments required 
for initiating a shipbuilding program, paragraph 2.10.3.  The title of the paragraph says it all 
“Assessments Required Prior to Approving the Start of Construction on First Ship of 
Shipbuilding Program.”  SECNAV is required by law (the 2008 NDAA) to submit a report to the 
congressional defense committees on the results of any production readiness review and 
concurrently certify to them that the findings the review support commencement of 
construction.170  These production readiness review report assessment addresses multiple key 
issues in an acquisition program focusing on shipbuilding.  The first metric the report must 
address is the maturity of the ship’s design as measured by the stability of the contract 
specifications e.g. how much growth there has been in the Statement of Work/Performance Work 
Statement (SOW/PWS).  This measuring of stability must also include the degree of completion 
of detailed designs and production design drawings.171  The next set of metrics that are addressed 
in the report are the development status of the developmental Command and Control (C2) 
systems, the weapons and sensor systems, and the Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical (HM&E) 
systems.   Along with these metrics, the SECNAV must report on the readiness of the shipyards 
                                                     
170  Ibid, 2-43. 
171 Deborah L. Clark, Donna M. Howell, Charles E. Wilson, “Improving Naval Shipbuilding Project Efficiency 
Through Rework Reduction,” Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 26.  Thomas Lamb, Engineering for Ship 
Production: A Textbook (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 1986), 16. Available online at: 
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and personnel to physically begin construction of the ships which requires inputs from the 
commercial contractors like Marinette and Ingalls Shipbuilding who have bid on the work.  The 
final three metrics are by no means the least but are all interconnected and connected to the 
preceding series of measures addressed in the report.   
 The SECNAV speaking for his department must report on the Navy’s estimated complete 
program cost at completion of the acquisition and the adequacy of budgeting to support this 
estimate.  He must also provide the estimated delivery date(s) for the ship and/or ships and 
justify or explain any variance from the contracted delivery date(s).  And finally, SECNAV must 
tell the defense committees what processes are in place and what metrics will be used to measure 
and manage risk (e.g. cost overruns, production delays) for the entire scope of the program.172  
This is obviously a comprehensive and critical report for the acquisition program, and potentially 
explains the adopting of a rigorous internal acquisition process on top of or in addition to the 
strictures already delineated in the DoD instruction on major acquisitions.   
 The full rate production decision i.e. building ships number two and three and so forth is 
actually addressed in chapter 1 and thus it is logical to address that decision point here vice under 
the section on chapter 1 above.  The FRP DR is held to inform the MDA on the outcome of the 
initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E).  It also serves to authorize the construction of the 
remaining follow ships in the class and to satisfy the requirements of the instruction itself.173  
This assumes of course that the IOT&E has been successful or at least satisfied the minimum 
requirements for authorizing continued construction. 
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THE ACTUAL ‘PROCUREMENT’ OF SYSTEMS AND SYSTEMS OF 
SYSTEMS 
At this point, we will step away from the governing instructions and how the 
government’s processes are designed to work to look at the actual process, in a broad sense of 
how the systems are actually physically procured by the government and in a narrow sense as to 
how the Navy is procuring these specific ships.  This should help set the stage for the following 
chapters which will describe the actual acquisition of the LCS; since its inception as a capability 
concept to the six commissioned and 13 under-construction units.174  It also provides some 
insight into the competition for contracts, the source selection process, and the administration of 
awarded contracts. 
At a much lower level, once the money is divvied out and the individual services receive 
their budgets, they then decide what the internal distribution will be.  In our case, the Navy has to 
decide how much money the shipbuilding and systems acquisition offices get to build and to 
equip the hulls that the Navy is buying.  The Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
(NAVSEA) is the overarching organization within the Navy responsible for surface ship 
acquisition including the LCS class.  The respective subordinate offices, like the Program 
Executive Office (PEO) Ships then decide what portion of their monies will go to the LCS 
program, what portion other surface combatants (like guided missile destroyers (DDGs)) and so 
forth.  This money becomes the bucket from which the LCS program office can draw to purchase 
what they require.  Thus, despite potential resources available from other programs or money 
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freed up by Overseas Combat Operations (OCO) supplemental funding, the program office must 
make choices and prioritize what it will buy.  
The uniformed or Government Service (GS) decision makers, who actually ‘own’ the 
funding must then work through the procurement or contracting offices to write Requests for 
Proposals (RFP) or Requests for Quotes (RFQ) to which commercial bidders must respond in 
order to qualify for a contract award.  This was what the DoD and SECNAV instructions labeled 
the RFP step or milestone B.  This is the stage where the FAR and DFARS really come into play.  
For the purposes of this work, with the focus on the “power balance” between organizational 
behavior and individual behavior, the FAR and DFARS, while they are important are also 
beyond the intended scope.  For the sake of brevity and allowing for the inaccuracy of the 
statement, these documents direct how the Request for Proposals will be written by the 
government, how the government should assess the responses, and how the government will 
administer the awarded contract or contracts.  They in effect determine the playing field upon 
which the potential vendors will compete and how the government will deal with all of the 
competitors both successful and unsuccessful.   
A SOLICITATION OR REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS OR QUOTES (RFP OR 
RFQ) 
 In a simplified example of an RFP issued by the government, the Statement of Work (SOW) or  
Performance Work Statement (PWS) delineates exactly what the government wants from the 
vendors.175  In the case of LCS, these specifications included range, maximum speed in a high 
sea-state, aircraft embarked, provisions in terms of days, weight capacity for mission modules, 
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draft, and operational availability.176  There were also a variety of other design parameters that 
the bidders were required to provide, many of them exactly mirroring the programmatic 
requirements illuminated in both the DoD and SECNAV acquisition instructions.  The actual 
structure and contents of the solicitation will be the subject of a significant section of the 
following chapter and for the sake of brevity this is as deep as we will dive into the contents for 
this chapter. 
The various bidders review the solicitation, especially the SOW/PWS, the contents and 
format required to be included in the response, and the grading criteria.  Based on these specifics 
and their firm’s intended solution, the proposal team will write a response to the government 
describing and pricing how they will satisfy the government’s capability requirement.  Usually, a 
proposal for a MDAP like LCS or the Joint Strike Fighter will include four to five volumes 
encompassing the technical approach in volume 1.  The second volume will generally describe 
the contract and program management design.  Volume 3 will include past performance, 
describing how a bidding firm or team of firms has successfully completed similar projects in the 
past.  Pricing is generally included in volume 4 and the fifth volume will address the sub-
contracting plan, delineating how the prime contractor will use its smaller team-mates like 8(a) 
firms, minority and women owned small businesses and companies certified as Historically 
Underutilized Business Zones (HUBZones)177 for example. The RFP response being duly 
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written, the bidders are generally required to provide at least one hard-copy and electronic copies 
on CD to the government.178 
The government receives the proposals and begins their review.  Often, the government 
will set up both a proposal review team and a source selection committee to which the review 
team reports.  The review team will be broken down into technical, managerial, and fiscal review 
groups who in turn review the pertinent sections or volumes of the proposals.  Once the review 
team determines if a proposal is compliant with the response requirements, they will assess the 
sections of the proposal for the value of the solution that they provide.  As mentioned earlier (see 
p. 49) the grading criteria are generally either LPTA or a quality trade-off (quality compared to 
cost).  Almost invariably bidding firms state that they will meet the government’s needs ‘better, 
faster, cheaper’ but unless they categorically and clearly state how they plan to achieve these 
goals, the review team will down-select or reject their proposal.  One key item to bear in mind is 
that the government is looking for reasons to reject proposals – they are laboring under a dead-
line as was the proposal writing team and anything that enables them to save time, like rejecting 
a non-compliant proposal, will be embraced with alacrity.  Once the review team selects the best 
proposal or proposals, they will provide the source selection committee with their assessments 
and recommendations.  The committee actually decides on the winning proposal(s).  The 
responsible contracting officer will review the source selection and if they concur, will notify the 
winner(s).      
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 The award of a contract is only the beginning of a more intricate and complicated process 
by which the contract is administered and executed.  The administration deals with required 
reporting, delivery schedules, payment, personnel, and security issues.  The execution is the 
schedule of progress, level of effort, monetary expenditure (often called ‘burn-rate’), and the 
testing of delivered materials, systems, or sub-systems.  This is a much-simplified version of 
how a contract is awarded and executed but it provides a frame-work for understanding the next 
chapter on the specifics of the acquisition of the LCS. 
SUMMARY 
This chapter described the nature of the U.S. defense market, described how the U.S. 
DoD goes about acquiring products and services, with a distinct focus on MDAPs like LCS, and 
in a very simple manner, presented the RFP process from both the bidder and from the 
government perspective.  The intent is to provide a basic understanding of the structure within 
which the LCS procurement was and is operating and to introduce some of the key stakeholders 
if not by name then by role or sometimes more importantly their ‘office.’  This framework 
should provide the needed context for a more descriptive and in-depth narrative and analysis of 
the actual development, acquisition, and fielding of the LCS class of ships. 
 The other key take-away from this chapter is that the market for national security is not a 
traditional market in the Smith, Ricardian, or Chicago School sense of a ‘free market.’  It is 
instead a significantly warped market where supply and demand are both greatly impacted and 
warped by indigenous and endogenous factors.  The single demand source has very much of a 
monopsonist’s power in the market.  Meanwhile the limited number of firms enjoy very much of 
an oligopolistic power of supply in reference to the customer.  It is a challenging environment for 




for-profit companies to compete and also for the government to get what it needs at a reasonable 
price. 
  






THE LCS CONCEPT AND SOLICITATION 
 This chapter is a narrative of the actual development of the LCS from a concept to IOC.  
The intent is to answer as many of the 5 ‘Ws’ as possible with some emphasis on the ‘Who’ 
question.  In order to understand the program and the organizations involved however, we need 
to understand the ‘What, Where, When,’ and of course the ‘Why’ of this acquisition program.  
This chapter starts with an investigation of why the U.S. Navy decided that it needed a Littoral 
Combat Ship.  The strategic environment that the U.S. had faced since 1945 suffered a sea 
change with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics.  The open ocean war at sea was a thing of the past.  This required new capabilities 
and thus new ships.  The second portion of this chapter addresses the actual solicitation that was 
released to industry for designing and constructing the LCS.  This Request for Proposal (RFP) is 
reviewed in depth to highlight the scope and breadth of the requirement.  This portion of the 
chapter is also intended to highlight just how transformational this solicitation was in comparison 
to past Navy ship procurements.  Previous classes of ships were incremental developments on 
preceding hulls and were solicited as technical specification bids.  LCS was a brand-new hull 
design and was solicited as a performance specification bid.  This encompasses almost ten years 
and about seven ships to date.   The overarching intent of this chapter is to recount the 
background and the specifics of the solicitation.    
We need to examine this road to IOC for the LCS class to better understand the class’ 
triumphs and failures.  The intent of this chapter is to examine the ‘birth’ of LCS, tracing it from 
the federal solicitation for bids to the first deployment of USS FREEDOM (LCS 1) to the current 




status of the class.   The goal is not to emphasize the failures of the LCS program so much as to 
reveal the challenges inherent in fielding an entirely new ship class.  The intent is to emphasize 
the revolutionary nature of this procurement program.  The LCS class was solicited in a very 
different way from any other class of ships in the U.S. Navy and it incorporates a ground-
breaking main propulsion system unlike any since the introduction of the US Navy’s first screw 
driven steamship USS PRINCETON in 1843.  This chapter will highlight just how unique the 
RFP for the LCS was in comparison to other ship solicitations and how different the installed 
propulsion system is from any other larger ship in the Navy.  This was the first time in living 
memory that the Navy solicited a new ship class using performance vice design specifications; 
there may have been some precedents but no other major combatant since the Second World War 
has been procured in this manner.  Akin to the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, the Navy told 
bidders what the LCS must and should be able to do and told them to design and build it based 
on those required capabilities.  One of the direct outcomes of this, specifically based on the 
required speed of the LCS class, was the design and construction of the first major U.S. warship 
propelled by hydro jets vice propellers.  The other engineering first that resulted from this Navy 
requirement was the capability to reconfigure the individual platforms for different missions.  
This was another major departure from traditional warship design.  Previously ships were 
designed for one fixed mission or to undertake several different missions with appropriate 
weapons systems permanently installed.179  This chapter will provide an in-depth view of the 
solicitation and the resulting ships.             
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Figure 5 LCS Fielding Timeline 
 
 
THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT 
 The LCS was born of a sea change in the strategic environment in the early 1990s.  The 
end of the Cold War and the final dissolution of the Soviet Union created a brave new world (or 
“New World Order”)180 for which the US Navy needed a brave new operational concept.  1992 
saw the first in a series of Navy white papers aimed at re-orienting the operational focus and 
training of the Navy from a “blue water” battle against the Red Banner Fleets of the Soviet 
Union to fighting in the littorals against regional threats.  The maritime focus of the U.S Navy 
shifted from the open ocean of the high seas to the cluttered regions near the shore where 
regional states represented potential maritime threats.  The white paper “…From the Sea” was 
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the first official Navy document that addressed the littoral “or near land” areas of the world as 
important potential areas where the Navy expected to face threats and in which it would be 
forced to operate.181   This was a huge conceptual adjustment from the open ocean combat that 
the Navy had expected in the North Atlantic to keep the sea lanes of communication (SLOC) 
open for reinforcing the land forces battling the Red Army as it tried to overrun Western Europe.  
Instead the US Navy envisioned a series of brush-fire wars similar to those fought across the 
Third World during the Cold War against a series of regional adversaries or those fought by the 
British and French during the height of the 19th centuries imperialist years in Africa, the Near, 
and the Far East.  Further complicating the future challenges was the very nature of the littorals; 
rather than the unrestricted waters of the high seas, the littorals are “confined and congested 
water and air space”182 with friendly, hostile and neutral entities and geographic features 
significantly complicating the identification, targeting, and weapons engagement processes.  
 “…From the Sea” was also the first place that mentioned the concept A2/AD though not 
in so many words.  What the white paper did mention however, was the capability of adversaries 
to concentrate and layer their defenses.183  These defenses did not include anti-ship ballistic 
missiles but did encompass tactical ballistic missiles, sea-skimming cruise missiles, submarines, 
mines, and potentially small attack craft.184  It also proposed the first tentative steps towards a 
mission tailoring albeit indirectly.  The concept did categorically state that a “carrier battle 
group” may not be the answer in every situation.185  Instead, the new war in the littoral regions 
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would require continuously tailored naval forces with sufficient command and control and 
surveillance capabilities (among others) to dominate the battlespace.186  This threat assessment 
and required operational capabilities would persist as key issues for the design and intended 
employment LCS.  Additionally, the concept of affordability and of fiscal resources impacting 
naval operations was highlighted in “...From the Sea.”  This white paper categorically stated that 
the naval forces had to be capable and affordable for the new struggle to control the littorals.  It 
also addressed at least in passing, the redundancy remaining in the Navy in the aftermath of the 
end of the Cold War.  These ideas too were going to resurface throughout the development of the 
LCS. 
The next iteration of Navy strategy was entitled “Forward…From the Sea” and came out 
in 1994.  This white paper reiterated the new challenge focused in the littoral regions of the 
world.187  It also focused much more intently than its predecessor on the idea of presence and 
most especially on forward presence by U.S. Navy units.188  But like “…From the Sea,” the new 
concept paper also mentioned the idea of “tailored” naval forces with specific capabilities.  
Alongside the consistent reiteration of forward presence in regional hotspots, this strategic 
concept paper emphasized the tailoring or sizing of naval forces as one of its basic themes.  This 
idea came to be one of the foundation concepts for the development of the LCS, that being the 
ability to adjust system installations on platforms to or for specific mission capabilities like mine 
warfare and surface warfare.   
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The last iteration of naval strategy papers from the 1990s again emphasized the criticality 
and influence of forward deployed naval forces operating in contested littoral regions around the 
globe.  It also continued the theme of dispersed and networked systems (or platforms) “linking 
dispersed units as an integrated force with command and control networks.”189  This phrase was 
repeated later in terms of spreading surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities across a wide 
geographic area.190  This version of the Navy’s operational concept provided more focus on the 
idea of the dispersed and networked platforms.191  It also emphasized or introduced so to speak 
the idea of on-scene command and control and the inherent self-sustainment capabilities of naval 
platforms, specifically in our case ships.  This self-sustainment piece included what became 
another key concept for LCS, the rapid re-deployment piece.192  The idea of the mobility of naval 
forces and dispersion of the same remained a persistent theme throughout this iteration of the 
Navy’s operational concept. 
It also brought out a point regarding the littorals that proved to be an important phrase in 
the following years for both the LCS program and for the Navy as a service.  “Seventy-five 
percent of the Earth’s population and a similar proportion of national capitals and major 
commercial centers lie in the littorals.”193  Several other key buzzwords or phrases like this also 
entered the strategic lexicon on the U.S. Navy in the wake of the Cold War.  Over 70 percent of 
the world’s surface is covered by water, over 90 percent of international trade by weight and 
volume value is sea-borne194 and any disruption of the global maritime commons would have a 
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serious deleterious impact on the global economy.  By extension this would have significant 
negative impacts on the American economy.  All of these phrases came to play a large role in 
what might be termed marketing materials published and promulgated by the Department of the 
Navy, the U.S. Marine Corps and the Navy itself.  In many ways, the ‘New World Order’ 
presented a much higher risk to the continued fiscal health of the Navy than it did to any of the 
other services, not excepting the Marines.  The blue-water armada that Admiral Sergey 
Gorshkov had so assiduously nurtured as Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy was almost 
completely no more and certainly most distinctly diminished.  The U.S. Navy had to find other 
dragons abroad to slay, if only to guarantee its continued physical and fiscal existence in the face 
of a looming ‘peace dividend’ in the years immediately following after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall.  
At the end of the Cold War, in a surprisingly short time for such a large organization, the 
U.S. Navy re-evaluated the international system that it faced and worked very hard to adjust its 
strategic assessments, plans, and goals to better suit the new operational environment.  The LCS 
was born of this strategic re-assessment especially when the outside environment was matched 
with the resource constrained national security environment or atmosphere internal to the U.S. 
and especially to the government, if not to the Department of Defense.  The Navy realized that it 
was going to face new threats both foreign and domestic and that it needed to adapt its approach 
and resource allocation to more effectively address these threats.  Hence new naval strategies 
were crafted, and new thoughts emerged on what sorts of systems the Navy ought to procure in 
the decade of the 1990s and into the Twenty-first century. 
THE BIRTH OF A CONCEPT 




The genesis of the LCS began with the publication of Wayne Hughes’ Fleet Tactics in 
1986. 195  There had been various other attempts to field small, high-speed surface ships from the 
ASHVILLE class gunboats in the 1960s to the PEGASUS class hydrofoils in the 1970s. Hughes 
provided a new and somewhat compelling if fictionalized argument in support of small surface 
combatants.  In his account of the ‘Second Battle of the Nile” he emphasizes the impact and 
effectiveness of the “absurd little eight-hundred-ton missile boats” comprising the U.S. 
Mediterranean (Sixth) Fleet.196  He also pointed out that conceptually mobility is the capacity to 
move long distances in a relatively self-sustaining manner and to do so in a timely and quick 
manner.197  Both of these ideas came to form key pillars in the concept development, design, and 
construction of the LCS.  Hughes also introduced the concept of dispersed platforms 
concentrating their firepower effectively in the offensive which also became another key pillar in 
the development of the LCS class.198  In many other ways Fleet Tactics was a seminal work as it 
strove to re-introduce the idea of tactical thought and development into the U.S. Navy, at least in 
the surface warfare community.  However, for our purposes Hughes’ postulates of a ‘new’ killer-
class of small, fast, and hard-hitting surface combatants employing long range missiles, 
connected (or networked) into a cohesive striking force, and moving with significant rapidity 
serve as the soil in which the LCS concept germinated and began to flower.  
The second edition came out in 2000 and added both a new title and several new chapters 
focusing on the near shore or littoral regime.  The new title Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat 
highlighted the significant and continuing shift from the “blue water” or open-ocean to the 
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littoral regions of the world as the main stage for U.S. Navy operations.199  The preceding fifty 
years had seen the USN focused on fighting the Soviet fleet in the North Atlantic in an updated 
version of the fight against the German Kriegsmarine to keep the flow of men material across the 
Atlantic Ocean to the European theater going.  The end of the Cold War had created a sea change 
in the operational and tactical focus for the USN and for most of the US allies around the globe.   
The second edition of Fleet Tactics also highlighted the challenge between fighting in the 
littorals with the large, multi-mission platforms against smaller, cheaper and often less 
individually capable weapon systems.  The disparity in the costs of the two types of platforms 
only served to emphasize this challenge.  
The next key work that forms the basis for LCS was an article co-authored by Hughes 
and the-then president of the Naval War College, Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski and published 
in 1999.  This article “Rebalancing the Fleet” addressed the Navy of yesterday, today, tomorrow, 
and the ‘day after’ tomorrow and focused very much on the littoral regions as the key places 
where the Navy today and in the tomorrows, would be operating.200  The first of the major ideas 
was the issue of numbers (of hulls) and the ‘robustness’ or survivability of these hulls.  They 
made a consider argument in favor of raw numbers while still accepting the importance of the 
idea of economy of force.201  Ultimately, the Navy and DoD only have so many resources or so 
much money, meaning that there must be a balance between just raw numbers and the individual 
capability (or complexity) of hulls or systems.  The authors also highlighted the importance of 
networking “a series of systems” in order to mass fires (or effects)202 in order to achieve military 
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missions.  Several other key attributes that also came to be intimately associated with LCS were 
discussed in this article including speed and modularity. 
Hughes and Cebrowski summarized their fleet rebalancing in terms of many small ships, 
minimally manned, and operating in swarms.  This was their version of the Naval War College’s 
“Streetfighter Concept.”203  They likened it to the 1970’s high-low mix with a change in that the 
smaller less-individually capable ships would lead the entry into hazardous waters in effect 
clearing the way for the larger, more expensive multi-mission platforms.204  The authors also 
discussed the portion of the concept that dealt with modularity enabling the smaller hulls to be 
tailored with specific systems installed or swapped-out to better execute given mission sets like 
(anti-) surface (ASuW) or anti-submarine warfare (ASW).  This scalability was married very 
closely to the required capability for networking the different platforms mentioned above. The 
three key attributes that the authors were aiming for were numbers of platforms, affordability 
(including manning and flexible modules), and networking the platforms to mass fires or 
effects.205  
In fact, the issue of affordability was actually rather strongly addressed in Cebrowski and 
Hughes’ article.   As noted above, the authors’ basic theme was a mixed force of multi-mission 
ships and a more numerous group (the Economy B force) of platforms.206  This bore a passing 
resemblance to the ‘High-Low’ surface combatant mix first pursued during Admiral Elmo 
Zumwalt’s tenure as CNO (1970-74).  Focusing on the price for the predicted force the authors 
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stated that the Navy must develop an Economy B force that complements and enables the 
capabilities of the larger, more expensive multi-mission ships “our Economy A power-projection 
force.”  The intended goal was to create a low-end force of ships costing less than 10 percent of 
the more expensive ships.  Based on a rough price estimate of one billion US dollars for a high-
end guided missile destroyer, the authors envisioned a “Streetfigher” ship to cost (in 2001 
dollars) about $100 (or less) million per hull.  This was actually not an unreasonable pricing 
strategy but would certainly have resulted in a rather austere platform when compared to the 
High-end ships envisioned in this strategy.  It is also likely that the Economy B ships would have 
had to be single mission ones.  The other part of the estimated force structure was that the B-
team ships would comprise more than one quarter of the entire surface force.  This coupled the 
argument in favor of less costly ships with the idea that raw numbers of hulls was good.  The 
idea of affordability or economy was one that has persisted throughout the life-cycle of the LCS 
program.   
THE NAVAL POST-GRADUATE SCHOOL STUDY 
 In 2000, the President of the Naval War College, then Vice Admiral Cebrowski, asked 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, CA to undertake a study or series of studies 
investigating the potential functionality of fast, dispersed and ‘cheap’ surface platforms to meet 
the Navy’s operational needs.  These studies included the following two key documents, the 
‘Crossbow’ and ‘Sea Lance’ engineering studies.  Cross functional team of NPS studies 
undertook these analyses as part of the curriculum for Systems Engineering & Integration, Total 




Ship Systems Engineering Program, the Aeronautics and Astronautics, and Business and Public 
Policy graduate programs.207 
CROSSBOW 
 The “Crossbow” engineering study was the first volume of the ultimately five-volume 
series of studies aimed at defining how to realize the ‘Streetfighter” concept championed by 
Admiral Cebrowski.   The first volume of the report focused on the ‘system of systems’ that 
would create the capabilities needed to field an effective “Streetfighter” force.  This report went 
beyond merely analyzing the required surface platform capabilities, it analyzed the required 
capabilities of a “Streetfighter” and the systems needed to deliver these capabilities.  This is one 
of the key ideas that many people have ignored when analyzing the LCS program.  LCS was 
never envisioned as a stand-alone platform but as one part of a system of systems to include a 
Littoral Sensor System (LSS) that through networking would provide the functionality required 
by the Navy to meet intended missions in the 21st century.  The hull was in effect a truck or 
frame upon which the required systems could be mounted, removed, and replaced with other 
systems depending on the assigned mission(s).   
 The Crossbow study started by defining the problem and scope in terms of the required 
capabilities: 
“CROSSBOW: A high-speed, rapidly deployable, integrated and distributed naval force with a primary 
mission of forward presence, littoral sea control, forced access, and access maintenance, in low to moderate 
threat environments around the globe.”208 
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The team then listed some of the entering assumptions and key considerations for the 
CROSSBOW system.  For the purposes of this work, the assumptions of interest include the idea 
of “combat-consumable” units, high-speed, and the system as a distributed force.209  The issue of 
combat-consumability did not survive as a basic system attribute into the construction and 
fielding of LCS except possibly indirectly.210  The indirect way that this may have survived is 
through the continued calls for cost control and ‘cheapness’ for want of a better term in the 
procurement of the LCS class of ships.  The high-speed requirement has definitely remained 
throughout the course of the entire acquisition program from concept to realization.  This is true 
too, of the distributed force operation both in terms of physical distribution but also in terms of 
networked platforms working as a complete, integrated system.  The “Key Considerations” that 
the engineering team utilized also replicated (or established) some of the basic attributes that 
were also delineated in their assumptions sections; these attributes have also persisted as 
components of the LCS class over its life-span.  The first of these was the intended extensive use 
of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technology – in order to reduce the cost of the system.211  
The other important cost saving intent was the stated ‘need for automation.’212  This was aimed 
at reducing the crew size which in turn can significantly reduce the cost of operating a system or 
system of systems, especially over the full life-cycle of said system.  The last section of the key 
issues focused on environmental factors; in terms of the external environment within which the 
system or platforms(s) would be required to operate and not environmental protection type 
issues.  None of these factors are necessarily remarkable but all have in one way, shape, or form 
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continued on into the actual procurement of the class.  Two specifically rate some discussion, 
one addressed the physical geography and the other the sea-worthiness required of the platform 
itself.  The first environmental point in the report addressed the cluttered physical environment 
and the increased risk of effective surprise attacks in the littoral regions of the world.213  This 
concern has provided fodder for the critics of LCS and has remained one of the required 
functional capabilities of the LCS from the release of the original design-build specifications to 
the present day.  The second consideration was the capability to operate in various weather and 
sea-state conditions.214  There were certain minimums of stability and sea keeping capabilities 
that any platform would require in order to effectively operate at sea, regardless of the specific 
geographic location. 
SEA LANCE 
 The study group at NPS undertook another significant engineering study in academic 
year 2000 that resulted in the “Sea Lance” concept report.215  This is in many ways the first true 
effort to format the modeling and simulation entities from war games and experiment into a 
physical reality that could be built.  The design team followed the standard acquisition 
programmatics in defining the requirement and crafting a mission needs statement from this 
requirement.  They then created an operational requirements document with a variety of topics to 
be addressed including the expected threat, current gaps and seams, required capabilities and 
cost.  The next step was an AoA with three alternatives and a comparison of the relative merits 
and shortfalls of each.  The last step was a technical evaluation that examined the actual 
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engineering and technical requirements to satisfy the overall system requirements.  From this in-
depth study, the engineering team found that the Sea Lance concept could satisfy the mission 
requirements as defined by the Navy. 
 The mission statement noted that the end of the Cold War had shifted the U.S. Navy’s 
most likely operating areas from the “Blue Waters” of the high seas to the near shore, or littoral 
regions of the world in reacting to regional crises.216  The team’s stated key to success was to, in 
effect, to flood the littoral waters with sensors, platforms, and weapons but to do so with 
sufficiently robust and affordable forces.217  This is in keeping with the already noted key 
attributes of ‘higher’ numbers of platforms and ‘manageable’ cost per unit.  The team also noted 
that the current fleet is not suited to operating in the confined and cluttered regions of the 
littorals218 – and while they do not categorically say so, the inference is that the current fleet is 
also extremely expensive to replace and losing it fighting in the littorals would likely be cost 
prohibitive.  In comparison, the Sea Lance would potentially be viewed by hostile forces as no 
worse than a “nuisance” and not worth expending expensive ordnance to eliminate.219 
 The operational capability requirement that the engineering team focused on was the 
“Capabilities for the Navy After Next” (CNAN), part of a study sponsored by Navy Warfare 
Development Command (NWDC).  The main focus was on platforms to distribute and augment 
a littoral sensor grid or network called the “Expeditionary Warfare Grid” (EWG), a successor to 
the LSS with slightly expanded capabilities but designed to cover a smaller geographic area.  The 
goal was to develop a combatant platform that could deploy the system and become part of the 
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network as dispersed individual platforms networked together and with other platforms, sensors, 
and weapons.220  The key issue to note is that while the individual platforms were the focus of 
the study, the required capabilities of these platforms were not necessarily inherently organic to 
the ships themselves.  The mission goal was to be able to deploy the EWG – to temporarily 
install a system that would provide Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISAR) of the 
operational environment, the littorals.  The Sea Lance was merely one of four main components 
in the EWG i.e. the “small combatants that deploy/tend the sensors and weapons.”221  They 
would provide some command and control of the sensor systems but much of the overall 
capability would reside in the networked nature of the systems.  
 The engineering study team in effect conducted the acquisition program steps of the 
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA).222  This included or was followed by the technical evaluation of 
the specific engineering alternatives that were reviewed in the AoA process.  The AoA looked at 
three potential system architectures.  The first was a medium size combatant with a tow (Option 
I). The second was composed of all medium size combatants (Option II).  The final architecture 
reviewed was a mixture of small and medium sized combatants (Option III).223  The design team 
then developed a set of Measures of Effectiveness and Performance (MOEs and MOPs) depicted 
in Table 2 below.  These included a number of standard warship attributes like range, speed, 
stability and some specific, new factors like the Grid Deployment Order and Modularity – of 
which Modularity has persisted as a key LCS attribute to this day. 
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Table 1- Sea Lance MOE/MOP 224 
 
 
 The team then analyzed the capacity of the potential system architectures to fulfill the 
required capabilities represented by the MOPs and MOEs.  There were several, notably the 
procurement and upkeep costs that the team could not realistically assess and reasonably they did 
not do so.  The next attribute of the Sea Lance that the team looked at was the salvo analysis.  
This analysis looked at required number of missiles or amount of ordnance required to attack a 
target, land, surface or air generally, or to defend the platforms themselves from attack.  This was 
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an application of operations analysis similar to that applied by Hughes in his Tactics books.225   
The research team followed this with a cost analysis focusing on the initial platform material and 
engineering costs.226  They looked at flexibility, lethality, and survivability and came to the 
conclusion that the largest of the three hull sizes (by displacement) scored best in four of the five 
MOEs/MOPs.227 
 The following section of the report looked at the specific nuts and bolts of the system 
architecture.  By this the authors meant the engineering systems, focusing on propulsion but also 
damage control systems228, sensors, computers, and the software to run all of these systems.  In 
striving to explore new and innovative solutions, the team looked at an electric drive for the ship 
based on the intent to apply an “Integrated Power System, which include[ed] electric drive.”229  
In a more ground-breaking move, the engineering team considered and decided that the surface 
platforms ought to employ water-jet propulsion in place of conventional propellers and shafts for 
the main propulsion system(s).  This engineering design recommendation was ultimately retained 
in the design-build phase of the LCS.  In a more information technological focused innovation, 
the team recommended the adoption of a Total Ship Open Architecture (TOSA)230 system to the 
Crossbow platforms.  This is in effect a commercial or open data and information for 
engineering, control, communication, and energy systems throughout a platform.231  The goal of 
TOSA was to reduce costs by enabling similar engineering standards across various sub-systems 
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thus minimizing required hardware changes when systems updates or installations were made.  
This was part of the PMS 512 (PEO Surface Strike) “Affordability Through Commonality” 
program where using similar software and more importantly similar hardware e.g. electrical 
controls, switches, motor controllers for various different ships and submarines would save 
money for the Navy by allowing the service to buy in bulk.  The other advantage, cost-wise, is 
that by using commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) software programs, the cost of acquisition is 
significantly reduced as compared to proprietary software or software written to a specific 
military specification (the infamous ‘milspec’).232   
 The engineering team continued with their analysis by examining the estimated volume 
(cubic feet), weight (tons), required power (kilowatts) and cost of the weapons and sensors to be 
installed.233  These estimates were based on COTS equipment available on the open market, 
mostly courtesy of European vendors.  They also categorically stated that the Sea Lance 
combatant is primarily [intended to be] a network centric warfare ship.234  In keeping with the 
intent to reduce costs, the team also looked at the minimum required crew to operate but not to 
maintain the installed systems on the platforms.235  The crewing review included reviewing the 
required sewage system, habitability issues (bunks, cooking [mess] facilities), and the training 
required to prepare the crew to operate the platforms.  The idea of the crew as focused on just on 
operating equipment versus operating and maintaining the equipment is another concept that has 
been retained throughout the acquisition and fielding of the LCS.    
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The key take-aways from the CROSSBOW study and especially from Volume II, the 
SEA LANCE were the value of multiple, simple dispersed platforms operating in the newly 
important littoral regions of the world.  The end of the Cold War revealed to the Navy that the 
areas of strife would likely shift from the high seas, especially the North Atlantic or Pacific to 
areas much closer to shore and in regions where maritime threats had previously been 
unimportant or less important than the threat from the peer competitor force, the Soviet Navy.   
Smaller and thus cheaper surface platforms ships for all intents and purposes were assessed to be 
more effective for the predicted costs.  Single mission ships, dispersed throughout the battlespace 
would in effect provide more bang for the buck to the U.S. Navy than a force of multi-mission 
ships operating in a more constrained geographic dispersion.  Alongside the idea of “quantity 
having a quality all its own,” rode the idea of high-speed.  Whether it is covered by ‘self-
deployability’ or simply ‘high-speed’ in the required capabilities, speed remained one of the core 
required capabilities for LCS from concept development through fielding.  The same has held 
true for the concept of networked or network-centric platforms and sensors.  These three key 
determinants have consistently dominated the LCS program – low cost for high(er) numbers, 
high speed, and networked systems.  By way of illustrating this, the Commander Fleet Forces 
Command (CFFC) “Overarching Requirements” in the LCS Concept of Operations brief (Figure 
6 below) that was released with the solicitation for LCS preliminary design stated:  Cost, mission 
packages, and networking capability while speed was to be a prioritized parameter for the new 
class i.e. they needed to be fast.236  This Fleet Forces table serves to further illustrate the three 
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key factors of cost, numbers, and connectivity or networked platforms.  The crew size entry re-
emphasizes the desire to field minimally manned platforms in order to reduce overall costs. 
 
Figure 6- LCS CONOPS Brief - Slide #7 
 
THE WAR GAMING 
It is a bit difficult to separate the sequence of the Cebrowski & Hughes article and the 
series of experiments conducted under the auspices of the Naval War College collectively 
labeled “Streetfighter.”  The article was published in November 1999, while then Vice Admiral 
Cebrowski was appointed as the President of the War College in 1998.237  The first reported 
“Streetfighter” experiment was conducted as part of the War College’s annual Global or Title 
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10/Global238 war-game in the summer of 2000.  The Global series of war games started in 1978 
to explore Navy capabilities employed in a strategic context against the Soviet Union. For the 
Navy, Global turned into the Title 10 game and carried on after the Cold War exploring Navy 
capabilities and doctrine.239  This war game series focuses on operational level warfighting 
concepts and was conducted by the War College from 1978 to 2001 as Global and resumed as 
Global/Title 10 in 2008.  For the 2001 iteration, the small, self-deployable and networked ships 
provided a potent surface component in the war-game scenario; where the U.S. Navy was facing 
an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) operational concept based on a potential capability of the 
People’s Republic of China circa 2015.240 
There were also war-games or experiments conducted as part of the Fleet Battle 
Experiment (FBE) series in the early 2000s as a sort of follow on series to the Naval War 
College’s “Streetfighter.”  The Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) executed the 
FBE series in the late 1990s and early 2000s to investigate new material and procedural 
capabilities to fulfill the Navy’s mission requirements in various warfare areas.  The emphasis 
was slightly different in these experiments in that the networked platforms were not just surface 
platforms but included other sensor system, unmanned systems and Marine Corps assets as 
well.241  The monograph “Strategy for a Long Peace” besides discussing the FBE series, also 
assessed the value of smaller (cheaper) surface platforms, networked with other platforms, and 
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with high speed.  The high speed for Krepinevich, et al was a tactical asset but the overall 
concept ultimately valued high speed for self-deployability vice the ability to out-maneuver a foe 
or out-run a hostile missile of torpedo.  The FBE series encompassed at least two (FBE “Foxtrot” 
and “Golf”) events and potentially three (the two named earlier and “Hotel”) where the surface 
platforms and networked system of systems of “Streetfighter” were physically tested and 
analyzed.   
There was also a series of experiments or war-games executed in the mid to late 1990s 
sponsored by OPNAV which examined the concept of smaller, distributed and networked 
surface platforms.  These games were executed under the general title of the Joint Multi-Warfare 
Analytical Game (JMAG) and unlike the FBE series, were done completely through modeling 
and simulation.242  The JMAG series investigated various unmanned systems, weapons, sensors, 
and platforms operating against a notional adversary (likely modeled closely on real-world 
states) with live decision makers, uniformed and non-uniformed subject matter experts (SME) in 
the decision loop.243  Reportedly many of the specific attributes of what came to be known as 
LCS were highlighted in JMAG events.  These included operations in the littorals, specifically 
focusing on the Strait of Hormuz; small, relatively high-speed surface ships; and mission 
capabilities focusing on mine warfare and anti-surface warfare capabilities.  The results and 
feedback from the SME participants provided several key insights that are likely to have 
impacted the concept development for LCS.  These included smaller size, mission specificity 
with some multi-mission capability depending on the threat environment, minimum manning, 
self-deployability, a level of high-speed, the ability to defeat multiple small boats attacking in 
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concert (known as “Swarming tactics”244), and some of the specifics of the hull forms and 
materials.245  Despite the claim of the article’s author, the JMAG series of war-games were only 
one of several concepts, experiments, and ideas that contributed to the creation of the LCS 
program and to the actual construction of the ships and their associated systems. 
These sets of war games and experiments while not necessarily directly linked all served 
to investigate the concept of the LCS.  There have been continuing questions regarding whether 
or not the Navy did the due diligence encompassed in the JCIDS process.  There may be some 
legitimacy in the contention that the level and number of experiments and war games served to 
feed the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) and the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) required in 
the first two phases of the acquisition process.  The real disconnect from the standard process 
timeline is revealed in that the Capabilities Development Document (CDD) was not released 
until after Milestone A – meaning that per the flexibility stated in both the DoD and DON 
acquisition instructions, the Navy did start this shipbuilding program before the official 
Milestone A was ‘met.’ 
The really important concepts that were revealed through the Navy’s war gaming and 
experimentation were however, the keystone concept ideas that culminated in the design and 
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fielding of the LCS class.  The first was that the new ships needed to be cheaper, both as 
individual hulls but also in terms of manning as compared to the larger, multi-mission ships like 
the TICONDEROGA class cruisers and the ARLEIGH BURKE class guided missile destroyers.  
The operational environment (formerly battlespace) that the Navy expected to see in the 21st 
century encompassed geography that enabled hostile states to apply Anti-Access/Area Denial 
(A2/AD) systems that would make sending larger classes into their coastal waters would greatly 
increase the risk of losing these expensive ships even if the mission(s) are successful.  The 
second key attribute was that the new class of ships needed to be flexible with systems that could 
be tailored to specific missions.  This was based on the predicted operational environment but 
was also based on the scheduled decommissioning of several classes of legacy ships like the 
mine-warfare ships (AVENGER and OSPREY classes), the PERRY class guided missile 
frigates, and the aging of the CYCLONE class Patrol Coastal (PC) boats.  There was an observed 
need, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, that each of the missions that these classes were capable 
of had to be done by another, replacement class of ships.   The pending decommissioning and/or 
aging of 91 hulls would leave a large gap in the number of ships that the U.S. Navy needed in 
order to accomplish its peace- and war-time missions.  And lastly, the new class needed to meet 
certain specific physical characteristics in order to be effective in the predicted environment.  
These specific characteristics included a very good turn of speed, shallow draft, and a range of 
operation enabling them to ‘self-deploy’ to regions where they might be employed.  These three 
broad areas of characteristics became the driving force(s) behind the concept and the material 
design of the LCS. 
THE CONCEPT “OPERATIONALIZED” OR “THE SOLICITATION” 




As noted above the CDD was officially released in 2004.  But the actual RFP was 
solicited in 2003.  This is effect made industry a collaborator in taking the concept of a warship 
for the littorals and turning it into a physical reality.  There was (and is) by necessity a rather 
higher level of collaboration and or ‘free rein’ for bidders to design ships as compared to smaller, 
less complex military systems.  The actual solicitation that was released bore more of a 
relationship to set of performance specifications versus a standard set of bid specifications.  The 
Navy basically told the bidders “Here are the capabilities that we want. Please provide a design 
or model that will achieve the required capabilities in the package size that we described.” While 
many fans and critics will not admit it, the LCS solicitation package in effect was an attempt to 
make the “Streetfigher” concept a physical reality.  The actual RFP was issued on 28 February 
2003 under the title “Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Preliminary Design,” (Solicitation Number: 
N00024-03-R-2309).  The required response date and time was “2:00 PM Eastern Standard Time 
on 14 April 2003.”  This did not allow a large response time-frame and there was a lot of 
required response material to compete for this contract. 
THE STATEMENT OF WORK (SOW) 
 The SOW specified the initial ‘flight’ or first production run as the desired Navy 
acquisition and specified that the delivered product had to meet the parameters listed in the 
Preliminary Design Interim Requirements Document (PD-IRD) (Attachment J-4).246  It also 
categorically stated that the “CAIV target for the LCS ship and the installed core mission 
systems is $220M FY-05 dollars threshold and $150M FY-05 dollars objective.”247  This 
statement was significant in and of itself because of the use of the term CAIV or Cost as an 
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Independent Variable.  This showed very clearly to the potential bidders at the very beginning of 
the LCS acquisition program that cost of significant interest to the government.  CAIV is part of 
an acquisition strategy that seeks to control (or minimize if possible) life-cycle costs across the 
entire life-span of a weapon system beginning with the acquisition phase.248  Formerly in looking 
at acquisition programs, the government focused on cost, schedule and performance. 
Performance was the fixed variable, meaning that cost and schedule could be adjusted as long as 
the delivered system met (or exceeded) the goal performance parameters.  Using CAIV, the 
performance is allowed to rise or fall along with the schedule and cost.  This allowed the 
government more flexibility and potentially lower costs than was possible with performance set 
in stone.249  The pricing was to include all of the design, outfitting and testing of the initial Flight 
0 LCS ship.     
The initial portion of the state of work addressed the basic requirements and desired 
performance compared to the minimum required performance.  Much of this requirements 
information was contained in Section C, Attachment J-4, and J-8-1 of the solicitation package. 
Attachment J-4 is the “Preliminary Design Interim Requirements Document Serial Number 
N763F-S03-026 For Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Flight 0 PRE ACAT.”  This document 
basically represents the design specifications sort of akin to the infamous ‘milspec.’  Looking at 
Table 3 following, we can see many of the key requirements that started as desired capabilities in 
Fleet Tactics and carried through the concept studies and other preliminary documents.  The first 
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key requirement that we can see is the “Total Price per Ship.”  This goes back to the number of 
platforms needed and the desired cost per hull.250  There are also the line items for crew size and 
accommodation requirements.  These continued to point out the desired minimum manning in 
order to push down overall costs for the LCS.  The second repetitive item that shows up is the 
required ‘sprint’ or maximum speed.  Of note, the minimum or threshold level is 40 knots in a 
specific sea state (winds and wave height).  And the desired capacity is 50 knots in the same sea 
state.  What was missing or not addressed in the list of design parameters was the network-
centric capability.  This was however, addressed in several other sections of the solicitation that 
we will review later in this chapter.  What was added or gained much greater emphasis was the 
requirement to adapt the ship to perform alternate missions, which translates into the mission 
package change out time limit.  Another important parameter to note in Figure 4 is the desired 
payload size.  This is important as the desired and required metric tonnages are not large and the 
difference between the two, 30 MT all total, is very small compared to normal U.S. Navy 
warship displacements.  The last key item to note in this figure is the required ‘Operational 
Availability.’  This translates into a percentage of time that while on a deployment or not in a 
maintenance period (usually called an ‘availability’ by the Navy); the ship must be available for 
operational missions at least 85 percent of the time.  This equates to a cost-savings because it 
reduces the load on other ships/hulls and thus reduces the absolute number of hulls required to 
meet the Navy’s mission requirements. 
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If we look at section 3.0.2 “Modularity,” we can see the increasing emphasis placed on 
the mission modules and the scalability or flexibility that is a stated key attribute for the LCS 
class.  As this section states: 
“The modular Mission Packages are a central feature of the LCS design and will provide 
the main war fighting capability and functionality for specific mission areas.”    
This clearly delineates the importance of the mission packages and the desired capability to modify the 
functionality of the ships to focus on specific missions, like mine warfare or ASW.  This is very much of 
a departure from the previous Navy preference for multi-mission platforms with the ability to undertake 
various missions using only installed systems.  Throughout the required parameters there was a distinct 
emphasis on marrying organic or installed capabilities with expanded equipment modules to improve 
mission capacity. 
 Speed remained extremely important throughout this section of the solicitation.  In particular, on 
the last page when addressing the requirement to meet the Cost as Independent Variable (CAIV) goals 
there was a list of discriminators provided.  Discriminators in contracting serve to highlight the 
advantages or better quality of a contractor’s offering whether equipment or services as compared to other 
competitors submitting on a government solicitation.  In this specific case the first of the listed 
discriminators was “top speed.”252  The second was performance in seaway (rough water) both at loiter 
and cruise speed further emphasizing the importance of speed.   
And just in case anyone missed the importance of speed in the response to the solicitation, the 
following figures depict the PowerPoint slides that were included as Exhibit B in the government 
package.  This exhibit was entitled “ONR/NWDC Sponsored Technology Demonstration Programs and 
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Experimentations.”253  The slides were meant to summarize the series of physical and/or modelling and 
simulation experiments and tests conducted by the Office of Naval Research and NWDC over the 
preceding decade or so.  Two of the platforms depicted were basically leased from commercial vendors 
for physical experimentation and two were expected to be either leased or constructed by companies for 
testing by the Navy.  In fact, the Navy had been experimenting with new hull forms for higher speed ships 
since at least the 1990s, first with the ‘Sea Shadow’ program then with the High-Speed Vessel (HSV) 
which was actually adopted for service by the Navy and Army as the Joint HSV.254  Including these slides 
in the solicitation package served again as a very strong signal that speed mattered, and that the successful 
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offeror must include speed as a key system attribute in their proposal. They are included in Figures 7 and 
8 following this section. 
 
Figure 7- Exhibit A from the LCS Solicitation (Slide 1) 
 
 
Figure 8- Exhibit A from the LCS Solicitation (Slide 2) 
 
THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 




 The really surprising thing about this specific solicitation is the amount of conceptual material 
and information included in it.  By this I mean that government requests for proposals or quotes often 
have broad and general descriptions in them with required quality attributes of the products or services to 
be provided.  However, they don’t often have the very, very broad concept materials like the CONOPs 
included in the formal solicitation for the government requirement.  More often albeit in slightly different 
government markets e.g. architecture and engineering, professional services and engineering services, the 
design specifications are either already provided to the bidders or a comparatively stricter set of 
design/performance parameters are presented.  The most pertinent example of this that comes to mind is 
the design contract versus a design-build/design-bid-build contract.  In a design contract, the government 
solicits reputable and capable firms to design an architecture or construction engineering project (most 
often a building or structure like an aircraft runway).  The winning bidder does the research, site surveys, 
calculations, drawings and basically delivers a set of design plans or blueprints to the government to be 
actually built or erected by the government or another commercial company as part of a separate contract.  
The design plus bid or build contracts have the prime contractor both design and erect or bid out the 
construction of the planned infrastructure.  There is very little that is undefined i.e. required floor space in 
square feet, number of offices, heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) etc.  There is some 
room for creativity but there are also many definable factors that the government will specify, and this 
limits the flexibility of designers. 
 In the case of the LCS solicitation, in many ways the government had far fewer parameters, many 
of which were (and are) to be honest difficult to quantify because of volume and weight trade-offs 
required in ships or surface platforms.  Because there were fewer hard and fast definable factors, the 
bidders were in effect given a much larger degree of freedom to design the system of systems to satisfy 
the government’s requirements.   But as mentioned earlier, the nature of balancing the various 
components and systems of the ship with the allowable volume and weight necessitates a certain amount 
of freedom and flexibility in the design of the vessel.  The more volume the ship has i.e. the larger the 




hull, then the larger the engines that can be installed in that volume.  However, the larger size increases 
weight which in turn requires more powerful engines which are generally larger and heavier to reach the 
desired speed.  Also, designers need to consider the amount of fuel which can be stored which again leads 
to the issue of more volume equates to more weight thus yet again requiring more horsepower to reach 
designed speeds.  It is a very careful balancing act, trading off capabilities to reach the most effective 
compromise possible.  In the case of the LCS class, these trade-offs were fixed by the desired and 
required draft, speed, and cost of the resulting ships.   The 20-foot maximum draft255, minimum maximum 
speed of 40 knots, and the required range of action without refueling placed some very tight design 
parameters on the bidders to achieve.   Based on this, they had to be allowed a higher degree of latitude 
than in many other government procurement programs to craft their own designs to meet the 
specifications. 
In the next section of the solicitation, Attachment J 9 Option Items, we can see many of 
the same themes mentioned earlier running through this portion of the RFP package.  Section C 
provides Design Specification and Performance Work Statements, and especially Option Item 
0004 – Final System Design256.  This Contract Line Item Number (CLIN) addresses the test and 
evaluation of the delivered physical platforms preceded by two Critical Design Reviews.  But in 
addition to the design reviews and op-testing, the contractor is directed to ‘report and utilize 
Total Ownership Cost (TOC) reduction measures for the new, proposed system...”257   Later in 
the section, the government also directs the contractor to show how the proposed ship design 
incorporates and successfully supports life cycle supportability considerations.258  This in effect 
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means that the design needs to be fiscally manageable over the entire life-span of the system, 
from cradle to grave.  Here again, we see the drive to control and if possible drive down the 
fiscal cost of the LCS program writ large.  This holds true almost by inference in the section of 
this attachment that addresses the automation, damage control, and maintenance requirement 
reduction desires of the customer.  Or to quote directly from the solicitation, to “maintain 
optimized manning levels.”259  In addition to this unstated goal of minimizing manning to reduce 
costs, solicitation enjoins the contractor to “affordably” modernize and upgrade LCS systems.260  
This is hard to truly quantify, meaning just how affordable will specific upgrades or 
improvements be? But it does re-emphasize the Navy’s desire to acquire a cheap or lower cost 
ship compared to previous ship classes.  As does the direction in this section that the contractor 
“shall ensure the straight forward and inexpensive accomplishment of technology insertion, 
technology refresh, scalability, and other modernization and disposal efforts.”261  Of note, the 
government was also very careful to delineate the amount of potential growth on the options 
listed in Section J-9 by addressing priced orders and undefinitized orders.   
Any priced order required that the contractors provide price quotes or estimates to the 
contracting officer.262  If awarded, the contractor and contracting officer were to negotiate the 
price and delivery schedule – leaving some room for adjustment but the underlying government 
inference is that this will result in orders that either in terms of timeliness of delivery or cost 
were advantageous to the government.  The terms were similar for undefinitized orders.  An 
undefinitized order is one for which the contract terms, specifications, or price have not been 
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agreed upon before performance is begun under the order.263   In the case of undefinitized orders, 
the contractor and contracting officer were bound by a maximum cost ceiling.  The contracting 
officer (CO) was to provide an estimated ceiling above which the government will not pay while 
the contractor in responding is tasked to provide a maximum ceiling mount as part of the 
response.  There is still some room for maneuver for both parties because both by definition and 
because this was very early in what would amount to a prototyping stage for LCS, the scope in 
terms of time and cost for “new” work or new work orders would be very difficult for either 
party to determine with any level of accuracy or precision.   What this all really amounts to 
though is that the government strove very hard to manage costs in the solicitation phase of the 
LCS acquisition while acknowledging that designing and building new ships, especially ones 
intended to be such a radical departure from previous Navy surface platforms was bound to 
create increased risk (of failure or problems) and this equated to increased cost to the 
government. 
THE NAVY OPEN ARCHITECTURE GUIDANCE 
 Networking the LCS platforms and systems and by extension the required software was 
such an important part of the concept that it warrants some discussion as it was presented in RFP.  
In section J-10 of the solicitation package there were several documents addressing the software 
and systems integration requirements applicable to the LCS acquisition.  The first of these was 
the “Design Guidance for the Navy Open Architecture Computing Capability.”264  This 
document was incredibly important to the entire LCS acquisition because it really drove the 
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requirements on how these ships were to be “network-centric” systems.  However, this was not 
the only key issue that the guide addressed; it also strongly reiterated the cost control or cost 
performance required of the architecture (software and hardware) systems to be procured.  While 
much of the preceding text has dealt with system acquisition and ship design it was not meant to 
down-play the importance or the cost of investment in the Information Technology (IT), both 
hardware and software associated with ACAT level I programs.  LCS is definitely an ACAT 
level I program, and the amount of software involved in the installed, modularized, and 
associated off-board systems is huge.  The point to make here is that the cost of the LCS 
acquisition or just about any major weapons system is not just caused by the hardware but also 
by the software required to operate that hardware.  And over the life-cycle of a weapons system, 
the cost to update, upgrade, and ‘fix’ software is not inconsequential by any measure especially 
across a number of platforms, whether airframes, sea-frames, armored fighting vehicles, or 
communications systems.  
 For the Department of Defense, “architecture” means the fundamental organization of a 
system embodied in its components, their relationships to each other, and to the environment, 
and the principles guiding its design and evolution.265   An open system is defined as:  
“A system that implements sufficient open specifications for interfaces, services, and supporting 
formats to enable properly engineered components to be utilized across a wide range of systems 
with minimal changes, to interoperate with other components on local and remote systems, and to 
                                                     
265 Per the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard 1471-2000 and the Defense Acquisition 
University, Acquisition Community Connection.  Available on-line at: 
https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=22108&lang=en-US. Accessed 05 Dec 2016, 0852 EST. 




interact with users in a style that facilitates portability.” – DoD Open Systems Joint Task 
Force”266 
This includes both hardware and software.  From our perspective and for this portion of the 
chapter, the key component of this is the software portion.  The NOA Guide focuses very much 
on the software and programming involved in Navy systems especially at it pertains to the LCS 
program.  The guide states that the design goals for Navy systems “include enhanced Human 
Systems Integration (HIS) and optimized manning.”267  This is another example of the intended 
and desired cost-control associated with LCS both from the stated design goal of minimum 
manning and the intended benefit of minimum manning, reduced operating and life-cycle costs.  
A following key policy statement emphasizes the ability to rapidly and affordably maintain, 
refresh, and upgrade systems throughout their life-cycle.268  It is the affordability requirement 
that again highlights the importance of cost to all Navy acquisitions not just the LCS class.   
 The Navy’s guide goes on to discuss the attributes of open architectures.  These are 
systems of systems that use widely accepted and available specifications, standards products and 
design practices for systems so that these systems are interoperable easily modified and 
extended, both in capabilities and life-spans.269  Here again, we can see the emphasis on cost 
management as easily modified and extended systems are generally less costly than those that are 
not.  But we also revisit the idea of network-centric systems in that they are interoperable with 
other systems, one of the key requirements for the Streetfighter concept and the actual LCS class.  
The intent of the guide’s approach is to manage, and control problems associated with technical 
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refreshes (updating or improving the hardware and/or software), mission capability upgrades and 
the total ownership cost of acquired systems.270  Here again, while it is the last of the intended 
benefits, we see the importance of costs to the Navy.    The physical challenge that the Navy 
faces is that any weapons system, immediately upon fielding is obsolescent.  The NOA guide is 
meant to address, at least in part, the challenge of providing surface combatants like the LCS 
with warfighting upgrades to avoid obsolescence and to keep pace with the threat while still 
containing the total cost of ownership to the Navy.271   So basically the Navy is attempting to 
balance the cost of maintaining premier capabilities in its warships with the need to apply fiscal 
resources across the entire Navy (and DoD) enterprise through applying open architectures to all 
systems procurements.  The legacy challenge is that milspec and proprietary systems and 
software are expensive to replace and upgrade but again, the threat continues to become 
increasingly complicated and capable.  This equates to a requirement or a “must do” to maintain 
a certain level of capability in Navy systems to defeat the predicted or perceived threats.272   The 
Navy states in the guide that the funding required to upgrade systems is in effect a major budget 
barrier to continued system development to fleet support.273  This statement in many ways forms 
the very core of the challenge that the Navy faces and why controlling costs has been so very 
critical to the LCS acquisition.  Regardless of the willingness of the administration in power, the 
Secretary of Defense, or Congress to fund the Navy’s shipbuilding program, individual ships are 
growing progressively more expensive.  As Drezner, et al pointed out in “Are Ships Different?” 
the length of time to design and build, the complexity, the low numbers of production units, and 
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the high unit costs all contribute to the overall expense of ship acquisitions.274  Another attribute 
that significantly increases the cost of warships is the requirement for high speed.  The size of the 
propulsion plant and accompanying cost for the machinery plus the increased fuel costs 
significantly increase both production and life cycle costs.275  Yet another contributing factor 
since the end of the Second World War has been the huge increase in the amount of electronics 
mounted on and in warships.  According to one Rand Corporation study for the U.S. Navy, 35 to 
57 percent of the cost of a warship was the cost of the equipment compared to material costs of 
11 to 15 percent.276  This same study found that power density has caused a huge increase in the 
size and cost of combatant ships.277  The Rand authors posited that power density is a better 
proxy for complexity compared with power generation capacity because it is indicative of how 
many systems are put on a ship of a given size.  For surface combatants over the past three 
decades, there has been a 40 percent increase in average power density.278  This equates to an 
equivalent increase in the cost of building a warship. 
The NOA Guide points out those non-standard products providing unique advantages or 
otherwise unavailable functionality and performance flexibility or a cost-benefit to the Navy are 
not forbidden but they need to satisfy the special characteristics noted.279   However, the goals of 
the program are to provide the Naval Warfare Systems (NWS) with both the benefits of assured 
technical performance and reduced life-cycle costs, affordable tech refresh costs, and reduced 
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upgrade cycle time; all of which equate to reduce overall life-cycle costs for procured systems 
and equipment. 280  In short, the Navy categorically states in the guide that it will implement 
warfare systems that meet operational performance requirements and that are affordable.  There 
is no inference that performance will be sacrificed for cost, but this inference could be drawn if 
resources became particularly constrained in future acquisitions.  In fact, the stated requirements 
for computing capability, again encompassing both the hardware or computers themselves and 
the software to run them, are robust.  While maintaining the requirement for affordability and 
maintainability, the required NWS computing systems are expected (or required) to continue 
operating under “battle conditions” that include exposure to shock, fire (or high temperatures), 
and salt-water spray.281  These are all well documented conditions that U.S. Navy warships have 
been subjected to in historical combat situations and are not likely to change in future conflicts.  
The one area that the NOA Guide does not specifically address and that has come under much 
closer scrutiny recently is the issue of cyber-attack.  Without veering too far afield on this topic, 
which is actually very important, the use of open architectures does increase in some ways the 
vulnerability to cyber-attack of Navy computing systems.282  However, it also makes it easier to 
craft patches and protective programming to defend systems from attacks or intrusion.  The 
ability of technicians and programmers to access the systems and their resident software enables 
more experts to support trouble-shooting, repairs, and improved security programs.    
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The following section of the RFP included the Navy Open Architecture Computing 
Environment (NOACE) Technologies, Standards, and Products guide. 283  This guide reinforced 
and expanded on the issues and guidance provided in the NOA Guide.  This document’s stated 
purpose was to provide initial and preliminary standards and product selection guidance for the 
Navy Open Architecture (NOA) program’s Navy Open Architecture Computing Environment 
(NOACE).284   It re-stated the NOA program’s goal as developing unified Navy product line 
using a common computing environment with a common set of warfighting functions shared 
across multiple platforms.285  Here again, we see the intent of distributed or network-centric 
ships or platforms as one of the key discriminators for Navy acquisition in general and the LCS 
program in particular.  But again, the Navy is also trying to avoid losing functionality while 
saving money because the end of the section mentioned above notes the intent to retain the 
“unique sets of warfighting functions associated with each ship class.”286  The overarching 
definition of the computing environment in this section of the document is that of a compatible 
set of standards based, Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) computing infrastructure components.  
These components will form a framework (or architecture) upon which warfighting and support 
applications (generally software) are to be built in accordance with the NOA rules and 
regulations.287  The use of COTS is particularly notable because it has and continues to be one of 
the Navy’s and the entire Department of Defense key policy ingredients for taming costs in 
acquisition programs.288  Later in this guide, the Navy discusses Information Assurance (IA) 
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again as in the NOA guide.  The basic argument that the Navy applies to IA while adopting 
commercial standards is that commercial best practices for products are less likely to inhibit their 
performance because market competition drives commercial developers to field systems that will 
both meet their operators’ performance needs while also protecting the operators’ proprietary 
information and data.289  Products that do not provide these capabilities will be driven out of the 
market by lack of demand.  So, in a somewhat ironic sense, considering the nature of the 
American national defense monopsony-oligopoly market, the DoD is relying on market 
efficiency conditions outside of the national defense one, to provide sufficiently robust and 
efficient products.  The following two attachments in the J-10 section of the RFP are 
spreadsheets containing standards, specific equipment, product manufacturers, advanced 
technology demonstrations, and Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) 
stakeholders.  These data are to inform the potential bidders on specific options required and 
desired in the solicitation response as well as identify potential beneficial items and technology 
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for their responses.290  The overall goal of section J of the solicitation was to inform and 
influence the potential bidders.  The inform piece was about the overarching network 
architecture and how it is intended to function.  The influence piece was intended to make sure 
that the bidders knew that costs were a significant factor for the network portion of the system 
and that whatever the bidder proposed as a solution had to function and function well within the 
parameters and network-centric architecture as described in the attachments.   These attachments 
again however serve to highlight two of the critical themes running throughout the LCS 
acquisition, price (or cost) and networked systems and platforms.     
The section following the architecture inserts also served to emphasize the goal of cost 
reduction and/or control in this acquisition program.  In section J-11, the Navy provided inferred 
guidance to the bidders by including the Performance Based Logistics (PBL) Guidance 
document.291  This was a directive that the FY 03 Defense Policy Guidance directed all of the 
services to establish a PBL for all new weapons systems acquisitions and to retrofit to all ACAT 
I and II fielded systems.   The basic goal of PBL is to improve logistics to the warfighter while 
maintaining or reducing the cost for this support.  As in the preceding sections addressing the 
software and hardware of the design, this PBL document focuses on “improving the total life 
cycle support and cost.”292  Here again, we can see the Navy’s goal of not necessarily buying 
LCS “on the cheap” but striving to control costs as far as possible in advance of actually 
purchasing and then maintaining the class over its entire life-cycle. 
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Attachment J-12 (see Figure 7 below) further hammered home the point about controlling 
costs.  This serves to both emphasize the desired price controls but also the government’s recog- 
 
Figure 9- Attachment J-12 Cost vs Performance 293 
nition that the stated design goals would come with increased costs.  The graphic represents this 
acceptance because it details the relationship between ship size and speed and the predicted cost 
of production.  The short version is that the faster and therefore the larger the ship, then the 
higher the cost to produce it (and likely the higher the cost to design it as well).  It may be an 
inference, but it is likely a good one that the intent is to reduce or manage as much as possible 
consistent with attaining minimum performance goals the expected cost per hull of the winning 
design. 
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The remainder of the solicitation package is not immediately applicable to this analysis 
other than to serve as proof that certain acquisition requirements from the FAR and DFARS 
remain applicable regardless of the nature or size of the acquisition.  While Section L-2 was 
relatively standard ‘boiler-plate’ FAR/DFARS on “Provisions Included in the Full Text” it also 
included several references to earlier acquisition documents that re-enforced the quest for cost 
control and flexibility in performance and/or construction standards.294  The opportunity to 
provide updated or non-military standards for the LCS flight 0 design was provided through 
reference to a NAVSEA document empowering “ALTERNATIVES TO SPECIFICATIONS OR  
STANDARDS (NAVSEA) (AUG 1994).”295  This paragraph allowed bidders to show how using 
or not using ‘old’ standards or specifications was “advantageous to the government” and provide 
how alterative, recommended newer or non-government (i.e. commercial) standards would 
satisfy the requirements as described in the solicitation.  Again, the inference here is that the 
government wanted to save some money by enabling the commercial bidders to make their 
case(s) for alternative and hopefully cheaper solutions that would satisfy the requirements.  The 
last paragraph of this attachment addressed another potential cost-saving measure through the 
use of Non-Developmental Items (NDI).296  In short, if there is some piece of equipment or 
software already in service, for sale, or needing some minor modification(s) to satisfy the 
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requirement of a Research and Development (R&D) or conventional milspec item, then the 
bidder could recommend the substitution to the government.  And rather than infer money 
savings as a goal, the Navy came right out and stated: “The intent of the NDI alternative is to 
provide the Navy with effective and economic solutions to its essential operational 
requirements.”297  The solicitation package combines two hard to achieve but complimentary 
goals, design and build a system that performs as required and provides that performance at a 
bearable fiscal cost.  The specific proposal response items and assessment criteria bear this out. 
THE RESPONSE REQUIREMENTS (AKA “THE PROPOSAL”) AND THE 
ASSESSMENT CRITERIA 
 In most cases of government RFPs and RFQs, the soliciting agency will spell out the 
specific response sections, to include permissible page lengths, that it wants from bidders.  The 
government will also tell the bidders how their respective proposals will be evaluated. This held 
true in the LCS Flight 0 solicitation.  The response section (Section L-3) laid out very clearly 
what responding offerors were required to submit in their proposals.298  This was to be a Firm 
Fixed Price (FFP) award to the offeror who provided the “best value” to the government.299  The 
vendors bidding on the LCS were directed to provide three volumes in their proposals to include 
a Technical Volume (I), a Price Evaluation Requirements Volume (II), and a Standard Form 33 
(SF-33) Solicitation Set and Subcontracting Plan Volume (III).  The below table (Table 4) shows 
that Volume I and certain required appendices had page limits while the other two volumes did 
not have a page limit.300 
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The Technical Volume requirements included a Management Factor with five sub-factors to be 
addressed by the bidding firms.  These sub-factors included capabilities and qualifications (1.1), 
ability to meet CAIV targets (1.2), the bidders’ management approach (1.3), and the bidder’s 
data management approach (1.4), and the usual past performance (1.5).301  The way these factors 
are articulated, their ordering, and their weighted value in the assessment evaluation are 
important because they reflect the Navy’s striving to achieve the desired performance 
capabilities but to do so at an economically feasible cost.  According to the Evaluation Factors 
for Award, the technical factor is more important than the pricing factor and the most important 
of the technical factors is the management one.  It outweighs all of the others.  In turn, factors 1.2 
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to 1.4 all outweigh 1.5 or past performance.302  These factors and the evaluation criteria serve to 
highlight the Navy’s focus on finding an offeror that is capable of producing a complex warship, 
hence the ‘capabilities and qualifications’ factor but can also adjust the cost by balancing it 
against the desired traits, thus the CAIV ‘management’ factor.  The other technical sub-factors 
serve to describe the actual nuts and bolts of how the bidder will design and build the LCS but 
also how that bidder identifies and mitigates risks e.g. schedule slippages, cost overruns, 
software failures.  In fact, though it has the least value in the assessment scoring, past 
performance is specifically retained to enable the Navy “to determine the offeror’s performance 
risk.”303     
After management, the second of the important technical factors was technical approach 
itself.  This included three major sub-factors, the preliminary design and systems analysis 
approach, the systems engineering approach, and the systems architecture development and 
implementation approach.304  These factors also reflect the quest to balance cost with capabilities 
but also serve to highlight one of the consistently sought capabilities of the LCS from concept to 
commissioning; the idea of networked platforms and systems.  Admittedly, the systems analysis 
and systems engineering is easily applied to the hardware associated with surface ships but the 
increasing ubiquity of computer controls, sensors, and the software to run them makes their 
application to electronics and software at least as important.  This becomes especially true in the 
area of systems architecture development and implementation.   The preliminary design and 
analysis was all geared towards creating a design capable of performing the specified mission 
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areas and in accordance with the LCS CONOPS discussed earlier.305  The technical approach 
was required to address the specifics of the Hull, Mechanical, and Engineering (HM&E) 
equipment, the mission packages, and the Human Systems Integration (program) that the bidder 
intended to apply.  
THE PRECEDENT 
The request for bids that the government sent out was a very unique acquisition strategy 
for the Navy – because it was based on a set of performance specifications.  The more traditional 
or standard way that the Navy had acquired ships, the FFG-7 or CG-47 classes for example, 
involved significant engineering and Research & Development (R&D) investments well before 
the first steel or aluminum was cut for the hull.  The current DD-1000, formerly DD(X), 
involved expenditures of $5-6 billion before the contract was awarded for construction.306  
Previous Navy ship acquisitions were not done using design specification style acquisition 
strategies.  The strategies used for the FFG-7, DD-963, CG-47, LHD, and new CVN class ships 
all involved both significant R&D allocations before the solicitations for construction were sent 
out.  They also included detailed design contracts where the Navy provided much of the design 
parameters, blue prints, and plans.  The TICONDEROGA cruisers were an evolutionary design 
that used the hull form and engineering plant of the preceding SPRUANCE class.  On top of 
these was mounted the Aegis combat system.307  They also shared many of the sub-systems from 
the preceding destroyer class including the guns, torpedo tubes, and sonar sensors.  The DDG 51 
class used the weapons system from the cruisers and mounted it on a modified hull form.  The 
engineering plant was also modified but again in an evolutionary vice revolutionary way; the 
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main engines and auxiliary generators remained the same but the space layout and some of the 
control and auxiliary systems were changed or improved.  The same is true in many ways of the 
current LHD/LHA class ships.  The WASP and AMERICA class are a direct linear descendent 
of the first Landing Helicopter Assault (LHA) class, USS TARAWA and her sisters 
commissioned between 1976 and 1980.  Their immediate predecessors were the IWO JIMA class 
of helicopter carries (LPH) serving from 1961 to 2002.  These ships are highly representative of 
the incremental design changes that the Navy applied to succeeding ship classes.  The physical 
layout of the succeeding classes was changed but generally in a minor way when compared to 
preceding classes.  The same was true of the engineering plants, where it was not until 2001 that 
USS MAKIN ISLAND (LHD 8) was laid down without a steam plant.  Instead, the last ship of 
the WASP class was designed and outfitted with gas turbine engines.  This design continuity 
clearly reflects the traditional Navy approach to ship design and construction.  And the LCS 
acquisition was and is a decided break from this tradition. 
Referring back to the previous chapter, the Navy had previously come to the bidders with 
a more detailed package formulated with the potential bidders more often than not.308  Most of 
the material or engineering specifications are already determined; hence the famous of infamous 
“milspec” or military specification, and the remaining definitions are limited in scope.  These 
were not the terms in which the LCS solicitation was couched.   This RFP was not an “I do not 
know exactly what I want but I will know it when I see it!!” sort of request.  It was however, a 
distinct departure from the process and methodology the U.S. Navy used to procure previous 
classes of ships.  
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The basic thrust of the solicitation was for cheap, fast, and single mission capable 
platforms to be designed and delivered within rather stringent capability parameters.  The 
overarching goal was affordability with speed (of the platform but to a lesser extent delivery) 
coming a very close second.  Price was to be kept low (relatively) through limiting the platform 
hull size and through minimal manning.  The minimal manning was in some ways the overriding 
factor for consideration because smaller ships require smaller crews and crews are often the most 
expensive operating cost for an individual ship or any other naval weapons system for that 
matter.  The other crucial design variable that the bidders had to satisfy was the speed of the ship.  
As discussed earlier, the engineering plant required to drive a hull at 40 knots would become the 
overriding technical factor in designing the LCS and in crewing the ship.  In some ways, the LCS 
parallels the A-10 Thunderbolt II (more commonly referred to as the “Warthog) which has been 
described as an airplane designed around a gun.  Similarly, the LCS class could be described as a 
propulsion plant around which was constructed a ship.  The government’s solicitation was clear 
if not precise regarding the desired performance parameters to include managing costs, making 
the ship go fast, and providing the platform to carry the desired capabilities.  The following 
chapter will show that the Navy got what it asked for but did not and does not like it.      
  






THE ROAD TO INITIAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY 
 
This chapter will delineate the path from solicitation to fleet introduction of the LCS.  It 
will in effect show how the Navy has taken a concept and made it a reality.309   How much of a 
reality is an on-going debate which this chapter will also serve to highlight to the reader.  The 
first section looks at the timeframe from contract award to ship launch.  The second portion 
describes and examines the propulsion plant problems and casualties that the class, regardless of 
hull type has faced and what has been done to improve the performance and reliability of the 
engineering plant to date (April 2017).  It will also provide context to these propulsion 
engineering challenges through some significant historical examples of other Navy ship class 
acquisitions.  Some of these examples are recent and some are more dated but as in the earlier 
cited episode of the Swedish ship VASA, marine engineering and naval architecture tend to 
present particularly difficult technical problems.  The final section of this chapter will describe 
the development and testing accomplishments to date with the mission packages.  It is also 
intended to highlight just how hard it is to design these systems because of space and weight 
limitations and the required system capabilities.  The final section will start to bridge the 
transition from technical to organizational challenges and the theory of organizational behavior.     
THE LCS PROGRAM – AFTER MILESTONE A 
The release of the solicitation for LCS design and build proposals marked Milestone A 
for this program.  And again, turning back to the previous chapter, we need to remember the 
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“flexibility inherent in the system” for ship building programs where production decisions are 
sometimes made before the Technology Development Phase and Integrated System Design are 
completed.310   
“Shipbuilding programs may be initiated at milestone A in order to start ship design concurrent 
with sub-system and component TD.” 311  
The contracts were awarded to two bidders.  One was a partnership between Lockheed 
Martine and Fincantieri (in the form of the Marinette Shipyard in Marinette, Wisconsin) and a 
team of General Dynamic Information Technology (GDIT) and Austal Shipbuilding, a joint 
company formed by the Australian firm Austal and the U.S. firm Bender Shipbuilding and 
Repair Company, that operates a shipyard in Mobile, Alabama.  The awards were made on 27 
May 2004.312  USS FREEDOM (LCS 1) was delivered to the Navy and commissioned into 
service on 08 November 2008.  USS INDEPENDENCE (LCS 2) was commissioned in January 
2010.  Both ships have made extended deployments to the Pacific region since commissioning, 
FREEDOM in 2013 and INDEPENDENCE in 2014.  The road to IOC has not however been a 
smooth one for either variant of the LCS.313 Figure 10 shows the difference in appearance and to 
a degree design between the two variants. 
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Figure 10- LCS 1 (top) and LCS 2  314 
 
ENGINEERING CHALLENGES 
 The LCS class, whether built by Marinette or Austal employed a revolutionary, for naval 
ships, propulsion system.  In order to reach the desired 40 knot top speed, the only viable 
alternative for a ship of roughly 3300 to 3500 tons (LCS 2 and LCS 1 versions respectively)315 
was to use water jets vice the more traditional propeller system.316  There has been a constant 
challenge in marine engineering to translate the rapid rotation of high speed turbines into lower 
rate rotations that ships’ screws or propellers can use to develop thrust and move the hull through 
the water.  Higher speed or higher Rotation per Minute (RPM) turbines are more efficient in 
turning thermal energy from steam boilers or fuel-air combustion in gas turbine generators like 
the LM2500 series engines into mechanical energy for propulsion.  However, these high RMPs 
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are often too high for large diameter shafts and screws to effectively and efficiently turn into 
mechanical thrust for moving hulls.  Navies around the world have used reduction gears since the 
introduction of turbines for propulsion to translate higher RPMs into usable propeller rotations 
for warships.  Reduction gears are generally bulky and heavy sets of machined gears and pinions 
that take up a lot of space and generally increase the displacement of a ship by several tons.  The 
propulsion system installed in the LCS class has eliminated the need for reduction gears but still 
requires the conversion of mechanical energy into usable thrust.  The use of water jets, akin to 
air-breathing jet engines in that the rotation, compression, and expulsion of a medium (liquid 
water vice vaporous air in this case), creates thrust has made reduction gears unnecessary.  This 
new water jet propulsion system while removing the requirement for reduction gears has 
however suffered from teething problems since the launch of the LCS hulls.  In 2010 one of four 
Rolls-Royce water jet propulsion units was replaced and in 2012 a shaft seal failed, which also 
required replacement.317  This level of mechanical reliability is not unusual for new marine 
propulsion systems, but it has made the LCS class an easy target for its critics.  Despite 
numerous critics and critiques however, the LCS class has been deploying to the western Pacific 
since 2013. 
FIRST DEPLOYMENT 
 USS FREEDOM (LCS 1) deployed to the Western Pacific centering on Singapore in 
March 2013.  The first leg of the trip was marred by power losses that forced the ship to stop 
over for a more extended stay in Guam than had been planned.318  In April 2013, while inport 
Singapore, sea water intrusion contaminated the lubricating oil system reportedly in the main 
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reduction gears but more likely in the shaft bearings for the main propeller shaft(s).319  On 21 
May 2013, FREEDOM’s engineering watchstanders found sediment in the ship’s lubricating 
system forcing the ship to return to the Changi Naval Base.320  Whether this was organic matter, 
metallic ‘chips’ carved from the machinery itself, or other foreign matter in the oil is unclear but 
based on the fact that the ship got back underway shortly after this casualty, it was likely just dirt 
or some other non-metallic ‘bits’ in the lube oil.   Then on 20 July 2013, while participating in an 
exercise with several other navies, including that of the Republic of Singapore, FREEDOM 
suffered a main propulsion engineering casualty that forced her to return to port.321  The ship had 
been preparing for a vertical replenishment at sea and these sorts of events usually require all of 
the ship’s propulsion and engineering systems to be up and running.322  The return to port while 
undoubtedly caused by the engineering casualty was a reasonable and standard safety measure 
under the circumstances.323  The ship returned to Changi Naval Base and an initial assessment 
identified exhaust leaks in turbochargers for the ship’s diesel generators that caused one 
generator to overheat and shut down.   There were also reportedly problems with electrical load-
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shedding between online generators, which is the process of prioritizing and shutting down (or 
shedding) non-essential systems.324  In October, the ship’s crew discovered sea water 
contamination in the starboard steerable water jet hydraulic system.325  This was followed by 
another minor engineering casualty in November when a steering indicator for the port steerable 
water jet was found to be operating incorrectly during pre-underway steering checks.326  The 
system itself was working fine but the position repeater on the bridge, potentially providing 
steering information to both the helmsman and to the Officer of the Deck (OOD),327 was not 
indicating the jet’s position correctly.  This was reportedly due to a damaged feedback cable in 
the system.  This first deployment served to highlight many of the predicted and some of the not-
so-predicted engineering challenges associated with the LCS class.  
 Despite these engineering challenges, FREEDOM did exercise at sea with other U.S., 
coalition, and partner nation ships.  This included Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training 
(CARAT) exercise programs with naval units from Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, the Philippines and Timor-Leste.  While some might consider 
CARAT exercises as rather simplistic events including basic seamanship, navigation, and ship-
handling events, they are prime venues for U.S. Navy units to show their skills in the skills that 
are crucial to professional mariners.  They also serve as opportunities to operate with current and 
potential allies, gauge these same navies’ skills, and to develop professional and personal 
relationships with these same current and potential allies at the individual level.   FREEDOM 
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also participated in the Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training (SEACAT) exercise program in 
September 2013 and made several port calls during her deployment.  Besides these training and 
Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) events, the first LCS class ship to deploy also 
conducted real-world operations, specifically providing Foreign Humanitarian Assistance by 
delivering supplies to the armed forces of the Republic of the Philippines after Typhoon 
Haiyan328 as part of Operation DAMAYAN.329   FREEDOM also conducted passing exercises 
(PASEX) with two Brunei and one Bangladeshi naval unit.330   In another key for the ship class, 
FREEDOM swapped crews in Singapore, completing the turnover on 06 August 2013.331  This 
was one of the key entering arguments in the concept of LCS, the ability to rotate crews bringing 
in new fresh sailors when embarked crews were worn down by the long hours of work and 
watchstanding.  The Navy, at least in the form of the Surface Force Commander, Vice Admiral 
Copeman considered the ten-month deployment by FREEDOM and her two embarked crews a 
success: 
“USS Freedom’s (LCS 1) maiden 10-month deployment validated the Navy’s overall concept of operations 
and provided us with valuable feedback on its operation, manning, and logistics. The insights gained on the 
deployment will be used to further improve the operational flexibility, maintainability and efficiency on 
future deployments for this newest class of ship in the U.S. Navy. “332 
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For all of the bad publicity aimed at USS FREEDOM, this was a success considering the miles 
steamed to get in and out of the Seventh Fleet area of operations and the specific mission and 
tasks completed by the ship’s crews during the ten months spent away from homeport.  It was 
not an unqualified success, but it did serve to provide “valuable feedback” to the Navy on this 
“newest class of ship[s]” and to support the theater engagement plans of the Combatant 
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command. 
THE LINGERING ENGINEERING CHALLENGES 
While the first LCS deployment was underway, USS INDEPENDENCE (LCS 2) was 
experiencing propulsion challenges as well.  Getting underway from Naval Station San Diego on 
21 June 2013, she experienced a sea water cooling casualty that forced the shut-down of her 
main propulsion gas turbine engines.333  There have reportedly also been problems with the 
INDEPENDENCE variant’s power generation equipment and propulsion drive-train 
components.334    
 The Navy has both acknowledged the problems and stated that fixes had been identified: 
“The SSDGs,” says Navy Undersecretary Sean Stackley, are “probably the most significant 
design deficiency we’re dealing with today. We do have reliability issues that we have identified. 
We have fixes in place on the follow ships. As LCS-1 continues its deployment, we’ll be 
incorporating those fixes on LCS-1 to address that issue.”335  One of the major problems was that 
the diesels were supposed to run for 850 hours until a failure occurred but the LCS ships were 
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only getting 400 hours between failures.336  There were also some design issues with the cooling 
system, maybe the diameter or geometry of the piping was not allowing sufficient cooling water 
flow to maintain the needed temperatures.   There is also a reported problem with the governors 
on the diesel engines that maintain the number of piston strokes required to support a given 
electrical load on the generators.  All of this is not surprising nor was it unexpected by the Navy.  
To quote a senior naval officer “The five things that I briefed [to more senior Navy officers and 
leaders] were going to break.  They broke.”337 
 The Navy undertook several initiatives to address the LCS class engineering challenges 
including a flag officer level council, an engineering program review, and hiring more engineers 
to oversee new ship construction.  The LCS Council was established by the CNO in August 2012 
with a charter to “rapidly and decisively resolve impediments to the LCS program’s success.”338   
The members were all 3-staff flag officers including the Director, Navy Staff; the Principal 
Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and 
Acquisition (ASN(RDA)); the Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA); and the 
Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CNSP).339   The seniority and composition 
of this council reflects the importance with which the CNO views the success of the LCS 
program in general, and the program’s engineering success in particular.  The engineering 
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program review is being supervised by Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) and includes 
reviewing both design and operational data.340  This review is intended to identify both material 
and systemic defects or potential defects before they become actual failures or breakdowns.  The 
Navy has also invested significant time and resources into providing and improving the 
engineering training that LCS crews receive.  The training contract awarded to Cubic Systems to 
develop courseware material includes the curriculum, teaching materials, individual class guides, 
and the software to use in the virtual ship facility out in San Diego, CA.341  Not only have new 
training facilities been brought online but the training curriculum and personnel rotations have 
been revised to strengthen individual and crew training.342   And finally the Navy awarded a 
contract (N00024-14-C-4313) to General Dynamics, Bath Iron Works, Bath, Maine to provide 
planning yard services in support of both variants of in-service Littoral Combat Ships.343  The 
idea behind a planning yard is that the contractor (or public shipyard) serves as a central manager 
for engineering, planning, ship configuration, material and logistics support to maintain and 
modernize a given class of ships.  Despite strident claims to the contrary, the Navy has not 
ignored the engineering casualties and perceived short-falls suffered by the LCS class.  However, 
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none of the solutions are going to be rapid panaceas and it will take some time to fix the 
problems with the LCS engineering plant. 
PREVIOUS ENGINEERING CHALLENGES 
 The LCS class of ships were not the first ones that the U.S. Navy commissioned 
employing electrical propulsion plants.  In the early years of the Twentieth century, a collier, 
USS JUPITER was outfitted with a turboelectric drive.  This drive used boiler produced steam to 
run a turbine generator that powered a motor directly connected to a propeller.344 The main 
alternative was using reduction gears to reduce the high rotations per minute (RPM) of steam 
turbines mechanically to a more efficient, lower RPM to drive the propellers.  The test-bed was 
sufficiently successful that the Navy chose to install a turboelectric propulsion system in USS 
NEW MEXICO (BB 40).  In fact, the system was deemed so successful that the next fourteen 
battleships laid down by the Navy used it for their main propulsion.345  There were some 
challenges associated with this first electric propulsion system notably weight and volume.  Also, 
it became obvious after the fact that the hatchways on the battleships were not large enough to 
allow the generators to be removed without cutting out larger accesses.346  This turboelectric 
system was obviously not the same type of propulsion plant as has been fitted on the LCS class.  
It was however, as groundbreaking in its time as the hydro jet system installed in LCS.  The 
biggest difference is that the turboelectric system was tested on a naval platform while hydro jets 
had been used commercially and successfully.  This is only part of the story because the LCS 
                                                     
344  Norman Friedman, U.S. Battleships: An Illustrated Design History (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 
1987), 125.  
345 Ibid, 126. 
346 Ibid, 127. 




propulsion system is required to push ships upwards of 40 knots while the battleships required a 
top speed of 21 to 22 knots. 
 Another new class of ships, the NORTH CAROLINA battleships had a significant 
propulsion related issue that delayed their operational employment in the Second World War.  
While both ships had been commissioned by the summer of 1941, neither had been able to 
achieve their maximum power trials because of excessive longitudinal vibration.347  A series of 
fixes using different propellers and more structural bracing topside were tried but the problems 
persisted until at least 1943.348  These problems had in fact delayed the deployment of both 
NORTH CAROLINA and her sister-ship WASHINGTON to the Solomons Island campaign in 
the Pacific. 
While not intending to be an apologist for or fan of the ships, the author would be remiss 
if he did not point out that these sorts of engineering problems are neither unique to LCS nor 
uncommon in the U.S. Navy’s surface force.  The fact that the reader ought to bear in mind is 
that naval engines, of whatever type, are intended to drive large hulls through the water at 
relatively high speeds.  This puts a lot of stress and strain on warships’ engineering plants and 
thus leads to periodic failures through high pressures, corrosion, and high temperatures.  Some of 
the casualties onboard FREEDOM were design faults but at least as many were due to running 
the engineering plant up to its designed limits, for extended periods of time.   And ultimately 
regardless of the reliability issues, the U.S. Navy got the speed and displacement that they 
wanted. 
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The SPRUANCE class destroyers which were commissioned into the fleet beginning in 
1975 also suffered from perception issues early on in their introduction to the fleet.  They were 
criticized for being too big compared to the visible armament of two five-inch guns and one 
Anti-Submarine Rocket Thrown Torpedo (ASROC) launcher.349 What most critics did not 
comment on was the design that allowed for expansion and installation of new systems and 
weapons once they were available.350  Throughout the life-span of the class the weapons systems, 
especially for surface and strike warfare were updated with new missiles, launchers, electronic 
warfare and cryptographic systems.351  They also failed to realize that the new engineering plant 
while not hugely more efficient in terms of fuel consumption was more efficient and more 
importantly was infinitely more flexible in terms of starting and acceleration when compared 
with the high pressure steam systems installed in previous USN destroyers and cruisers.352 It also 
incorporated a sound reduction system with systems that generated bubbles which masked the 
noise from the engineering spaces (called “Masker”) and one that generated air bubbles along the 
edge of the propellers, reducing noise created by cavitation (called “Prairie”).  This made the 
SPRUANCE class significantly quieter than preceding classes which in turn made them much 
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more effective anti-submarine (ASW) platforms than their predecessors from both a sensor 
effectiveness and counter-detection perspective.353    
The same sorts of criticism greeting the introduction of the OLIVER HAZARD PERRY 
(FFG 7) class frigates and the TICONDEROGA (CG 47) class of cruisers.  In the case of the 
FFG 7 class, the then General Accounting Office issues a report in January 1979 that addressed 
several perceived short-comings in the class.  GAO stated that the FFG 7 “program has been 
characterized by significant cost growth, schedule delays, shipbuilding claims, and deficiencies 
in the performance of naval ships.”354  This statement sounds like it could be a summary for the 
LCS program, thirty years later.  The GAO director went on to note that in order to build the 
number of hulls required by the Navy, significant design controls were exerted on the size and 
cost of the class.  This equated to sacrificing systems and capabilities in order to get a certain 
number of hulls.355  In yet another comment that echoes the criticism of LCS was the issue of 
ship survivability.  The FFG 7 in general was susceptible to splinter damage from topside 
explosions, shock induced damage from hits and near misses, and had inadequate protection 
against chemical and biological hazards.356  In the case of the TICONDEROGA class, there were 
significant and voluminous complaints or concerns regarding how top-heavy and unstable the 
ships were because of the radar panels being mounted so high up on the superstructure.357  
Dipping further back into U.S. warship design history we can find even more examples where 
new classes of ships were derided by the experts.  The first series of heavy cruisers built under 
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the strictures of the 1922 Washington Treaty were generally underweight, meaning that 
displacement that could have been used for improved machinery, weapons and/or survivability 
went unutilized.358 It also meant that the stability and sea keeping of the ships was less than 
optimal, according to a contemporary Royal Navy observer there was a short and deep roll on 
these ships that gave “a sharp violent motion to the ship in any sort of a sea in a way which [was] 
very disconcerting to gun pointers and naturally reduces the accuracy of their fire.”359  While the 
first tranche of ships built for the U.S. Navy were adequate as proven by their wartime service 
they were still called “tinclads” and “eggshells armed with hammers” by contemporary writers.  
The second series of cruisers designed and built starting in the late 1920s were better positioned 
to take advantage of the un-used weight that their predecessors revealed and were thus much 
better protected with armor.  However, the treaty limitations adopted as a result of the 
Washington and London (1930) treaties meant that the Navy had only 10,000 tons of 
displacement to work with a speed requirement dictated by the cruiser’s intended missions.  
Again, as with the LCS, the Navy had to make difficult decisions and ultimately sacrificed 
increased protection for the required speed.360  
These historical examples are not provided as some sort of apologia for the challenges 
faced by the LCS class.  They are however presented as evidence that designing and building 
ships, including the various engineering and weapons systems they carry, is not a simple or easy 
process.  As noted in a preceding chapter, at least one masterpiece of the naval architect’s art 
capsized and sank before its maiden voyage.361  The real point made in this section is that new 
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classes of U.S. Navy ships, from battleships, to cruisers, destroyers, and LCS have all met with 
less than enthusiastic welcomes from pundits and have almost invariably suffered from some sort 
of design failure that required rectification.  Most, if not all, were ultimately ‘fixed’ and the ships 
provided good service both in peace and war to the U.S. Navy.   
 THE MISSION PACKAGES 
While engineering challenges remain a concern, the lack of fully functioning mission 
packages is a critical short-coming for a warship.  There have been incremental testing and 
development steps completed in the mission module design and implementation since the arrival 
of the first LCS hull in 2008 but critics and champions alike, agree that the mission modules 
have lagged behind the platforms since the start.  As in the preceding section, the LCS like most 
other new ship classes has and is receiving criticism because of its weapons or lack thereof.  One 
ought to bear in mind however, that preceding classes notably the SPRUANCE destroyer, 
received significant upgrades and installations of new weapons and sensors throughout the 
class’s service life.  The lag between the development of the sea frames and the mission 
packages remains one of the key criticisms levelled at the LCS program and has some validity.  
At congressional hearings in April 2016 the Navy laid out the road map to fielding the mission 
packages (MP): 
“The LCS Mission Modules program continues to field capability incrementally as individual 
mission systems become available in order to fill these critical warfighting gaps. The SUW MPs are being 
introduced in three phases, providing capability to address Fast Attack Craft and Fast Inshore Attack Craft 
in the littorals and maritime security and escort roles previously assigned to Oliver Hazard Perry class 
Frigates and Cyclone class patrol ships. MCM MPs are being fielded in four phases delivering capability to 
address maritime mines and to replace legacy Avenger class Mine Countermeasures ships and MH-53E Sea 
Dragon helicopters that are nearing the end of service life. The ASW MPs will be delivered in a single 




phase and provide counter-submarine capability in littoral and deep water environments, High Value Unit 
(HVU) ASW escort and barrier patrol capability.”362 
The mission modules (and entire LCS program) was slated for a Milestone B review in the 
summer of 2012 but this was pushed back to late spring of 2013.363  The Continuing Resolution 
(CR) which the DoD labored under in 2013 was potentially pushing the IOC of several mission 
modules to the right, with the most impact on the mine countermeasures package.364  There was 
some good news regarding this package as the Knifefish unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) 
completed an important design review in April 2013.365  And the Navy was hopeful of 
completing a ‘full dress rehearsal’ with the existing mine warfare package in the summer of 
2014.366  
For the (anti-) surface warfare package (ASuW) the cancellation of the Army’s non-line-
of-site missile in 2009 while not crippling, significantly disrupted the delivery of a fully capable 
ASuW mission package.  The Navy had intended to experiment with applying the Griffen 
missile367 as a stop-gap but instead turned to the Longbow Hellfire, originally developed as an 
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anti-tank weapon for the Apache Longbow helicopter.368  USS FORT WORTH completed a 
successful test of the second phase of the ASuW package development process in October 
2013.369  More recently, there has been a concerted effort on the part of the Navy to provide the 
LCS with a surface-to- surface missile (SSM) over the short term.  In July of 2016 USS 
CORONADO (LCS 4) successfully launched a Harpoon SSM and she had already successfully 
launched a Kongsberg SSM in 2014.370   There was also a test-firing of Hellfire missiles from 
USS MILWAUKEE (LCS 7) in February 2017 off the Virginia coast.371  These are all however 
just temporary fixes for the required capability of engaging hostile surface targets, preferably at 
long range, that the LCS class has.  In order to address this short-fall, Navy recently released a 
draft RFP and a formal solicitation for an over-the-horizon weapons system (OTH WS).372  
Unfortunately the specifics of the desired weapon system are enclosed in a classified Top Level 
Requirements Document (TLRD)373 but we can surmise that the goal is to develop a longer 
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ranged missile than the current potential SSMs with capabilities against threat surface platforms 
that are also ‘better’ than the current systems available.  In short, the Navy is seeking a long-term 
fix to address the current gap in LCS capabilities for the ASuW mission module. 
The plug and play nature of the LCS has been one of its main weaknesses according to 
various critics throughout the program’s life-cycle.  These critics voice concerns about cost, 
capabilities, complexity and the rapidity of change out as the major negative attributes of the 
intended mission package for the LCS class.  The lengthy development time has only added to 
the critics’ complaints as they note that the basic components required for the intended core 
missions of the LCS of mine warfare, anti-submarine warfare and surface warfare remain in 
development almost eight years after the first ship was delivered to the Navy in 2008.374  In 
many ways the technical and engineering challenges in developing and fielding the mission 
packages are greater than the propulsion issues that have apparently dogged the LCS class.  Akin 
to the geometry and weight dictated by an engineering plant capable of 40 knots, the mission 
packages have certain volumetric and mass limits that they simply cannot exceed.  In turn, they 
also have performance requirements that they must meet.  This has and continues to represent an 
interesting challenge for the contractors developing, testing, and fielding the mission packages. 
The LCS was intended and designed to be a limited mission platform with equipment and 
personnel that would be added in order to perform expanded missions to be provided by a 
“mission package.”375  The main missions or ‘focused missions’ for which packages were to be 
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developed were anti-surface, anti-submarine, and (anti-) mine warfare.  And to add to the 
complexity the Navy intended that these mission packages would be capable of rapid change out, 
meaning that an LCS could be configured to say hunt mines and then in a matter of hours or 
days,376 would have the modules swapped out and proceed back to sea to hunt submarines.  
These were the major warfare ‘missions’ that the Navy intended would require increased 
equipment and people but there were several additional missions that were felt to be inherent; 
these included Special Operations Forces (SOF) employment, mobility, and to an extent 
Command, Control, and Communications (C3).377  Based on the installed habitability, storage 
volume, communication, and sensor systems, these inherent missions could be conducted with 
no additional, significant changes to the basic ship.  However, taking on the other core missions 
was going to require a relatively sizable increase in both equipment and people to accomplish 
successfully.  
One of the key intended attributes of the mission packages was that they were going to be 
built based on networked off-board, unmanned systems.378  This is a significant issue from a 
design perspective because while they might operate while off of the ship, they would still need 
to be stored onboard and lifted into and out of the water in order to function.  Thus, some of the 
key systems became important variables in the weight and stability, power, and maintenance 
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calculations for the ships.  The designers needed to ensure that once loaded the off-board systems 
had sufficient space and were secured safely to prevent physical damage from movement at sea.  
They also needed to be accessible to the outside and have cranes or some sort of lowering and 
lifting system to move them from the LCS deck to the water and back.  There was also a 
requirement that the ship’s engineering plant be powerful enough to provide electrical power to 
operate the off-board systems and added auxiliary gear e.g. cranes, hydraulic pumps, that would 
be needed to support the underwater vehicles. 
The following figures serve to illustrate the variety of systems involved in the three main 
mission packages and give some idea of the volume of material, sensors, and the supporting 
systems required to operate the whole system of systems.  Figure 8 below illustrates the number 
of both underwater and airborne platforms to be used in mine hunting and neutralization.  This 
includes the MH-60S helicopter with several different potential mission packages installed on it 
and the MQ-8B Firescout unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).   There are several iterations of this 
mission package that will add capabilities in upcoming FYs.  For instance, the Firescout will be 
outfitted with the coastal battlefield reconnaissance and analysis system (COBRA), a capability 
to search for buried mines and mines in the surf zone.379 There is also a completely autonomous 
system “Knifefish” that will be used for mine hunting and neutralization but likely not until FY 
19 or later (01 Oct 2018 and on).380  
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Figure 11- Mine Countermeasures Package  381 
 
 
Something else to bear in mind in this investigating this mission module is the scope, 
size, and complexity of the ships and systems that the LCS mine countermeasures package is 
intended to replace.  The AVENGER (MCM 1) class minesweepers in spite of claims to the 
contrary once all of the equipment and personnel were factored in, represented a fiscal value (in 
roughly 1999 dollars) of $250 million. Despite concerns regarding the cost growth in the LCS 
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cost per hull to a roughly $440 million cost, this would seem to be a good economic choice, 
especially in terms of the single mission nature of the MCM 1 class, their top speed of 14 knots 
(vice 40), and their 25 plus years of service.  The AVENGER class included a hull mounted, 
variable depth sonar, a Mine Neutralization Vehicle (MNV), and mine sweeping gear.  All of 
these capabilities are scheduled to be replicated in the LCS’s mission package to a greater or 
lesser extent.  In another explanatory figure below (Figure 12), one can see the size of the 
minesweeping gear (in particular the white floats and the cutting cables in the middle 
foreground) that is being replaced albeit with some loss of raw physical cutting capability.   
 
 
Figure 12-MCM 7 Preparing Minesweeping Rig, Exercise FOAL EAGLE 12382 
 
The following picture of the Remote Mine Hunting System with a AN/AQS-20A sonar 
body mounted below it (Figure 13), serves to highlight that the new systems are large in and of 
themselves and will probably be larger than the MNS that was installed on the AVENGER class 
ships.  The development of unmanned underwater autonomous system is of great interest to the 
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Navy writ large and especially to the LCS program.  The focus is very much on the LCS 
program because of their stated mission requirement to conduct MCM operations. Autonomous 
platforms serve to reduce the risk to the personnel involved as well as the ‘mother-ship’ that 
controls and services the systems.383  An interesting though maybe tangential point about the 
developing MCM packages is that the Navy is looking at systems that will operate both within 
the water column meaning underwater vehicles but also surface systems operating on top of the 
water column where most of the mine targets are likely to be operating.384  While development is 
still lagging according to some the Navy remains optimistic that LCS minehunting packages will 
be ready for fielding and deployment by 2020.385  On a cautionary note however, the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense’s (OSD) Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) has 
expressed significant reservations regarding the individual testing of the MCM systems in the 
past.  According to a 2014 report the systems performance and reliability of the RMS was overly 
optimistic. The DOT&E stated that:  "These tests were not conducted in an operationally realistic 
manner."386  Again, without seeming to be an apologist for the laggardly appearing MCM 
mission module, it is important to keep in the mind the number of systems and the volume that 
these systems take up as currently configured in and on a ship’s hull.  Developing the same 
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capabilities and fitting them into a somewhat smaller volume is a not insignificant engineering 
challenge. 
 
Figure 13- RMS recovery aboard LCS 2 387 
 
This somewhat exhaustive section is intended to highlight the complexity and the sheer 
engineering challenges of developing a mine counter-measures mission packages for the LCS 
class and its variants.  Basically, the Navy is trying to cram an entire set of sensors, towed and 
self-propelled bodies into a manageable ‘package’ that can easily be installed and removed not to 
mention possibly shipped to a foreign port for that installation – thereby enforcing even more 
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weight and volume restrictions so that the mission package is air portable.  Again, this is not 
intended as an apology or justification for the long time-line to develop this and all of the 
mission packages; it is however intended to highlight that this is akin to rocket science and is 
certainly an ‘engineering challenge’ if the Navy wants it done right.  
  
 
Figure 14- Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Package 
 
The above figure (Figure 14) of the ASW mission package is intended to replace the 
sensors and systems associated with the OLIVER HAZARD PERRY (FFG 7) class ships.  While 
in some ways simpler than the mine warfare module, it does involve switching out various 
systems, the RMS for example to be replaced by the ‘Light weight tow,’‘Multi-function towed 




array,’ and the “Variable depth sonar’ for hunting submarines.388  Also, while the helicopter 
remains the same MH-60R/S, the equipment and ordnance to be mounted will be different.  In 
fact, the ordnance, in the form of torpedoes and sonobuoys will be significantly different.  ASW 
has historically required a large number of torpedoes and sonobuoys which in turn requires much 
more storage and much more secure storage onboard the ship.  The explosives, fuel, and 
electronics used in torpedoes do not take kindly to rattling about and excessive vibration and 
concussions can cause leaks and malfunctions.  The sonobuoys are less susceptible to shock 
damage but in some cases, they also require explosives in the form of explosive charges used to 
eject them from launching tubes.  All of this means that the storage spaces on the ship need to 
have cradles or shelves in which torpedoes and sonobuoys can be fastened down and that are 
able to vent inadvertent explosions to limit damage to the hull and systems on the ship should the 
ordnance detonate. 
One facet of the anti-submarine warfare package that has not received much attention is 
the computer processing power required.  Sensor information in the form of detected sound or 
reflected sonar energy requires computer processing to filter out non-target ‘noise’ and to 
identify specific frequencies of sound.  This entails more computers and more auxiliary support 
for powering and cooling these computers.  This in turn increases the required shipboard volume, 
the electromagnetic signature and increased weight.  There is surprisingly little comment or 
criticism about this potential challenge in any of the literature concerning LCS.  There has been 
one observation regarding the weight or displacement of the class, but as with many other claims 
for and against the LCS there is very little hard data upon which one can make an accurate 
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assessment.389  The other challenge is that if the data processing for ASW is to be done off-board 
of the ship, at some shore location, then the data transmission requirements increase 
significantly.  There have been several reported shortcomings in the LCS capability to transmit 
its own engineering data back and forth from the shore-based maintenance node.390 
SUMMARY 
The path to IOC has been a difficult and slow one.  Both the engineering plants and the 
mission modules have been plagued with physical and fiscal challenges since the commissioning 
of LCS 1.  These challenges are not new and are inherent in the fielding of new weapons systems 
and as described above, in the fielding of new ship classes.  A new class faces not only technical 
but organizational challenges on the road to joining the fleet.  It takes time and ultimately money 
to fix the problems and to develop the support programs for new ships.  To add to this challenge, 
the technical complexity of both the LCS propulsion system and the intended mission modules is 
significantly greater than most of the previous ship systems procured by the U.S. Navy.  This 
chapter has served to describe the road to IOC and to highlight some of the specific challenges 
inherent in the fielding of the LCS class.  The next chapter will address some of the 
organizational complexities and challenges faced by LCS and reveal some of the insights these 
offer to the theory of organizational behavior. 
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THE ANALYTIC MODELS 
 
This chapter will analyze the acquisition of the LCS class through the lenses of the three 
models of state or government behavior as presented provided by Graham Allison and Philip 
Zelikow in the second edition of Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis.  The 
intent is examine this acquisition in terms of the Rational Actor Model (I), Organizational 
Behavior model (II), and Governmental Policies model (III).  The goal is to provide some insight 
or explanation into how the concept of LCS was developed and made a reality from its origins in 
Admiral Cebrowksi’s Streetfighter to the ships current active and joining the fleet.  This chapter 
will address the nature of the evidence available, its strength or fidelity and the challenges that 
exist to gathering additional information.  Finally, it will also present an initial assessment of the 
original hypothesis that this dissertation started with; namely that individuals have as much 
impact as organizations on decision making.  At the risk of pedantry, organizations are made up 
of individuals.  And while organizations operate in accordance with certain rules or customs as 
described in Essence of Decision and elsewhere, not all individuals abide strictly by these rules.  
But in truth, the evidence of this is rather thin on the ground. 
THE FRAMEWORK 
 In trying to determine the best analytical methodology to address the how the USN 
acquired the LCS vice the why, one particular set of models came to mind.  These were the three 
models introduced by Graham Allison in the first edition and expanded on by Allison and Philip 
Zelikow in the second edition of The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis.  




While understanding that these models do have limitations they do however seem to a good fit as 
an analytical framework.  At the risk of disrupting the flow of reasoning here, it is important to 
segue back to the reason behind looking at the “how” the USN acquired the LCS and not the 
“why.”  The why was sufficiently explained in Chapter Three and was based on the number of 
hulls removed from the Navy inventory from 1990 until the present day.  This decrease in hulls 
coupled with both Operation Plan (OPLAN) force requirements391 and the everyday “presence” 
operational requirements, the Navy had and has required capabilities that it must provide to 
support the U.S. National Security and National Military Strategies.  Hence, we have the why but 
the how remains murky at best.  Even knowing how the process of major system acquisition is 
supposed to function, our view from the outside remains opaque.  Thus, we need some 
methodology to determine the reality, albeit one offering only a certain level of real clarity or 
ground truth, for the “how” the Navy end up with the LCS.  The linkages between an action and 
an outcome, the acquisition of a major weapon system brings us back to the appropriateness of 
the analytical models.    
We are after all looking to explain the decisions or outcome of a large organization which 
was and is impacted by many of the same variables that states and their governments face in 
international relations.  These models have also been tried and tested in various analyses of state 
behavior within the international relations system at both the structural and sub-systemic levels.  
For example, the Rational Actor Model was one of the cornerstones of deterrence theory, 
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especially the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) concept.  MAD was cornerstone of nuclear 
deterrence strategy starting in the 1960s and continuing at some level to the present.  The works 
of Schelling, Wohlsetter, and Brodie, to name just a few were heavily influenced if not 
dependent on the idea of rational actors.392  Organizational Behavior, or Model II, has less of a 
pedigree than RAM but has still served as a successful template for analyzing individual state 
behavior, especially how sub-state (national) processes impact state actions and choices at the 
systemic level.  The last model, governmental or bureaucratic politics has provided significant 
insights into various international relations theoretical and case studies, most notably in the 
various examinations of the European Union (EU), its member states, and other states and 
organizations outside of the EU.393  Of course the most obvious successful application of these 
models was by the Allison and Zelikow in their analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
THE ANALYSIS STRUCTURE 
 In the second edition of Essence of Decision, Graham Allison and Phil Zelikow re-
introduced the three models of government decision-making.  These models were the Rational 
Actor Model (RAM), the organizational behavior model, and the governmental politics model, 
numbered Models I through III respectively.  There were three basic propositions behind the 
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authors’ selection of these models.  The first was that scholars and practitioners of international 
relations actually relied on implicit conceptual models that have significant impact on how the 
think about problems in foreign and military affairs.394  These models not only frame the analysis 
of the situation but also the actual perception of the situation; at the risk of stating the obvious 
the input variables and outcome products are driven by the concepts or maybe more accurately 
the perceptions of the analysts.   The second proposition underlying the authors’ analysis is that 
most analysts explain and predict the behavior of national governments through applying one 
model, RAM.395   This means that actors’ choices are framed in terms of rational decisions or 
selecting rational courses of action in order to achieve their specific objectives.  Finally, the 
authors reintroduce two alternative conceptual models which they opine “provide a base for 
improved explanations and predictions.”396  The following paragraphs will provide a more in-
depth parsing of just what the three models are. 
RAM 
 For our purposes and in the spirit of simplification in this section, RAM or model I will 
be used interchangeably to indicate the Rational Actor Model and U.S. Navy will be substituted 
for “the state” or “the government.”  The idea of the state represented in proxy by the 
government of that state acting as a unitary actor in a rational manner has been one of the most 
important assumptions both explicit and mostly implicit used by IR scholars since the field was 
formalized in the early 1950s.397  Under RAM, the basic unit of analysis is the national 
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government or leadership of a state, which is treated as a unitary actor or “monolith.398”  Using 
short-hand phrases like “The United States” or “the Crown” allows analysts to conceptualize a 
state as one entity in the international system, vice a conglomeration of competing internal 
political organizations and interest groups e.g. the president, parliament, etc.  As one 
international relations scholar has termed it, the unitary actor, the state is a “black box.”399  It 
enables a level of theoretical parsimony in analysis which as some scholars have pointed out may 
result in oversimplification but it is sufficiently robust and complex for our purposes.400  Model I 
focuses on the actions taken by an actor are chosen as a calculated course of action to solve a 
strategic challenge. 401  In model I, the core concepts include goals and objectives, alternatives, 
consequences and choice.  All of these concepts are predicated on one key governing 
assumption.  The actor in question is seeking to achieve the best payoff, value maximization, or 
greatest utility under a defined set of essentially limiting conditions.402  This assumption is based 
on the classical “economic man” and the rational man of modern theory, who makes optimal 
choices in narrowly constrained, neatly defined conditions.403   There are some problems with 
this model in that players are assumed to have perfect information and to have considered all 
possible alternatives before choosing a course of action or making a decision.404  For our 
purposes, it should suffice to frame this model as an actor faced with a problem must make a 
decision that will provide the most utility (in the economic sense) with certain limiting factors 
like time and money available obtaining. 
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 The decision or action facing the U.S. Navy was a requirement to replace numerous aging 
and retired ships.  There were as always, only so many dollars available in the defense budget 
and only so much time before the shortage of ships had significant impact on the Navy’s ability 
to perform its missions.  The expected behavior of the Navy as a rational actor would be to 
acquire new ships using the monies available.  In order to maximize its utility, the Navy would 
seek to acquire the most number of ships that it could with said monies available. 
THE ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR MODEL 
 Model II focus on the interactions within the “monolith” to describe or define how a 
certain decision was made or action taken.  Decisions and actions are the outcome of the result of 
internal response to external stimuli.  The idea of the action as an outcome has some importance 
as we can potentially see how a selected action may appear only partially rational i.e. reflects 
bounded rationality405 because it is the result of internal processes and compromises as opposed 
to a perfectly ‘rational’ action taken by a unitary actor.  This is a bit of a canard but because we 
are looking inside the black box as it were, the actual formulation of the action or decision is 
more complex or nuanced and more intricate than in model I.  The authors note that a 
government is actually a conglomeration of different organizations, each of the organizations 
having a life of their own.406  In our case, the Navy is very much a smaller example of the 
government model, with numerous organizations, some subordinate to others and some not, 
operating with tasks and goals, or sub-tasks and sub-goals.  Theoretically, the tasks and goals 
embraced by subordinate organizations all serve to supplement or support the intended goals of 
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the larger organization.  It is rather obvious from the historical record that this theory is not 
always completely accurate. 
 Organization behavior predicates that the action by a state or other entity is not an active 
decision but the outcome of various internal processes within an organization or conglomeration 
of organizations.407  The key issue with these internal issues that often seems to result in a less 
than optimal or less than completely rational ‘decision’ is that large and complex organizations 
are heavily dependent on standard operating procedures (SOP) for reacting to situations.  This 
results in what James March and Herbert Simon classify as the logic of appropriateness in taking 
an action or making a decision.408  This translates into organizations often making a sort of 
heuristic assessment of a situation, determining how familiar the situation is to some recognized, 
historical standard, and applying that standard to address or process the decision or action in 
question.409  The problem is that not all situations are actually akin to their perceived 
predecessors and thus SOPs may lead to an unintended or less than optimal output.  It also goes a 
long way to revealing how and to an extent why, as Allison and Zelikow put it: “Organizations 
often behave in ways that seem inconsistent with a purely functional account, even one that 
acknowledges the idiosyncratic ways an organization might pursue efficiency.”410  
 There are five key points for Allison and Zelikow in addressing organizations as entities.  
The first and most basic is why organizations or why organize?  The second point provides the 
answer to the first; organizations create capabilities for achieving purposes and performing 
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tasks.411 They are designed and intended to “do stuff” whatever that “stuff” might be.  Their third 
point is that existing organizations, programs, and routines ultimately serve to constrain 
behavior.  The fourth key consideration is that organizational culture within existing 
organizations shapes the behavior of the individuals working in those organizations.  The result 
is that individual people are in effect pressured to abide by and act in accordance with the formal 
and informal norms of their respective organizations.  This individual behavioral constraint has a 
multiplicative effect when coupled with the organizational behavior constraint in point three 
above.   The fifth and final key point in looking at organizations is that organizations are less 
analogous to individuals than to technology or a bundle of technologies.412  There are several 
ideas to highlight from these key points but the first is that while organizations may be viewed as 
unitary actors as in RAM, unlike the conceptually unitary actors in RAM, an organization is still 
the outcome of a variety of viewpoints and compromises.  There is also the restriction or 
constraint that the organization applies to the individual thus implying conformity and a 
willingness to adopt or accept the organization’s goal as an entity.  This is a nuanced difference 
between model I and II but the perspective of analysis for model I does not take into account 
how the unitary actor formulates his decision while model II does account for the inputs and the 
process of how a decision is made or an action is taken.  This can reveal what the critical 
variables are and how they are ranked by the organization.  This priority ranking through 
organizational processes can have significant impact on the apparent rationality of a decision or 
action under model II.   
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 Besides these five key points, another key concept in examining model II is the 
competition between what they call the “paradigm of efficiency” and that of “culture.”413  This 
has direct bearing on the issue of rationality addressed in the preceding paragraph.  A paradigm 
of efficiency is focused on producing the most output using the least input.  The organizational 
goal is to in economic terms “reduce transaction costs enough to offset the cost of the 
organization itself.”414  The paradigm of culture on the other hand will drive organizational 
decision making or actions based on a rationality based on the organization’s ability to define its 
own missions.415  The idiosyncratic pursuit of efficiency mentioned earlier becomes much 
clearer when for example the Navy is directed to clean up an oil spill and sends a bunch of 
sailors out with boats, hoses, and oil-absorbent pads while say the Coast Guard hires a 
commercial contractor to do the same task.  The Navy just wants to get the task done while the 
Coast Guard might be more interested in avoiding bad press created by the media portrayal of its 
personnel cleaning up a spill because this implies Coast Guard responsibility in causing said 
spill. This is a simple illustrative example, but it helps to convey the difference between 
efficiency (accomplishing an assigned task) and culture (avoiding bad publicity).  Differences in 
organizational culture and norms make certain decisions logical or rationale if one understands 
the internal preferences of a given organization. 
The authors’ proceeded to analyze the paradigm of organization and the title they used 
the basic unit of analysis is very revealing: “Governmental action as organizational output.”416  
This serves to highlight the sub-process going on within the black-box that is conversely labeled 
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a “unitary actor” in RAM.  The following section of the analysis addresses the organizing 
concepts, reiterates some points mentioned earlier but also reveal some key attributes that serve 
to distinguish model II from model I.  The first of these is the repetition that the key actors in 
model II are not monolithic nations or governments but constellations of loosely allied 
organizations which act only when component organizations perform their routines.417  This 
serves to highlight the second point that organizations, internally and externally, operate under 
conditions of factored problems and fractionated powers.  This means that individual 
organizations are tasked to deal with certain aspects of a given problem even when they have the 
“primary” power or capability of addressing said problem.418 It also means that specialization i.e. 
the ability to address certain problems or take certain actions leads to differing levels of 
responsibility even within an individual organization.  This idea leads directly into one of the 
overarching issues that acts as both an input into organizational behavior and an output of it, the 
issue of standard operating procedures. 
Not only do standard procedures impact how an organization addresses a problem, they 
also have a very deterministic impact on what the organization does or the actions that it can 
take.  As mentioned above, SOPs allow large organizations to address complex problems or take 
actions in response to the problems.  They (SOPs) are driven by and designed to deal with both 
the complexity of the organization and the complexity of the problems faced by a given 
organization.  The challenge is that in international relations and federal acquisition both, 
standard procedures again both enable but also constrain the actions that an organization is 
capable of taking in response to a situation.  This can mean that the actions taken are not exactly 
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pertinent to the situation at hand or on our case the acquisition may not match the conceptual 
capabilities.  Another key attribute is that often organization objectives become performance 
targets.  This can result in successful compliance with organizational objectives and 
organizational constraints becoming measure of success.  SOPs become the framework within 
which organizational performance is measured as well as a framework for how performance is 
executed.   There are several other attributes in the organizational behavior construct that are of 
interest including uncertainty avoidance, problem-directed searching and organizational learning 
and change. 
Avoiding uncertainty might be considered a sub-set of standard procedures but it is not.  
This is an observed organizational behavior, especially in government bureaucracies where the 
organization cannot abide uncertainty in their environment.  In fact, organizations make every 
effort to control their environments in order to minimize uncertainty.  Allison and Zelikow call 
this a negotiated environment.419  This is very appropriate to our case study in that the Navy and 
all of the services work very hard with and against each other and with all of the involved 
budgetary stakeholders to create as promising a fiscal environment for their needs as is possible.  
In fact, the Air Force is almost notorious for their skills and efforts in these public relations 
campaigns.  The issue of problem-directed search is not necessarily looking for a problem to 
solve.  It is an organization’s efforts to adapt to a non-standard situation by searching for a 
solution from within the organization’s existing expertise, knowledge, and physical resources.420  
To a certain extent this is akin to ‘when one has a hammer, all problems look like nails’ and the 
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example of the U.S. Army’s efforts to combat counter-insurgency in Southeast Asia using the 
technology and firepower strengths that it had is very illustrative.421 
This leads us into the general propositions of Allison and Zelikow’s analysis.  It also 
feeds directly into one of the major points for the authors but also for our specific case study on 
LCS; existing organized capabilities influence government (organizational) choices.422  To 
revisit the hammer and nail analogy again, the military has the capability to address a military 
invasion of the Homeland or of an allied nation but if the “invasion” takes the form of a crop 
blight or disease, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) or Centers for Disease Control 
(CDC) might be a more effective organization in response.  This also serves to outline the issue 
of organizational priorities or goals influence how an organization implements actions or 
responses.423  Again, in the case of an invasion, DoD would likely react with physical force to 
repel the invaders.  For crop blight DoD might cordon the fields and burn the affected crops.  
USDA might instead, take samples, do biological studies, or experiment with bio-responses like 
alternative seeds or insects to displace or eat the affected plants.  It becomes an issue in many 
ways of how the organization defines success e.g. acres burned versus spread slowed to x meters 
per day.  Here we find a third idea from Allison and Zelikow that we have discussed previously, 
namely SOPs.  The implementation of responses or actions tends to reflect previously established 
routines, from SOPs to programs to what the author’s call organizational “repertoires.”424  DoD 
has various sets of standard responses to pre-determined situations like harassment at sea, close 
approaches to North American air-space by foreign military aircraft, and small infantry unit 
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ground combat.  The same is true for USDA with crop blights, the CDC for disease outbreaks 
and for other government agencies.  All of these factors obtain in the case of the Department of 
the Navy and the LCS.  For instance, the Navy has a corporate knowledge and level of expertise 
in the management of ship construction. This coupled with an organizational priority to replace 
several different classes of ships, covering several different warfare areas influenced the Navy’s 
selection of surface platforms – ships – to fill the impending capability gap vice using aircraft or 
autonomous vehicles.  The implementation of the solution, replacing the aging or de-
commissioned ships was very much in keeping with established Navy routines of ship-design 
and shipbuilding program management.  The one significant change was the solicitation using 
performance vice design specifications, and even this could be classified as an “adaption of 
existing programs and activities.”425 
Organizational behavior or model II serves to illustrate that sub-systemic, sub-national 
level analysis can reveal some important insights about how an organization creates an output.  
This in turn can help to explain how a seemingly irrational decision or action can be made or 
taken by an organization notably if one realizes that it is not a unitary actor or a featureless 
black-box.  The challenge here is that we violate one of the basic tenets of International 
Relations, at least according to leading realist and neo-realist thinkers if we go below the 
systemic level.  The price we pay for drilling down, so to speak, is the parsimony of the 
theoretical construct.  However, this is a valid price to pay for the revelatory and explanatory 
capacity we gain by looking several layers deep into the system.   
MODEL III – GOVERNMENTAL POLITICS 
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 The one minor modification that we will make to this model is to substitute the word 
bureaucratic for governmental.426  While the bureaucratic eco-system is different from the 
governmental, the similarities in terms of competition for resources, time, and attention are 
sufficiently similar that we do not risk losing much in terms of applicability and appropriateness 
by this substitution.  As in politics, bureaucracies, notably government ones, are constantly 
competing for influence, for resources, and for the attention of key decision makers.  Like 
politicians one could claim that many bureaucracies have personalities and their spokesmen and 
managers certainly have personalities.  Bureaucratic politics like organizational behavior is a 
challenge for IR scholars because it is after all “messy.”  Peering inside the black box reveals a 
complicated, intricate, and often confusing process or set of processes that may have created an 
outcome or action but we as scholars may remain unsure because of the complexity.427  So, 
recognizing the potential short-comings of these models and keeping them in mind let us accept 
them as viable if not all-encompassing tools for analyzing the process that resulted in the 
acquisition of the LCS. 
Even with a respectful nod to Bendor and Hammond, this model has to be the most easily 
applicable and relatively straight-forward of the three models from Essence of Decision to apply.  
For the purposes of this analysis the author has chosen to accept the limitations for the sake of 
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simplicity and to accept that the resultant analysis may not be as rigorous and detailed as 
conceptually possible.  That being said, the key thesis of bureaucratic politics is decisions or 
outcomes are the result of bargaining games vice a more organized or defined process.428  The 
outcomes, what the authors call “decisions” and “actions” are collages.429  This hints at one of 
the main drawbacks to governmental politics from the academic perspective, they are messy.  It 
is difficult to derive overarching and parsimonious theoretical constructs from messy, 
idiosyncratic processes, especially one often extremely dependent on the personalities involved.  
Framing the Navy’s decisions or outcomes regarding the LCS acquisition and fielding is no 
different.  It may not have been as contentious as say the Affordable Care Act, but it was a 
political fight within the Navy bureaucracy to bring the LCS into the fleet. 
Allison and Zelikow frame the governmental politics model in terms of the players, their 
make-up, and how they interact to create an outcome.  The collages that are created are often the 
result of the operational environment within which the players operate, other issues intrude, real 
world events, and competition for attention create what are sometimes less than ideal political 
outcomes that leave everyone dissatisfied to some degree but are “good enough” to meet part of 
everyone’s requirements.   
   If one substitutes Navy officers for politicians, the rules of the game remain the same.  
It is all about bargaining between stakeholders as opposed to brokering a deal as the uniformed 
head of the service. The CNO may be the professional head of the service but there remain 
strong semi-independent satrapies among the organizations within the Department of the 
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Navy.430 The competition within the Navy, between the services, and among the other 
stakeholders in the national security community certainly provides the sort of playing field with 
which bureaucratic politics thrives. 
PREDICTED VERSUS OBSERVED BEHAVIOR – MODEL 1 
 If we insert Navy or the CNO as the unitary actor in model I the next step is to determine 
the value or utility maximization that the CNO was looking for in a given timeframe.  In the late 
1990s and early 2000s the Navy faced both decreasing numbers of hulls and a resource 
constrained environment i.e. less money.  It was not until the attacks of September 11, 2001 that 
the U.S. military saw an expansion to their funding in the wake of the end of the Cold War and 
the resulting Peace Dividend.  The Navy was thus faced with competition from the other services 
and other federal agencies for funding. If we frame the action or decision with a goal of 
maximizing the Navy’s piece of the budgetary pie we can then turn to the expected behavior of 
the Navy.  For our purposes then the expected behavior will that behavior which maximizes the 
number of ships by ‘winning’ largest ship procurement budget possible for the Navy.  At the risk 
of going off on a significant tangent, this competition for funding is very reminiscent of two- 
level game logic. 431  The Navy after all had to ‘fight’ with both internal constituencies e.g. the 
aviation community, and against the other services e.g. the USAF for the funding. 
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 The observed behavior appears to justify or validate the predicted behavior of trying to 
maximize the size of the shipbuilding funding and to acquire the largest number of ships possible 
based on the funding awarded.  Looking at the role of the Chief(s) of Naval Operations (CNO), 
most specifically Admiral (ADM) Vern Clark (2000-2005) and his successor Mike Mullen 
(2005-2007) during the initial acquisition phase provides some justification for the expected 
model I behavior.  These two leaders are particularly critical because Clark was the author of the 
LCS and Mullen was a driving force during the development and initial acquisition steps.  There 
are also two main factors that each share and that at least theoretically had significant impact on 
the design and building of LCS; each was a surface warfare officer (SWO) and each worked for 
then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.  The importance of their warfare community432 is 
of significance because the early 2000s saw the pending end of life for several ship classes 
including the PERRY class frigates, the CYCLONE class patrol ships, and the AVENGER class 
mine countermeasure ships.  These pending retirements totaled 79 hulls.  The Navy had already 
seen the disappearance of roughly nine individual ship classes433 during the 1990s.   Coupled 
with these ships retired in the 1990s, the on-going disposal of the SPRUANCE class destroyers, 
the Navy faced a decrease of 137 combat hulls by 2015.  These hulls needed to be replaced.  The 
timeframe of Admiral Clark’s and Mullen’s respective tenures as CNO under Secretary 
Rumsfeld was important because of his attraction to the concepts of innovation and revolution.  
The LCS as conceived and designed was a revolutionary weapons system meant to appeal of 
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Rumsfeld’s stated philosophy.  It was intended to tickle his fancy and served as a sales pitch to 
the Secretary of Defense.      
 The importance of influencing the SecDef is very much in keeping with expected 
behavior under model I.  In order to achieve their goal of more ships, the CNOs made a rational 
choice to maximize their (service’s) benefits.  Appealing to Rumsfeld’s interest in innovation 
and revolutionary change or the Revolution in Military Affair (RMA)434 was intended to get his 
support and thus get the funding to buy the LCS.  In the case of the LCS, the two most important 
variables in the equation were funding and political attention or support. 
 The fight for a piece of the budgetary pie is a crucial battle executed each and every fiscal 
year by the services.  For many years in the 1950s the U.S. Air Force received a larger piece of 
the defense budgetary pie than the other services, averaging approximately 46% between 1954 
and 1960.435  This and potential racial memories of the Admiral’s Revolt in the later 1940s, make 
the leadership of the U.S. Navy particularly loath to lose out in the funding battle in the halls of 
the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill.  None of the services in fact enjoy losing in the funding battles 
within and without the DoD and all compete very, very hard against one another to secure their 
perceived “rightful” share.  Any CNO worth his or her salt will view the pending and on-going 
budget clashes as an important if not critical factor in their success.  This is true whether in 
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comparison with the other service or internal to the Navy.  In some ways, the chief of a service is 
viewed like a venture capitalist fund-raiser and if he or she can’t get the money that the service 
needs, their prestige within the service suffers.  This is only amplified when the time comes to 
internally divvy up the dollars and in the Navy’s case some stakeholders don’t get as many 
airplanes or submarines at they wanted – individual and institutional memories tend to be long in 
the sea services and a poor fund-raising CNO will not be a popular leader.  However, the idea of 
having to compete for funds feeds directly into the next major concern for Admiral Vern Clark in 
the early 2000s especially after September 11th, 2001, how to get the administration’s attention – 
the transformational nature of LCS was just that thing. 
 The DoD under Donald Rumsfeld was absolutely fixated on “transformation.”  Slapping 
a label like transformational, revolutionary, or “represents the very epitome of the revolution in 
military affairs (RMA)436” was the perfect sales pitch to Mr. Rumsfeld and his coterie.437  In 
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truth, trying to revise the thinking and approach of the DoD was both well-intentioned but also 
truly needed.  Even after almost a decade, the services were still shaking off the residue of the 
Cold War and near peer competitors remained far away over the time horizon.  A shake-up was 
needed.  Thus, transformation came into its own – and LCS was of course transformational.  One 
of the keys to success is matching requirements to policy whether it is merely spin-doctoring 
your sales pitch or actually developing a concept that is in keeping with the current 
administration’s buzz-word of the day.  LCS fit the bill in both accounts.   
If using the RAM model, we look at the participant aiming to maximize their pay-off or 
realize the most or best gains then the CNO selling the LCS to the SecDef and Congress seems a 
rational strategy.  It satisfied the requirement for replacement hulls in view of the previously 
decommissioned and pending ship retirements.  It also fit the administrations’ and more 
specifically the SecDef’s concept of transformational technology especially as a money saver.  
By this I mean that even though the LCS as a class was not conceived as a multi-mission system 
at any one time, it was conceived as a platform that could be modified to cover at least individual 
mission areas.  The time required to change out equipment and systems to accomplish the 
specified missions was not necessarily played up in the discussions with the people in OSD or in 
congress, but it was not a key selling point that received a lot of attention or hype from the Navy. 
Stepping back a little and applying Model I as Allison and Zelikow did let us first look at 
the unit of analysis.  We can still use government action as a choice.  In this case the choice was 
to acquire the LCS or some other surface system of systems.  Now admittedly, rather than a 
government, we specifically see a sub-systemic and sub-national entity, a military (or naval) 
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service, the U.S. Navy as represented by the CNO championing this choice to the resource 
providers but for the sake of this analysis this suffices.  The unified actor for our analysis is a 
national level actor, the U.S. Navy.   
The problem at the national level is to compete for funding against the other services as 
well as the other government agencies and entities competing for federal funding.  As mentioned 
above, there is only so much money in the federal budget, and only so much of that is doled out 
to the DoD.  This leads to serious competition within the department to justify service needs and 
this service funding.438  In one of the most notable examples of this sort of knife-fight was the 
so-called “Revolt of the Admirals” in 1949.  This was a bare-knuckled effort by the Navy 
leadership to fight the Air Force and by extension the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the 
aftermath of the cancellation of the first super-carrier, USS UNITED STATES (CVA-58) for 
funding.439  The Navy lost but was in many ways saved if not redeemed by the advent of the 
Korean War and increased overall military funding as a result.  This revolt, if somewhat 
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excessive, serves as an illustrative example of the ends to which the U.S. military services will 
go in order to secure their ‘just’ funding.  The action of choosing to acquire the LCS was based 
on the objective of realizing some amount of federal funds in order to purchase capabilities 
execute required missions like mine hunting and ASW.  It may or may not have been simply a 
lack of other viable alternatives but the then recent notoriety of the “Streetfighter” concept and 
war games and the Crossbow and Sea Lance engineering studies may have influenced the 
decision. 
The options included a variety of other more traditional platform designs, potentially 
more airborne systems, maybe even a slew of unmanned systems. However, each of these 
options had their own drawbacks including limited flexibility, time to fielding, time required to 
test, expense, and so forth.  The basic challenge with airborne systems was duration or time on 
station.  Aircraft can fly far and fast but their ability to linger in a geographic region is limited 
when compared with that of a surface platform.  Plus, while many aircraft can perform multiple 
missions, they don’t carry the same number of sensors or amount of ordnance that a surface 
platform is capable of carrying, even one as small as the LCS.  Finally, aircraft while generally 
cheaper than ships are often not that much cheaper, and it takes more airframes to provide the 
same time-duration coverage as a ship so any savings in individual platform costs would likely 
be negated by the numbers required not to mention the pilot training, crew training, aircraft 
maintenance, fuel, etc.  Unmanned systems present or presented many of the same problems but 
additionally would have required more experimentation, research, and development to reach the 
same levels of performance as surface ships or their airframe alternative.  Today, almost 
seventeen years on from the birth of LCS, unmanned systems remain less capable than most 
surface platforms and the command and control of unmanned systems is a communications and 




software challenge of the first order.  Thus, some sort of surface platform was the ‘best’ choice 
or the value-maximizing one at the time. 
The consequences could be a relative loss of funding or the inability to execute required 
missions thus increased threat(s) to national security. The choice, for the Navy, was what system 
to select? Bearing in mind the mantra of “Transformation” echoing through the halls of OSD and 
Joint Forces Command (JFCOM)440, the Navy would have been ill-served by trying to buy more 
of the same; meaning more destroyers (the DDG 51 class were still in production at the time) or 
another traditional frigate or “new” class of destroyers.  Again, the system of systems to achieve 
the desired effects (see Effects Based Operations or EBO)441 had to be transformative and 
revolutionary, for certain values of revolutionary.  In order to achieve certain budgetary goals, 
the Navy needed to select a platform that could both meet its national security responsibilities 
but also scratch the itch at OSD and the administration.  The Navy chose the LCS, with some 
additional intended mix of unmanned systems to augment the class’s capabilities. 
The dominant inference pattern seems to bear up under the RAM analysis in that the 
Navy’s selected action was the value-maximizing means of achieving its objectives.  The 
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ultimate objective was to acquire replacement ships.  These ships were needed to “support 
conducting prompt and sustained combat operations (the worst case) in support of national 
security objectives.”   The objective preceding replacing these ships was to secure the funding to 
be able to buy them.  This required support from the Secretary of Defense.  Thus, it behooved the 
Navy leadership, for our purposes the CNO as a unitary individual should suffice, to sell the LCS 
to the SecDef and his bureaucracy.  To sell it, the CNO needed to use words and phrases that 
resonated with Secretary Rumsfeld.  The LCS as a concept certainly fit this bill.  So, we saw the 
CNO pitching the LCS, in effect making the choice to acquire this system of systems to meet his 
service’s requirements.  The action served to meet his statutory and assigned mission needs. 
MODEL II - EXPECTED VERSUS OBSERVED BEHAVIOR 
 Turning to organizational behavior as our analytical framework, we would expect to see 
the desire to maximize budget awards as an organizational outcome but maybe not the decision 
to maximize the shipbuilding budget.  But again, we are faced with a two-level game of sorts as 
the Navy is competing internally to justify allocating resources and externally against the other 
services and sometimes congress to get the Navy’s ‘fair share.’  The shift from a unitary actor to 
a conglomeration of interests changes not only the dynamic but also the analysis.  The expected 
behavior as noted above remains the same at one level but becomes a lot more controversial at 
the internal level(s) of the organization in question.  Writ large, one could state that, in general, 
the Navy would prefer to have more systems, people and platforms than not.  The form of these 
desired platforms becomes the key variable.  Aviators want more manned airframes, submariners 
more submarines and ship drivers want more ships.  The internal comparison of resourcing may 
reveal some insights into how the organization decided on LCS as an outcome. 




 The observed behavior is harder to parse meaning evidence is much thinner on the 
ground.  This is due to a variety of reasons including security classification, proprietary 
information controls, and a certain lack of enthusiasm to discuss this procurement on the part of 
those previously and currently involved.  We can however tease out some details from the 
official record.  First, the Navy continued to support the acquisition of the LCS despite 
documented engineering challenges, pending weapons system challenges, and a distinct lack of 
professional enthusiasm from many in the surface warfare community.  Secondly, the Navy 
conducted several internal re-organizations and created new sub-organizations to foster and care 
for the LCS through the construction of various hulls and the introduction of the class into the 
fleet.  Finally, the Navy is continuing the acquisition even though it is likely to be less than 
expected and there is already a search underway to at least design the successor class. 
 Again, discovery in the sense of identifying evidence is much more problematic when 
dealing with the LCS acquisition.  Besides the various factors mentioned above, people in the 
military portion of the bureaucracy tend to change more often than one would expect.  Most 
uniformed personnel spend no more than three years working on any one specific acquisition 
program.  Service needs, and individual career requirements dictate that commissioned officers 
especially need to move to new billets in order to continue their knowledge and experiential 
growth for promotion and employment in the larger, broader service organization.  We can 
however determine at least one evidentiary event that speaks to the tendency of organizations to 
react to situations even new one by applying standard operating procedures (SOP).442  The 
normal reaction of large organizations to situations, whether normal or abnormal is to act/react in 
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accordance with establish patterns of behavior.443  The specific incident from the LCS 
acquisition program that indirectly highlights the application of standard routines is the reaction 
to the intended mechanical construction standards initially intended for the ship class. 
The initial intention was to construct the LCS hulls based on a commercial standard, set 
by the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS).444  This decision came under intense scrutiny as the 
first hulls were commissioned and the Navy Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) began to 
inspect the ships.445  A series of Navy, GAO and congressional studies highlighted the perceived 
shortfalls of building the hulls to a non-Navy survivability standard.446   While not directly 
addressing the current LCS construction standard the Director of Operational Test and 
Evaluation told congress that planned improvements in the LCS follow ships, a multi-mission 
frigate “will not significantly improve the new ship's overall survivability relative to LCS.”447  
The Navy has responded indirectly by raising the level of survivability standards to something 
                                                     
443 Ibid, 43. 
444 Sandra I. Erwin, “Navy's No. 2 Civilian Chronicles Missteps in Littoral Combat Ship,” 
www.nationaldefensemagazine.org, 29 January 2013.  Megan Eckstein, “CNO 'satisfied' with LCS cost, schedule, 
performance GAO Report: Navy Considering LCS Changes That Could Raise Costs,” www.InsideDefense.com, 19 
July 2013 
445 The Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) is tasked to examine commissioned U.S. Navy warships 
and determine if their material condition is sufficient for the ship to remain in service as a unit of the fleet.  The team 
is led by a senior flag officer and reports directly to the CNO and Fleet Forces Command on the inspection results. 
From the INSURV mission statement: “The Board of Inspection and Survey conducts acceptance trials of ships and 
service craft for the purpose of determining the quality of construction, compliance with specifications and Navy 
requirements, to determine if builder responsible equipment is operating satisfactorily during the guarantee period 
following acceptance and to make recommendations upon their acceptance by the Navy.” Available on-line at: 
http://www.public.navy.mil/FLTFOR/insurv/Pages/Mission.aspx. Accessed 16 May 2017, 0908 EST.    
446 Government Accountability Office, “Littoral Combat Ship: Knowledge of Survivability and Lethality 
Capabilities Needed Prior to Making Major Funding Decisions,” GAO-16-201, December 2015, summary page. 
Department of Defense, Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, FY 2014 Annual Report, January 2015, 203. 
447  Lara Seligman, “DOT&E Tells Hill Upgraded LCS Won’t Meet Standards For Modern Frigate,” Inside the 
Navy, 06 July 2016. See also Anthony Capaccio, “U.S. Navy Littoral Ship Found Vulnerable to Attack,” Bloomberg 
News, 24 June 2015. 




more than standard ABS commercial levels while still, as evidenced above, not meeting the 
entirety of the Navy’s standard for survivability.448 
 The organization’s reaction was to apply a standard and standard response by trying to 
apply a modified version of the normal survivability standards to the design and construction of 
the LCS.449  These were admittedly the lowest of the Navy’s survivability but still to some this 
was an improvement over the straight-stick commercial ABS standards.  The problem with 
changing the standards however is that is also increased the cost per hull.  The following table 
reflects the estimated difference in construction cost per ton in similar ships and for LCS with 
increasing levels of survivability.450  As the table shows (Table 5), striving to attain the slightly 
improved survivability of the Coast Guard’s National Security Cutter (NCS) would have pushed 
the price-tag for LCS well over the initial $250 to $350 million goal.  The organization found 
itself stymied by the cost increase inherent in the improved standards, but it dusted off another 











JHSV 1,515 tons $174M $115,000/ton Commercial 
NSC 3,206 tons $529M $165,000/ton Commercial + 
FFG 7 3,140 tons $617M $196,000/ton USN Lev I 
LCS 2,700 tons $310.5M $115,000/ton Commercial 
    $445.5 M $165,000/ton Commercial + 
    $529M $196,000/ton USN Lev I 
Table 4- Construction Cost/Ton451 
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The second evidence of organizational behavior contributing to the explanation of how 
the LCS was procured is circumstantial but involved internal re-organizations within the Navy.  
While not exactly providing plausibility to the bureaucracies, if successful, will produce more of 
it, whatever it is and seek more resources to do theory posited by some economists, the increase 
in internal sub-organizations does reflect attributes of model II.  The basic attribute it reflects is 
the already mentioned reaction to circumstance by using tried and true forms or processes; in this 
case setting up another committee the Littoral Combat Ship Council.452 
Unlike some committees however, the composition of the LCS Council is both indicative 
of the important that the head of the service places on the class and the influence that its 
members can potentially exert in establishing the LCS as a viable platform in the Navy’s arsenal.  
The council is composed of senior flag officers, Vice Admirals all,453 and is chaired by the 
Director of the Navy Staff (DNS).  DNS represents a major center of influence and bureaucratic 
power in the OPNAV staff and the Navy in a wider sense.  The other principals include the 
Commander of the Naval Surface Force, the Commander of Naval Sea Systems Command 
(NAVSEA), and the Principle Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 
Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN(RDA)).  The Commander, Naval Surface Force 
is responsible for the manning, training, and equipping of all of the Navy’s surface 
combatants.454  His assignment and attention to this council adds emphasis to the service’s 
commitment to successfully acquiring, fielding, and actually operating the LCS class.  The 
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Commander of NAVSEA is responsible for all of the systems installed or planned for installation 
on the LCS and also manages much of the research and development of the systems and their 
upgrades.  The Military Deputy to the ASN(RDA)) is the senior uniformed naval officer 
involved in the design and procurement of all of the Navy’s equipment from uniforms to ships.  
Much as in the case of COMSURFOR, making these officers members of the LCS Council gives 
them, their subordinates, and the Navy writ-large a signal that the Navy, as an entire organization 
is committed to the effective implementation of the LCS as a procurement program and as a 
fielded system of systems.     
The actual mission of the council only serves to reinforce the importance that the service 
applies to the LCS. The specific mission of the LCS Council is to:  
“…drive action across the requirements, acquisition, and Fleet enterprises of the Navy to 
ensure the successful procurement, development, manning, training, sustaining, and 
operational employment of the LCS Class ships, their associated Mission Packages, and 
shore infrastructure.”455 
This makes it very clear that the Navy as an organization wants the LCS to succeed and is 
dedicating leadership and management resources to accomplish this goal. 
 The supporting members of the council further bolster this intent. The primary 
stakeholders include the Navy lead manpower office; the Deputy CNO for Manpower, 
Personnel, Training, and Education, the OPNAV Director for Surface Warfare, the Commander 
of Naval Air (vs. Sea) Systems Command, the Director for the PEO for LCS, and several key 
warfare and capabilities staff officers from both US Fleet Forces and the Pacific Fleet.  Again, 
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the scope of the responsible individuals and their seniority, most of these listed stakeholders are 
at least two-star admirals, indicates the importance of this program to the organization.  So, while 
the Navy has applied a standard practice as per model II, the importance of the people assigned 
to the committee indicates this is not just “Let’s study this for a while” - with the inference that 
the delay created by the studying will see the issue goes away.  There is also the difference in 
wording where this council is not directed to study a problem but instead to guarantee the 
success of this “problem.”  
The second indication of organizational behavior as defined by Allison and Zelikow from 
the Navy in regard to LCS is the internal re-organizations or what the Navy calls ‘stand-up’ of 
new sub-organizations within the larger organization.  This is keeping with the gradual and 
incremental changes in organization cited in Essence of Decision.  In this case, besides the 
creation of a new Council for LCS in 2012, the Navy also created a Program Executive Office, 
Littoral Combat Ships (PEO LCS) on 11 July 2011.  What is significant besides the creation or 
‘stand-up’ of a new organization, PEO LCS was created in part from the existing PEO Littoral 
and Mine Warfare (PEO LMW).  PEO LMW was created in 2002 and had been responsible for 
much of the mission module equipment and engineering responsibilities that was passed over to 
the new PEO LCS in 2011.456  The sea-frame (or hull) had been under the management of PEO 
Ships working in concert with PEO LMW.457  However, with the creation of PEO LCS, PEO 
Ships like LMW passed its acquisition and maintenance duties off to the new organization with 
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some limited amount of resources, people and money also transitioning.  This lineage of PEO 
LCS can serve as evidence of the slow but study organizational processes that the Navy seems to 
favor.  Reorganization can to a certain extent stand as a proxy for incremental changes to 
procedures and repertoires and the idea that new activities typically consist of marginal adaptions 
of existing programs and activities.  In addition, they serve to reflect the concept of organizations 
having limited flexibility imposed from both within and without.  In the case of the Department 
of the Navy limits are not just the result of institutional or cultural drivers but also political and 
statutory ones from DoD, the Chief Executive, and congress. 
MODEL III - EXPECTED VERSUS OBSERVED BEHAVIOR 
Despite the apparent applicability or “rightness” of bureaucratic politics in a case like the 
LCS acquisition, the reality is not as apparent and clear once we look a bit closer.  Under model 
III we would expect to see a significant amount of politicking going on within the Navy to garner 
support for LCS in comparison to other programs.  There should be horse-trading, log-rolling, 
band-wagoning, favor swapping, and pork barrel exchanges between different organizations and 
individuals within the Navy hierarchy.458   The different organizations or sub-organizations 
involved in this acquisition program would be trading influence, resources, or actual equipment 
in order to bolster support for the LCS.  We would expect to see program offices trading future 
options to support systems under development or to be developed in exchange for providing 
‘political’ support to LCS in the present.  This kind of support can be political in terms of public 
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statements, point papers, or technical studies that positively endorse the intended capabilities of 
the LCS class.  It can also be purely technical and somewhat passive in nature, where for 
instance the PEO for unmanned systems offers support in the form of advocating the systems 
that they are already responsible for which in turn will be installed onboard various platforms to 
include LCS.  Unfortunately, most of the potential evidence for bureaucratic politics is not 
readily available.  
What we can actually observe of the bureaucratic behaviors is indefinite, indirect, or 
inferential as evidence of bureaucratic politics.  The strongest evidence may be found in the very 
beginning of the LCS acquisition, in fact before LCS became a designated ACAT program.  The 
initial portion of design and construction funding was actually from Navy R&D funding vice the 
Navy’s shipbuilding account.459  This is indicative of a potential trade between OPNAV and the 
Navy’s R&D community, potentially including the Office of Naval Research and NAVSEA.  
The specific offices involved in this are not clear, i.e. we can’t immediately trace the money but 
again this unusual use of R&D finding could indicate a bargain between certain stakeholders in 
the Navy.  Another example, similar to the notional one cited in the preceding paragraph, is 
where PEO Integrated Warfare Systems (IWS) as the responsible technical lead for the LCS 
ASW mission module supported the efforts of PMS 406, the PEO LCS organization responsible 
for several unmanned undersea vehicles to develop these systems with potential applications to 
non-LCS platforms.  There is also some potential for internal bureaucratic politics as PMS 406  
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Figure 15- Graphic Representation of the Knifefish Underwater Unmanned Vehicle (UUV) 
Source: PEO LCS, PMS 420 Brief to Navy League Sea-Air-Space Exposition, 17 May 2016.  
 
Figure 16- RMMV testing underway 
Source: PEO LCS Small Business Industry Day Brief, 13 Aug 2015 
 
and PMS 495, the program office for MIW systems are sharing some unmanned systems in 
development like the Knifefish460 and the Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle (RMMV). These two 
systems are shown in Figures 15 and 16 above respectively.  The focus is admittedly mostly on 
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the mine-hunting mission area but there may be inferred potential to apply these underwater 
vehicles to submarine hunting in some scenarios.  The other potential evidence of bureaucratic 
politics in terms of trading is the cancellation of the follow-on acquisition and the re-issuing of it 
at a later date.  The delay in re-issuing the solicitation and the decision to not open up new, 
alternative supplier yards in addition to the Austal and Marinette teams resulted in significant 
short-term savings for the Navy.  These short terms savings were re-programmed into other 
programs to include paying for several other Navy procurements.461  The challenge is that we do 
not know what sort of bargaining took place within the Navy or what sort of agreements were 
made between the stakeholders to take this action.  This is all circumstantial evidence at best and 
nothing but a straw man at worst.  It is however, the best evidence we have indicative of some 
level of bureaucratic politics active in this acquisition program.   
The third model is much more difficult to uncover, there remains no ‘smoking gun’ to 
which we can point in the case of the LCS.  There is some evidence of bargaining that can be 
inferred from the facts available but nothing truly substantive to which one can definitively 
point.  While this is true for the preceding models, uncovering the evidence to validate 
bureaucratic politics as a ‘culprit’ in the LCS acquisition is more obfuscated.   This is true for 
two main and one minor reason.  The first of the major reasons is that the acquisition program is 
still on-going thus subject to government and commercial proprietary rules.  This also results in a 
certain level of unwillingness on the part of those previously and currently involved to speak 
candidly regarding the acquisition program.  Many people who were formerly involved in the 
acquisition as uniformed personnel are not working on it as commercial contractors.  Their 
continuing livelihood is heavily influenced and restricted by the LCS.  The minor reason is that 
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some of the information and data, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, is classified or 
unclassified but “For Official Use Only” thus not readily available for use in this dissertation.  
One may be able to infer some evidence of bureaucratic politics based on the formation of the 
PEO, LCS in 2011.  One can only infer though, that someone in the PEO Ships and LMW 
wanted to combine the authorities and responsibilities formerly held by the two separate offices 
into one “new” organization to be responsible for the LCS. 462 
THE EVIDENCE OR LACK THEREOF 
This leads into a somewhat longer discussion regarding the nature of the evidence and the 
conclusions to be drawn from it.  As mentioned earlier there is no smoking gun in the records 
and information gathered in this dissertation to reveal complete compliance with any of the 
models that Allison and Zelikow described.  There is however some evidence that provides grist 
for the analytical mill and that indicates some compliance with each of the three models from 
Essence of Decision.  One caveat to bear in mind besides the current limitations on publicly 
available information is that this procurement is still on-going as is the introduction and 
integration of the LCS class into the fleet.  Time or history not only provides the benefit of 
hindsight, it also reveals more objective data and personal accounts that can shed light on how 
LCS was bought and fielded. 
The intended over-arching research question of this thesis was intended to be how and 
when individuals may have impacted or influenced the LCS acquisition.  There is no hard and 
fast evidence or again, no “smoking gun” that we can point to and say, “There it is!”  There is 
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some limited anecdotal evidence regarding the role that some flag officers have played in the 
system design and acquisition463 but it is just that unofficial anecdotal evidence – some might 
even say it is hearsay.  On the other hand, and pertinent to the analysis of models II and III 
above, all of the interviews and discussions between the author and people involved in the 
program mention the role of different organizations within the Navy.  One instance involved a 
reported discussion regarding the stabilized 30mm guns for the surface warfare mission package.  
A “faction from the N96 staff and the LCS program office” was looking to reduce costs and use 
a current MK38 Mod2 25mm gun that was already in the Navy’s inventory and would not 
require research and development investments.  The contrary view stated by USFF N8/N9 and 
the then Surface Warfare Development Group (SWDG) was that the effectiveness of the new 
30mm gun in a cost-weight-performance analysis more than justified the selection of these 
weapons over the existing 25mm guns.  In the end, USFF N8/N9 and SWDG ‘team’ won.464  No 
real mention was made of the opposing individuals by name, only the organizations that they 
represented.  The same hold true for discussion regarding the engineering and other mission 
module discussions and correspondence that the author has had with past and current 
stakeholders.  Other people have talked about the role of various PMS organizations e.g. PMS 
420 for mission modules, PMS 505 for LCS fleet introduction, and the role of NAVSEA in the 
overall process but little mention is or was made of specific individuals.465  So again, there is 
little or no evidence to back-up a hypothesis regarding the influence of individuals in this or any 
other procurement. 
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 So, what has this chapter done?  It placed the LCS acquisition program into an analytical 
framework based on the three models of state behavior described in The Essence of Decision.  It 
used these models to investigate the evidence available.  It also attempted to show just how 
strongly or weakly the observed behavior of the Navy matched the expected behavior of an 
organization predicted by these models.  There is some justification to state that the Navy did 
abide by the expectations of all three models and while the evidence is not overwhelming it does 
provide some level of justification for this conclusion.  This contributes to understanding how 
the LCS acquisition went from a concept of a bunch of networked commercial platforms 
working in concert to a group of more expensive naval platforms, working with other existing 
naval systems with a much higher price tag and still to be verified performance.  This section 
also addressed the evidence available and not available for investigating LCS.  There are notable 
gaps in the data available and many people who might provide insight into the program either 
cannot or will not discuss it because of legal, proprietary, or security reasons.  This makes the 
analysis more challenging but we as scholars can still draw some conclusions with some level of 
confidence.  Finally, this chapter addressed the original research question of who and how 
individuals may have influenced or impacted the LCS acquisition program – and found little or 
no valid evidence to answer this question.  It also noted that there is little justifiable evidence to 
even prove the validity of the question itself.  At the end of the day, the best that we can do is 
look at the impact of the organizations involved in the procurement and draw some conclusions 
and inferences from their actions and the impact of these on the LCS acquisition program.    
  






RESEARCH FINDINGS OR THE “SO WHAT?” 
There has been an almost decade’s long interval between the commissioning of the first 
LCS and the first fielding of a mission module.  This is, by any reasonable standard, an excessive 
lag-time between initial operating capacity and fully functional capability attainment.  While 
categorizing the LCS as a failed acquisition program may be excessive, claims of success are 
hard to justify at any level.466  While the preceding lines may be more of a statement or 
recapitulation of the preceding chapters than a revelation, the delay in fielding a fully capable 
system of systems is the crucial issue that continues to dog the LCS program.  Even if the ships 
themselves still suffered from the hull, mechanical, and to some lesser extent electrical 
shortcomings that they do, having a fully functioning set of mission modules would at least 
dampen the persistent critics and provide some justification for claiming at least a qualified 
success.  However, the LCS class remains a single mission platform and even this SUW mission 
module is incomplete and does not meet the intended capability requirements for which it was 
designed.  The following chapter will highlight some of the reasons pertinent to explaining this 
as well as re-engage the topic of grand strategy in the form of the strategic landscape or more 
conventionally to DoD joint doctrine, the operational environment.   
There are several key findings from this study of the LCS acquisition program. These 
findings stretch across government acquisition, international relations, and defense planning 
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topics, all of which represent topics of interest to scholars and practioners in these fields. There is 
a distinct risk of developing a large gap in time between fielding a sea-frame and mounting all of 
the intended weapons and sensors on it to make the system of systems a “full up round.”  This 
highlights the challenges of using Evolutionary Acquisition and Spiral Development. The choice 
of weapons systems for a predicted operational environment may or may not be suitable based 
on both the accuracy of the prediction and the actions of the participants in this environment.  
The case studies that follow serve to illustrate the difficulty in predicting the shape of the 
international system and the transitory nature the operational environment especially when the 
competitors begin acting and reacting to one another. None of these conclusions are revelations 
that have not been identified by scholars, acquisition professionals, or military planners but they 
do serve to add some more clarity to challenges in both acquisition and national security 
planning. 
EVOLUTIONARY ACQUISITION, SPIRAL DEVELOPMENT, AND THE 
TIME LAG    
What this study reveals is that there is a significant lag time between the IOC of the LCS 
as a platform and the fielding of the weapons systems to arm it and complete its functional 
capability as an integrated weapons system.  Or to put it another way, the LCS system’s full IOC 
has still not been achieved. This may not come as a surprise to the reader but if we look at the 
factors as described in the preceding chapters that contributed to this timeline, we can understand 
the how and the why of it.  The dis-joint between platform or sea-/air-frame functionality and the 
functionality of the complete ‘system of systems’ could serve as a template or as a warning that 
may be applicable to a wider range of DoD weapons procurements especially those labeled as 




“major weapons systems.”  The separation of the platform or ‘carrying frame’467 from the other 
systems that when joined create a major weapon system aka ‘system of systems,’ could serve as 
a cautionary tale for practitioners of both acquisition and warfare.  Building a platform but not 
building the actual weapons, sensors, and software needed to fulfill the intended mission of said 
platform creates a risk that the platform cannot provide the capabilities required of it in a given 
timeframe – creating what the military terms “gaps and seams” in capability.  The development, 
testing, and fielding of weapons, sensor, hulls, and propulsion need to be closely sequenced 
whether the hull is a ship, an airframe or an armored fighting vehicle. Building the best fighter 
aircraft in the world in terms of speed and maneuverability is wonderful until the missiles, guns, 
and radars are installed, operationally tested (optested), and the speed and maneuverability are 
re-tested with the added mass and weight.  The physical impact of the required equipment may 
significantly and negatively impact the observed performance of the stripped-down airframe.  
Not only do the systems need to work as advertised but their impact on the physical capacity of 
the frame carrying them to move at the intended speed and with the intended agility needs to be 
tested and verified physically.  Modeling and simulation and Computed Aided Design (CAD) 
have made huge advances in closing the gap between designed and observed performance but the 
final test always comes with the demonstrated physical performance of the entire system of 
systems, in the air, on the land or on (or under) the sea.  
EVOLUTIONARY ACQUISITION AND SPIRAL DEVELOPMENT 
This case study also reveals what may represent a precautionary example for acquisition 
professionals and uniformed operators of the risk inherent in spiral development acquisition 
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programs.468  While the idea of developing systems in a series of stages (or spirals), integrating 
and installing them as they reach a certain level of capability has notional merit, it also creates an 
increased risk of failure or under-performance. The over-arching acquisition concept is labeled 
evolutionary acquisition.469  It is defined as an acquisition strategy that seeks to define, develop, 
produce or acquire, and field an initial hardware or software increment of operational capability 
with follow-on versions intended to provide increased levels of performance.470  In turn, with 
Spiral Development (SD), the final functionality cannot be defined at the beginning of the 
program. Each increment of capability is defined by the maturation of the technologies and 
supported with the evolving capability needs of the user and continuous user feedback.471  This 
was and is usually applied to software development and procurement for the DoD.472  But as 
mentioned earlier, more and more complex weapons systems are completely reliant on software 
to function properly.  So, even if the sensors, individual portions of the weapon, and the carrying 
frame or transport platform are built and function as designed separately, without the software to 
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"House Lawmakers Skeptical of DOD Acquisition Reforms." Aerospace Daily 201, No. 45 (2002): 4. Gansler, 
Jacques, and William Lucyshyn. "National Security Acquisition Challenges." Strategic Studies Quarterly 4, no. 4 
(2010): 13-31. Jesse Ellman. “The Role of Evolutionary Acquisition and Spiral Development in the Failure of the 
Army's Future Combat System.” Master’s thesis, Georgetown University, 2009. ProQuest Dissertations and Theses. 
Ryan Novak, Trevor Sthultz, Timothy Reed, and Christopher Wood. "Evolutionary Acquisition: An Analysis Of 
Defense Procurement And Recommendations For Expanded Use." Journal of Public Procurement 4, No. 2 (2004): 
238-67. 
469  See DoD Directive 5000.1, para 4.3.1 and DoD Instruction 5000.2, para 3.3, and USD(AT&L), “Evolutionary 
Acquisition and Spiral Development,” Memorandum, Washington, DC: April 12, 2002 for definitions and more 
clarification.  Of note, the most recent DoD Instruction “Operation of the Defense Acquisition System,” DoDI 
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470 USD(AT&L), “Evolutionary Acquisition and Spiral Development,” Memorandum, Washington, DC: 12 April 
2002 quoted in Manager's Guide to Technology Transition in an Evolutionary Acquisition Environment, DAU, Ft 
Belvoir, VA, June 2005, p.1-6. 
471 DAU, Manager’s Guide to Technology Transition, 1-7. 
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Evolutionary Acquisition but is retained in software development. Available online at:  
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integrate them into the ‘weapons system’ and to operate them, they are just so much high-tech 
ballast.  This is what LCS amounts to at this point; the transport system is functional and some of 
the mission modules are functional – sort of…. So, we have a platform with one mission module, 
the surface warfare one, somewhere past IOC but still lacking a key sub-system, the surface to 
surface missile.473  The other two major mission area modules, the mine-warfare and anti-
submarine warfare systems both remain in development. The spiral or parallel development of 
the mission modules, which have been delayed because of software, physical engineering 
challenges and funding issues caused by the Budget Control Act474, has resulted in what some 
have called a failed procurement program.  Whether this condemnation is appropriate or not, 
there has been an almost decade’s long interval between the commissioning of the first LCS and 
the first fielding of one semi-functioning mission module for surface warfare.475  This is, by any 
reasonable standard, an excessive lag-time between initial operating capacity and fully functional 
capability attainment for a weapons system. 
There is an argument to be made that the LCS procurement was actually not a spiral 
development but an Incremental Development approach.  This, in contrast to the SD approach, 
means that the final functionality can be defined at the beginning of the program, with the 
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content of each increment determined by the maturation of key technologies.476  The key 
technologies in the LCS case are the mission modules and the sub-systems making up these 
modules.  Even if this definition and program approach is true, it does not mitigate the fact that 
the bulk of the mission modules for LCS remain in the development stage of existence; the key 
technologies remain immature.  This while the 12th ship of the class completed her builder’s 
trials in May 2017 and the 14th ship of the class is slated for commissioning in the first or second 
quarter of calendar year 2018.477  This gap represents or should represent, a warning to the DoD 
acquisition professionals and to the service operators trying to get their hands on new weapons 
systems that again, the timelines for platforms, sensors, and weapons systems need to be 
carefully monitored and adjusted, especially when a new and innovative major weapons system 
is in the acquisition process. This is not meant to suggest that synchronizing the various systems 
and sub-systems of a major acquisition program, especially if some of them are brand new 
technologies being developed, is simple or easy.  However, the size and cost of major weapons 
systems and the accountability of the services to the civilian branches of government requires 
more accountability and visibility of the success, failure, and costs of the overall program. This 
makes it incumbent on the Department of Defense to manage as carefully as possible the costs 
versus the capabilities of new weapons systems.  
Cost increases in ships, aircraft, and other DoD systems are not independent of market 
forces. Increases in the market cost of steel or aluminum or crude oil directly causes increases in 
both weapons procurement and operating costs.  What DoD can control are changes in the 
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desired capabilities and thus what are consciously incurred cost increases vice the tyranny of the 
“invisible hand” or market price increases.  This writer is reminded of a potentially apocryphal 
account of a design change to the ARLEIGH BURKE class of guided missile destroyers during 
the final design or initial construction phase of the lead ship.  The class was reportedly designed 
with a standard mast standing vertically relative to the hull and waterline (see pics below) similar 
to the SPRUANCE class destroyers.  However, during the design or actual construction phase a 
decision was made  
 
Figure 17- USS SPRUANCE (DD 963) underway 1975. USN photo. 
 
by the Navy to build the class with a swept back and faceted mast as shown in the figure below. 





Figure 18- USS SHOUP (DDG 86), underway 2017. USN photo. 
The advantages of the design change were significant in terms of reduced radar cross-section and 
the ability of crew to access the antennas and equipment mounted on the mast using internal thus 
somewhat safer ladders.  However, the cost was, at least anecdotally, quite significant to change 
the design rather late in the procurement process.  The point to this example is that trading off 
cost increases for improved performance needs to be carefully and objectively done and some 
determination of the cost benefit of the change made before the contract and design are changed.  
The opportunity to label a change as part of adaptive acquisition or spiral development represents 
a risk of unintended cost increases that acquisition professionals and operators ought to monitor 
carefully. 
DESIGN VERSUS REALITY: THE ACQUISITION SYSTEM IN PRACTICE 
What this case study also reveals is that despite or maybe because of a plethora of 
governing instructions, manuals, legal and regulatory requirements acquisition programs may not 
proceed with in accordance with the proscribed and described processes.  As we saw in chapter 
two, there are literally thousands of pages of text describing how ‘things’ are to be procured by 




the U.S. government.  All of this direction does not seem to have resulted in a steady and 
predictable path for the LCS class of ships.  Whether this is a truism that can be applied to all 
major weapons systems procurement programs is not absolutely clearly indicated through this 
single study, but it can at least serve as a point of departure for further studies, especially 
comparative studies of other acquisition programs like the Joint Strike Fighter or the now-
cancelled Army’s Future Combat System.  Another program that could serve as a basis for 
further study is the current FORD-class aircraft carrier or the ARLEIGH BURKE guided missile 
destroyers.  The advantage in comparing and contrasting these programs with LCS is the semi-
unique nature of ship procurement which separates them from other acquisition programs.  The 
technological and engineering challenges when a service is looking to push the performance 
envelope need to be considered very carefully and the required capabilities defined very clearly 
before an MDAP/ACAT level I-III program is pushed into the formal acquisition pipeline.  Also, 
this close monitoring cannot be relaxed while the system is in the acquisition pipeline as noted in 
the preceding paragraph. The quest for better performance needs to be carefully weighed against 
the quest to control costs; or as the latest Defense Acquisition System instruction puts it: 
 “The Secretary concerned, in coordination with the Chief of the Military Service fielding 
the system, will balance resources against priorities and ensure appropriate trade-offs are made among 
cost, schedule, technical feasibility, and performance throughout the life of the program.”478 
 Despite careful attention to detail, program monitoring, or any potential defense acquisition 
reform effort the DoD remains bounded by the monopsonist nature of the market.  The distortions 
inherent on this market make it difficult and costly to adjust programs and designs to fit emergent 
requirements or changes in the nature of the threat.  Once the initial system design has been accepted and 
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the price to create and manufacture and potentially maintain the system has been agreed upon changes 
will necessitate some adjustment to the contracted price, cost, or performance parameters.  Statutory and 
proprietary issues generally prevent the transfer of contracts from one awardee to another excepting 
generally exceptional situations like bankruptcy or total failure to abide by the contract by the awarded 
firm.  There is always either stated or implied the right of the government to terminate a contract “at the 
convenience of the government” but there are significant costs in these sorts of contract terminations.  
Often the terminated firm protests within the acquisition system, sometimes the legal system, and often 
the congressional delegation from the terminated company’s state starts to ask a lot of questions of DoD.  
Also, contracting officers tend to be a cautious and conservative lot and are far more likely to work with 
the incumbent almost beyond the pale to make a program successful.  Finally, even if another firm is 
awarded the contract, they will obviously be behind the schedule compared to the former contract holder.  
All of this leads to a cramped market space with only a few competitors willing to provide the 
technological and manufacturing expertise that the government and DoD in particular need.  And there is 
no guarantee that any firm will be able to deliver a system with different capabilities from the initial 
design for the same budget and cost, quite the opposite.  
THE STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE OR “OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT” 
From the perspective of international relations and grand strategy, the LCS as a tool of 
grand strategy reflects the difficulty in predicting the challenges of the future, notably in terms of 
geography and in terms of the nature of the threat.  This is especially pertinent in view of the 
recent shift in American focus from potential regional challenges to near-peer competitors and 
the so-called Pacific Pivot or shift in focus to Asia.479  The LCS was designed for combat in the 
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littorals and most specifically for a set of missions to be executed in the Strait of Hormuz, the 
Arabian Gulf, and the North Arabian Sea.  There was some notional intent in the concept of 
operations for LCS that the South China Sea would also be a likely area of operations for the 
class, but the size of this area is significantly larger than the original regions envisioned in the 
design and earliest CONOPs development.  LCS is less suited to operations South China Sea and 
the class not necessarily intended for operations in the Sea of Japan, the Northern Pacific Ocean 
or the North Atlantic and Mediterranean Sea.  The shift in U.S. strategic focus has found the LCS 
concept and platform wanting, especially considering the lag in developing and deploying the 
mission packages.  In some ways this reminds one of the aphorism that the military is always 
“planning to fight the last war.”  While this has some applicability, it does not do justice to the 
transient nature of national interests which in turn drive state strategies. There are several case 
studies that we can examine that focus on the national or service prediction of the operational 
environment and the accuracy or variance of these predictions from the reality that developed. 
THE ROYAL NAVY AND PLANNING FOR THE MARITIME STRATEGIC 
ENVIRONMENT 
The nearest case-study that we might apply in comparison is that of the Royal Navy in 
the Twentieth Century.  In the early years of that century, the “Dreadnought Revolution” was 
actually just one part of what could be called the “Jackie Fisher Revolution” especially if applied 
in terms of the impact that Admiral John “Jackie” Fisher had on the Royal Navy from 1904-
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1910.480  Up to Admiral Fisher’s appointment as First Sea Lord, the uniformed head of the 
service in 1904, the Royal Navy was somewhat mired in the customers and traditions of the 
service epitomized by the historic victory at Trafalgar and the Age of Fighting Sail.  This is not 
to say the British ignored the technological changes from sail to steam that occurred between 
1805 and 1904 but the technologies were not adopted systematically nor were they welcomed 
with open arms by a reportedly conservative service.  Perhaps more dangerously, the service 
itself had not adapted operationally or culturally to the new demands placed on its leadership 
because of the increased speeds, longer gunnery ranges, and extended communications that were 
becoming the standards by 1900.  Fisher saw both the changes in technology but also the 
changing strategic situation.   
For almost two and a half centuries, France had been the main strategic threat facing the 
British Empire.  This situation was altered by the rise of the German Empire in the latter half of 
the 19th century and radically altered by the first in a series of German Navy Laws in 1898.  The 
growing threat of a modern and powerful surface fleet in the waters immediately adjacent to the 
British Isles became an issue that the Royal Navy could not safely ignore.  In an interesting 
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juxtaposition, the U.S. Navy saw a contrasting radical decline in the numbers and capabilities of 
its main competitor, the former Soviet Red Banner Fleets after 1989.  
Fisher’s reaction to the increased threat in home waters was twofold.  First, he scrapped a 
variety of older, less effective warships whose obsolescence made them useless in potential 
combat against the new Hochseeflotte.  Secondly, he significantly reduced the number of ships 
that the Royal Navy had formerly had scattered across the globe at various stations and instead 
concentrated the mass of the fleet in home waters or much nearer to the UK in the Mediterranean 
Fleet.  The reduction in hulls which freed up significant manpower and money allowed the 
British government to fund the construction of new dreadnought, battle cruisers, and later super-
dreadnought ships to match or overmatch the new Imperial German construction.  The 
concentration of ships enabled the Royal Navy to train for larger fleet operations and to retain 
new construction ships once commissioned as opposed to dispatching them to the various fleet 
stations around the empire.  The U.S. found itself again in somewhat the opposition situation 
where, to maintain presence world-wide and facing the changed nature of the threat, needed to 
disperse platforms to various numbered fleets around the globe.  However, like the British, the 
scrapping or decommissioning of ships had freed up personnel and maintenance resources to 
potentially devote to new construction.   The U.S. Navy suffers somewhat in comparison if we 
take the LCS as a proxy for adaption because it took over fifteen years from concept to 
execution.  In the case of the Dreadnought Revolution, it took the Royal Navy about four years 
from concept to execution, although the full shift from global presence to home waters 
concentration did take roughly a decade to execute and was still, at least in some ways, a work in 
progress when the First World War broke out in August 1914.  However, the bulk of the reaction 
to a changed operational environment was done in roughly six years.  And in a more specific 




comparison, the ship who gave her name to an entire generation of ship-types, HMS 
DREADNOUGHT was laid down, launched, and commissioned, as a complete and functional 
weapons system, in about 14 months. 
The second episode that offers some insight as a comparison is again focused on the 
Royal Navy, but it occurred after the First World War and is more akin to the U.S. case, was an 
issue of dispersion versus concentration.  The removal of the threat from Imperial Germany 
summarized with the scuttling of interned units of the Hochseeflotte in Scapa Flow in 1919 
removed the immediate threat to the British Isles.  However, the U.S. and Empire of Japan 
remained more or less comparable naval competitors and threats to the far-flung British Empire.  
The British were graced with several naval treaties, the most important the Washington Naval 
Treaty of 1922 through which most of the naval powers agreed to limit ship numbers, size and 
armament.481  The Royal Navy was required to scrap several older and new construction 
battleships as were some of the other signatories.  Though the threats may have been reduced the 
British naval commitments to defend the imperial territories were not.  The British governments 
of the 1920s and 1930s applied the Ten-Year Rule but also took advantage of the 
dreadnought/super-dreadnought building holiday.482  Instead the Royal Navy acquired cruisers 
displacing less than half of the larger super-dreadnoughts and costing probably less than half to 
build and certainly less to man and maintain.  The “Treaty Class” cruisers provided the presence 
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operations that the Royal Navy needed in the 1920s and 1930s.  These ships also provided 
valuable service in combat during the Second World War but the Royal Naval found itself short 
of smaller anti-submarine escorts and aircraft carriers.  These types of combatants were better 
suited for the specific high-intensity domains of warfare in the Second World War, namely ASW 
and air warfare.   
THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY AND SOVIET RED FLEET 
There are two potential counter-factual cases that present choices in naval systems that 
were actually well suited and effective in the strategic environment for which they were intended 
and in which they were employed.  The first of these was the case of the Imperial Japanese Navy 
between the wars.483  The Japanese were faced by two main competitors who were both likely to 
field numerically superior fleets regardless of how much Japan invested in her Navy, the U.S. 
and the Royal Navy. The IJN chose a strategy that focused on the U.S. primarily and intended to 
attrite the attacking force as it made its approach across the vast expanse of the Pacific towards 
the home islands. The weakened U.S. fleet would be engaged in a Trafalgar-like fleet action 
resulting in decisive results.484  The IJN designed its surface force to be the key ingredient in the 
climatic fleet action with the intent that each major unit, battleships and cruisers, would be 
individually a more effective fighting unit in comparison to the enemy ships.  This choice of 
quality over quantity was in some ways a mandatory one based on the limited physical and fiscal 
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resources that the imperial government could devote to the IJN.  More importantly though, it was 
a strategic and operational choice made consciously by the service and consistently adhered to 
until the actual outbreak of the war in the Pacific.   
The IJN did not formally abandon the strategy of attrition but it did find that the borders 
of the protective zone had been stretched well beyond the distances envisioned in the formulation 
of the strategy.  It also found that ad-hoc commitments of forces, as in the Solomon Islands 
campaign disrupted its ability to mass against the later U.S. advance in the central Pacific 
because of the attrition that the IJN suffered from in the struggle over Guadalcanal and the 
islands in the Solomons group.  Additionally, the alternate route of approach by forces under 
General MacArthur coming up the New Guinea and East Indies path created split-threat axes 
which the IJN would not have had sufficient resources to resist even without the grinding losses 
in the Southwest Pacific or from the Battle of Midway.  One other capability gap had a 
significant impact on both IJN and the overall Japanese effort to resist the allied advance; the 
Japanese industrial base was too small to both maintain production of current systems and 
develop, field, and produce in significant numbers new weapons.  For example, the “Zero” 
fighter totally outclassed the allied fighters it faced in 1941-1942 but starting in late 1942 both 
improved tactics but more importantly better Allied aircraft (both fighters and bombers) 
significantly reduced the effectiveness of the Zero.485  Japan did field new fighters with better 
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protection (a specific weakness of the Zero) and other aircraft over the course of the Pacific 
campaign but never in large numbers.  The IJN surface force continued to be an efficient and 
effective force but the open ocean carrier battles that followed the Solomons campaign were not 
the correct operational environment for surface engagements.  The IJN had a fleet that was well 
suited for the operational environment for which it was intended.  However, as the operational 
environment evolved, and the enemy got his vote, this tactical and technological edge was 
ground down and ultimately lost.  This highlights the fact that operational environments can be 
envisioned, and systems designed to perform well in them.  However, it also highlights the 
transitory nature of the operational environments and the importance of adaption and the ability 
to evolve for weapons systems after a conflict has begun.  
The other case study that may apply is that of the Soviet Navy during the Cold War.  The 
various Red Banner Fleets were intended to choke the NATO countries in Western Europe by re-
fighting, successfully this time, the submarine campaigns of the two world wars in the North 
Atlantic and Western Approaches.  The platforms that the Soviet Union designed and fielded in 
the 1950s through the 1980s were well suited to execute this intended strategy in the envisioned 
operational environment.  The surface fleet was designed quite intentionally to support the 
submarine fleet through attacking and reducing NATO’s anti-submarine escorts. The expansion 
of the Soviet fleet in the 1960s and 1970s was designed to negate or at least reduce the threat 
from U.S. carrier-borne aviation to protect surface units so that they could, in turn support the 
submarine force attacking Atlantic re-supply convoys.  If one examines the design of the 
MOSKVA class helicopter cruisers, the number of surface-to-air missile launchers and anti-
aircraft guns indicates the threat posed by NATO aircraft to Soviet surface ships and their design 
to defend against this threat.  Another telling design feature was found on the Modified KASHIN 




class destroyers and earlier classes of Soviet destroyers, where the surface to surface missiles 
were mounted to be launched from aft section of the ship.  This was purportedly so that they 
would be facing away and steaming away from the aircraft carriers which were their primary 
targets while launching their surface-to-surface missiles.486  In addition to this, all Soviet surface 
combatants mounted some type of air-to-air defense, mostly missiles but sometime guns, 
regardless of how small the ships were; this speaks directly to the threat that the Soviet Navy 
considered naval aviation to be.  It also reflects Soviet efforts to design their ships to be effective 
and survivable in the operational environment that they thought would obtain in the North 
Atlantic in a war with NATO.  The Soviet naval strategy was overtaken by economic events 
much as the RN and IJN suffered but resulting from the relatively peaceful implosion of the 
Soviet Union in 1989-1991 versus major global conflicts.  Funding dried up and the ships, 
submarines, and aircraft of the former Red Banner Fleets were laid up, sold, or scrapped.  Soviet 
designs however had been well suited to perform and potentially survive in the operational 
environment that the Soviet (and NATO) high command expected in a conflict during the Cold 
War.  This is admittedly a hypothetical assessment because unlike the observed performance of 
the IJN systems in 1941-1943, there was no actual combat period from which we could assess 
the actual effectiveness of the Soviet naval systems. In contrast to the Royal Navy cases, these 
two examples show that operational environments can be predicted with some level of accuracy, 
but they reinforce the idea of the transitory nature of the operational environment.  Even if a state 
designs its weapons and strategy to succeed in a predicted strategic landscape the landscape will 
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change because as mentioned earlier the enemy gets a vote or competitor states act and react to 
moves by others.   
The Royal Navy and the British governments before both World Wars were not poorly 
served by the tools of grand strategy that they thought met their strategic needs but these 
platforms, dreadnoughts and cruisers respectively, were not ideal for the threats that developed 
during the wars, submarines and later aircraft and submarines. These weapons platforms were 
not new but the improvements in performance, range, and weapons between 1918 and 1939 
created a new level of threat from both aircraft and submarines.  The ships that the British had on 
hand fulfilled their missions and were adaptable enough to provide some of the required mission 
capabilities but the operational environment that successive governments and the RN had 
predicated their planning on, besides even the notorious Ten-Year Rule and the various dis-
armament conferences was not exactly as they had foreseen.  Neither of the wars against 
Germany and her partners was unforeseen, though the first was maybe a bit more overt in its 
nascence but the ferocity and longevity of the both struggles took British political and naval 
leadership by surprise. The nature of these wars and the technological development that was 
applied by both sides caused significant and somewhat unexpected losses among RN warships.  
The emergence of the submarine and the mine as effective weapons in 1914, again while not 
unexpected, created additional threats to the British battle-line.  In 1939, the aircraft was added 
to this threat matrix and in both historical cases, the RN’s major ship type suffered significant 
losses that might not have occurred if the environment for which they had been designed did not 
morph into a much deadlier one. This is the true key issue of these case studies and the 
application to LCS, predictions, even very good ones, of future strategic landscapes may miss 
intricacies or complexities that make the chosen tools of grand strategy less effective or increase 




the cost of using them in ways or under conditions for which they were not designed.  Alongside 
this is that weapons development and tactics are never stationary, to use a favorite military 
aphorism that seems oft forgotten, “The enemy gets a vote.” Threats will increase and change as 
combat occurs and as operators gain more experience. The missiles, torpedoes, mines, and 
ordnance that the LCS is designed to confront are likely to be either more effective or supplanted 
by some other, unexpected weapon.  
The preceding paragraph is a bit of a statement of the obvious but the point that the tools 
of grand strategy are designed for a future that is at best estimated and at worst flat-out not 
considered. The reality will likely only bear a passing resemblance to the estimate whether it is 
done by the U.S. DoD or a science fiction author. The point is not so much to reiterate “We 
cannot know the future” but to state that the defense equipment purchased today may or may not 
be as successful as intended because conditions change. These changes can be tactical as pointed 
out in the preceding chapters or they could be truly strategic as for example the shift in British 
strategic focus from the French as the most likely enemy to the German Empire. 
WHAT CAN BE DONE? 
 First and foremost, military and political planners need to realize that the operational 
environment, military, political, meteorological, etc. is by its very nature, transitory.  The facts 
that obtain today may or may not do so tomorrow.  In the military, the planning term used to 
describe how planners deal with this is “branches and sequels.” The main plain has branch plans 
that are activated if a certain set of conditions applies or if and as conditions changes.  Sequels 
are follow-on to branches and are used if the conditions remain stable.  If not, one revisits the 
branches to select a more appropriate and hopefully effective model.  From a weapons systems 




perspective, designing in ‘room’ for upgrades whether mechanical or electronic is one way to 
address changes in threat systems or mission requirements. 
 In point of fact, the basic concept that LCS was designed to embody is another path to 
mitigate changes in the operational environment.  Developing platforms that can be reconfigured 
to conduct a range of missions, with varying suites of weapons and sensors installed and 
swapped to fit the mission is another conceptually sound method of risk mitigation.  It is 
however, as noted earlier dependent on the availability of functioning mission packages.  There 
are other drawbacks to this approach as well.  The time required to change mission modules and 
the geographic location of those modules and a facility in which the equipment can be off- and 
on-loaded represents a risk to quick execution. It may take longer to remove, install, and align 
new modules or take longer to get required modules to the ship’s location than expected.  
Understanding these temporal and physical risks allow planners and operators to adjust 
scheduling and operations accordingly but the so-called ‘tyranny of distance’ remains a 
challenge for naval planners despite the U.S. Navy persistent forward presence globally. 
 Another option in contrast to a platform capable of performing multiple missions one at a 
time is the concept of fielding truly multi-mission platforms.  As noted earlier, this had been the 
U.S. naval tradition for many years, at least since the beginning of the First World War.  Ships 
were generally designed and equipped to carry out missions in several different areas, notably 
destroyers and frigates, the nearest analogs to the LCS.  These ships were generally optimized 
for one mission, ASW but they were designed to have some capacity to perform surface and anti-
air warfare to survive in the operational environment. It seems that the latest intended Navy ship 
acquisition program the frigate program (RFI: FFG(X) - US Navy Guided Missile Frigate 




Replacement Program487) will return to this design paradigm.  Having a ship equipped with 
various systems capable of performing different warfare missions makes it more effective 
potentially per unit but as we noted earlier, it also exponentially increases the per-unit cost.  This 
is a solution to the risk, but the fiscal climate and available resources do not make this an optimal 
choice. 
 From the political perspective, managing conflict by adjusting the timing of conflicts and 
working to control the sequencing is another potential method for mitigating risk in the 
operational environment.  While not always possible this at least offers some buffer for military 
forces if required to move to the threatened area or theater, often called “posturing” in DoD 
parlance.  This returns us to the concept of grand strategy and utilizing all of the tools of national 
power, here in general the diplomatic skills and resources of the government.  This may also 
serve to highlight the importance of diplomacy to both military and political leadership to gain 
time for a proper and proportional response in the military sphere if required.  This potential 
solution is much more reliant on national level resources that may or may not be available or 
effective. It also pre-supposes that the diplomats can have some influence on the outbreak of 
hostilities.  
 Another possible method of adjusting to change in the operational environment is to take 
advantage of it by adjusting one’s operational approach or TTP.  Things as basic as changing the 
geometry of physical approach to the scene of combat, hiding behind weather fronts, using 
alternate weapons or sensors or different platforms to execute missions form some examples of 
adapting or leveraging change in the operational environment.  This is in many ways an echo or a 
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parallel to the idea of asymmetric warfare.488  While asymmetric warfare has been more broadly 
applied to terrorism and insurgency in the recent past for obvious reasons, it still has application 
to more conventional, force-on-force military engagements.  Many experts consider the Iranian 
military to have developed an asymmetric approach to deterring and potentially fighting the U.S. 
Navy in the Persian Gulf.  Specifically, the Iranian armed forces have developed numerous 
small, high-speed boats, backed by anti-ship cruise missiles, submarines, and mines to threaten 
the U.S. Navy in areas where it lacks the weapons, tactics, or the operational space and time to 
effectively counter the threat.489 In turn, the U.S. can adopt asymmetric tactics and operational 
maneuver to adapt to changes in the operational environment, whether more accurate hostile 
weapons, expanded threat sensor coverages, or changing alliance members to cite just a few 
examples.  The other option that has recently raised cries of alarm from DoD leadership because 
of the threat to U.S. systems is the idea of cyber-attack.490  The challenge here is that it 
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presupposes that hostile systems are as reliant on software to operate as U.S. and allied weapons, 
sensors and communications systems.  The DoD’s joint doctrine system cautions against 
assuming away an enemy strength and by extension one ought not assume away an enemy 
vulnerability.  Based on this, cyber-warfare, attacking the software and computers that enable the 
command and control of weapons systems offers another possibility of mitigating or addressing 
change in the operational environment.  This potential adaption policy is however potentially 
more susceptible to the transitory nature of the environment as it is very likely that a hostile force 
will notice when its radars do not detect aircraft or when missiles fail to explode.  But again, 
warfare is often about moves, counter-moves, counter-counter-moves and so on; it represents an 
opportunity to address the shifting landscape of the operational environment however fleeting the 
opportunity may be. 
 One final approach to adapting to a changing battlespace to use the term in vogue 
previous to operational environment,491 the DoD has pursued what were called non-material or 
non-technological solutions.  These were included in the rather bulky term DOTMLPF-P492 or 
Doctrine, Organization, Training, materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel, Facilities, and 
Policy.  In the late 1990s and through the early 2000s, the emphasis, at least in the DoD and 
former-Joint Forces Command was on the doctrine and training headings of this term.  The Army 
focused to an extent on the Leadership piece as they began investigating and working on what 
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was called mission-type orders, telling subordinates what needed to be done but not how to do it.  
All of the services and the National Defense University looked at the joint professional military 
education at the various staff and war colleges to investigate potential non-material solutions to 
waging war and peace.  While material remained one of the terms this was supposed to be 
focused on non-acquisition things that could be purchased commercially and either weaponized 
or adapted to military requirements often called ‘Commercial-off-the-Shelf’ (COTS).  Utilizing 
this analytical framework to look for efficiencies so to speak could offer some ways of dealing 
with changes in the operational environment.  The areas that this author would highlight for the 
best possibilities are Training and Leadership and education.  Any weapons system is only as 
good as the people that employ and operate it.  Teaching operators, leaders, and followers that 
“the enemy gets a vote” and “No plan survives first contact with the enemy” could potentially 
provide a buffer against human surprise as the battlespace changes.  While these pithy phrases 
seem just another set of buzz-words or phrase so adored by the U.S. DoD, there are some deep-
seated lessons to be learned from them and developing officers and men who are flexible and 
adaptable would go a long way to making the instability of the operational environment less of a 
threat and more of an opportunity. 
In an attempt to answer a perennial question, “What is the optimal match between a 
weapons system and the operational environment?” there are three main attributes of a weapons 
system to address.  First the system ought to be flexible enough to perform under the predicted 
conditions of the expected operational environment while retaining sufficient performance to 
operate in an expanded or changed operational environment.  This could be a reserve of speed, 
extra range, or back-up computers to name a few that with changes in weather, target range, and 
counter-measures still enable the system to find, fix, and kill the enemy.  The second attribute 




that a weapons system requires is the ability to adapt to the changing operational environment.  
This equates to sufficient volume, mass, control systems, and overall design features that enable 
upgrades when changes in the operational environment are so significant that the systems 
flexibility just will not achieve the intended and desired effect upon the enemy.  The final 
attribute that would mark the optimal match between a weapons system and the operational 
environment is dependability.  This means that regardless of weather, enemy actions, counter-
moves, the weapons system works as advertised.  The challenge is getting all of these 
characteristics into a weapons system with a definite budget and delivery schedule.  Real world 
threats, dead-lines, and fiscal resources force weapons system designers, operators, and 
acquisition professionals to accept some lesser combination of flexibility, adaptability, and 
reliability.   
 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR MODELS REVISITED  
One another level, this case study could serve as a very strong example of government or 
state actions as the output of processes.  The transition of LCS from the initial concept of a series 
of cheap but fast networked platforms operating in concert with one another and other maritime 
assets to the current platform and mission module configuration could shed light on how the 
process morphs ideas based on both internal and external variables.  The internal variables are 
rather clear from the Navy perspective, most notably the rejection of commercial material 
specifications for the ships and the adoption of modified Navy material standards for firefighting 
and damage control.  The other variable addressed in the preceding paragraphs highlights an 
external variable, the perceived change in the strategic environment that impacted the current 
acquisition.  This recent shift to a more traditional geo-strategic or geo-political challenge from 




near-peer competitors has had significant impact on the DoD and on the Navy’s acquisition 
execution and planning.  This has directly impacted the Navy’s LCS acquisition program and 
contributed to the decision to curtail the entire LCS procurement and replace it with a frigate 
acquisition program.493  The previous historical case studies highlight another potentially 
interesting path for future research, examining weapons acquisition programs in light of 
changing strategic perspectives. How does a perceived shift in the nature or the scope of threat a 
state thinks it is facing impact the weapons that it acquires and what significance does this have 
for political and military leaders? Or in some ways more topical, framed in terms of the defense 
market, what impact(s) do changes in the strategic landscape have on commercial defense firms? 
Has the nature and speed of technological development changed the very nature of change in the 
international system?  
From the acquisition perspective one interesting question that this program raises is 
whether or not there is a “point of no return” where the investment in the procurement and 
expected return on investment outweighed or began to outweigh the institutional incentive to 
abandon a program? Despite collecting a large amount of data there is again no smoking gun that 
provides a specific and definitive answer to this question.  We can hypothesize that the point of 
no return in this case was when the Navy decided that the follow-on sea frame acquisition should 
be cancelled and re-issued.  The Navy could have abandoned the whole program at this point but 
                                                     
493 Megan Eckstein, “Stackley: More Capable Frigate Requires Full and Open Competition, But LCS Builders May 
Have Cost Advantage.” USNI, 12 May 2017. Available online at: https://news.usni.org/2017/05/12/stackley-
capable-frigate-requires-full-open-competition-lcs-builders-may-cost-advantage. Accessed 28 June 2018. Sydney J. 
Freedberg, Jr., “Beyond LCS: Navy Looks To Foreign Frigates, National Security Cutter.” Breaking Defense, 11 
May 2017. Available on line at: http://breakingdefense.com/2017/05/beyond-lcs-navy-looks-to-foreign-frigates-
national-security-cutter/. Accessed 28 June 2017. Bill Riales,”Austal Looks at LCS Redesign for Frigate,” WKRG, 
18 May 2017. Available online at: http://wkrg.com/2017/05/18/austal-looks-at-lcs-redesign-for-frigate/. Accessed 28 
June 2018. Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “LCS: HASC Seapower Chair Praises Frigate Delay.” Breaking Defense, 4 
May 2017. Available online at: http://breakingdefense.com/2017/05/lcs-seapower-chairman-praises-frigate-
delay/?_ga=2.197073772.1538672250.1493964904-671527529.1483508113.  Accessed 29 June 2017. 




instead chose to re-address the intended long-term production plan and in the short-term, re-
program some of the money to other acquisition programs.  Unfortunately, there is no evidence 
besides the new RFQ for production from both Austal and Marinette issued by the Navy to 
indicate that this really was a point of no return for the program.  The evidence in the form of 
budgetary and capabilities memoranda, meeting minutes, point papers, and PowerPoint briefs 
from within OPNAV itself and between OPNAV and the other Navy stakeholders are not 
currently available.  This is definitely an opportunity for further study by both acquisition 
professionals and naval historians to see if there is a discernable point in the Navy’s LCS 
acquisition where there was no turning back. 
SUMMARY 
 To steal an oft-quoted phrase attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte, “Ask me for anything but 
time.” This is extremely apropos for this study because we have seen how the time difference 
between fielding a ship and fielding the systems required for that ship has contributed to a gap in 
mission capabilities for the LCS.  We have also seen how the transitory nature of the strategic 
landscape impacts even the ‘correct’ weapons procurement plans of military services and states.  
The impact of Evolutionary Acquisition and spiral development has contributed to the disjoint 
between the launching of the sea-frames and the installation of the intended weapons and sensor 
systems. In turn, this time-lag has definitely reinforced the perception of the LCS as a failed 
acquisition program and a less-than stellar addition to the Navy’s surface force.  The selection of 
this tool of grand strategy and its focus on mission capabilities in one geographic area has 
revealed a level of risk based on the evolving nature of the operational environment, especially 
when we look at just how quickly this environment changes once ‘battle is joined’ and the 
contestants begin struggling to dominate a battle space. As General André Beaufré put it: 




“These unquestionably complex problems [national security] have a double nature; on the one 
hand they are current and require each day practical decisions of considerable moment; on the 
other hand, they are related to hypothetical future situations.” 494 
There are also a couple of interesting questions regarding the design compared to the reality of 
procurement and the determination of a cancellation point for a major acquisition program – “Is 
it too Big to fail?”  None of these revelations are exactly earth-shattering but they are interesting 
and do represent topics of interest for students of acquisition and international relations to 
potentially investigate further.   
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APPENDIX A  
 
THE INTERVIEW PROCESS 
 
Interviewing Process 
 The researcher applied Snowball sampling, requesting that interview subjects identify 
other likely subjects to interview. The proposal for conducting research using human subjects 
was reviewed and approved according to the ODU Procedures for Review of Human Subjects 
Research. After the ODU Arts & Letters Human Subjects Review Committee reviewed and 
approved (#95026201) my interview intent and process, I used or leveraged people I had served 
with in the Navy, the Navy Reserve or worked with as a contractor since 1989.  The initial 
question was addressed to a former ship-mate who was still working for the Navy and he pointed 
me towards several folks who had potentially been involved in the LCS procurement and 
continuing fleet introduction program.  I then contacted subjects using e-mail, telephone and 
Linked-In© to ask if they had experience in the LCS procurement and were willing to talk with 
me about it.  I also used personal contacts, Linked-In© and google to locate contact information 
for Admirals Mike Mullen and Gary Roughead and several former Commanders, Naval Surface 
Forces to ask them if they would be willing to be research subjects.  I was not however able to 
identify anyone in the contracting organization that would be willing or able to discuss LCS 
because of legal, proprietary, and contractual issues. 
 Those subjects who were willing and able to discuss the procurement received a copy of 
the survey sheet and a physical or phone interview meeting was scheduled.  The meetings were 
done one on one with only the researcher and the interviewee in the room or on the phone.  Once 




the survey questions were addressed, the discussion shifted to a more general question and 
answer session about the LCS.  After the interview, I typed up a set of notes and observations 
and provided these to the interviewee for review and correction as desired.  Once a final set of 
notes was complete, the researcher used these as reference material for writing the dissertation. 
  




APPENDIX B  
 




 The following questionnaire is presented as part of academic research into the U.S. 
Department of Defense/Department of the Navy (DoD/DON) acquisition procurement system, 
focusing on a case study on the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).  The study will examine the balance 
in procurement decisions between organizational behavior models based on Allison and 
Zelikow’s 1991 edition of the book The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile 
Crisis and the observed, recorded or perceived role of individuals in the on-going procurement 
program for the LCS class for the U.S. Navy.  The specific intent of the questionnaires and 
interviews is to collect anecdotal and contemporaneous data concerning how organizations and 
individuals and which specific organizations and individuals have been involved in LCS 
procurement decisions. 
 The specific intent of the questionnaires is to leverage the respondents’ knowledge of and 
expertise in the LCS acquisition program to identify key organizations and/or individuals who 
may have had significant influence on the program at any stage.  The focus is not to identify 
“good” or “bad” roles in this specific procurement but to identify key stakeholders and how they 
interact within the DoD and DON’s acquisition program structure.  The underlying research goal 
is to compare the influence of organizations with the influence of individuals and then to 
compare this influence with the more generally accepted theoretical models of organizational 
behavior used by Allison and Zellikow in Essence of Decision.  The deeper goal is to potentially 
provide some insight to the services and to the acquisition community about how the acquisition 
process works, how generic organizations and generic individuals with the acquisition 
community and services may interact, and to identify potential recommendations for adjusting 
the DoD/DON acquisition process.  
 Your participation as a respondent is completely voluntary, you may withdraw from 
participation at any time, and all of your answers will be kept strictly confidential.  If any 
information or observations that you provide are cited in the resulting dissertation, you will not 
be identified by name, rank, or specific billet.  A set of generic titles, e.g. senior defense official, 
naval officer, government contractor, etc. will be used along with the time and date of the 
interview or correspondence when the information was provided.  Please note that while every 
effort will be made to protect your specific identity and those of the individuals to whom you 
refer and who were or are acquisition process participants, there is some risk that readers may be 




able to identify both your identity as a respondent and the identities of the individuals referred to 
in the interview. 
 If you are willing to participate, the following set of questions serve to set the framework 
within which a phone or face to face interview would take place.  The interview is intended to 
take no more than 45 minutes of your time at your convenience.  It is also not intended to be 
merely a recitation of the questions below but to present you the opportunity, as a Subject Matter 
Expert (SME) to discuss the acquisition program and process for the Navy’s newest combatant 
class.  Again, your participation is completely voluntary, you may withdraw from participation at 
any time, and your time and attention are greatly appreciated.  
 
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Procurement Questionnaire 
1) How were or are you involved in LCS procurement? 
a) Specific billets? 
b) In what organizations (NAVSEA, OPNAV, PEO, etc.)? 
2) What are or were some of the key Navy organizations involved in the initial decision to 
procure LCS? 
a) What are or were some of the key Navy organizations involved in the decision(s) to procure 
Mission Packages (modularity)? 
b) What were the Navy organizations involved in these decisions? 
c) What other procurement decisions, either major program or major system, have been made 
over the course of the program esp. since IOC and deployment to the fleet? 
d) How has the IOC and first deployment(s) of LCS impacted procurement?   
3) Were there some stakeholders -meaning organizations - that you perceived to have greater 
impact on design and/or procurement decisions? 
a) Were there specific people – pls identify by using a generic title or job description or rank/rate 
& pseudonym i.e. LCDR “Jones” or CAPT “Smith” – whom you perceived to have had a greater 
impact on design and/or the procurement process compared with other individuals or to 
organizations? 
b) What is the balance between organizational inputs and inputs from specific people? 
c) Where does the balance change through the procurement process? 




4) How closely did or has LCS procurement follow the notional procurement process - from 
requirement definition through source selection to award? 
a) How did the number of competitors impact the process? 
b) How did the Navy's actions impact the process? 
5) Who else should I or could I talk to IOT gain some insight and get other perspectives on the 
questions above? 
6) If you could ‘fix’ the process – what are three critical things to change? 
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